{"id":68366,"date":"2007-01-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-01-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/04\/surge-mode-demploi\/"},"modified":"2007-01-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-01-04T00:00:00","slug":"surge-mode-demploi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/04\/surge-mode-demploi\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cSurge<\/em>\u201d : mode d’emploi"},"content":{"rendered":"

GW Bush continue \u00e0 se pr\u00e9parer pour annoncer sa nouvelle strat\u00e9gie en Irak, et les sp\u00e9culations continuent bon train concernant ce qu’on annonce comme un renforcement des forces US en Irak. C’est la fameuse id\u00e9e popularis\u00e9e par le mot<\/a> surge<\/em> : 15.000-20.000, ou 20.000-30.000 hommes de plus, pour renforcer le contingent US en Irak et, pense-t-on, stabiliser la situation par une action d\u00e9cisive. Dans tous les cas, voil\u00e0 la th\u00e9orie, qui est soumise pour \u00eatre contredite au champ infini des erreurs courantes, des lenteurs d’organisation, des contradictions politiciennes \u00e0 Washington, des fausses perceptions et des incompr\u00e9hensions am\u00e9ricanistes sans nombre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe surge<\/em> des forces US a donc tout pour aboutir \u00e0 de nouvelles complications plut\u00f4t qu’\u00e0 une soudaine am\u00e9lioration de la situation. En attendant, il est int\u00e9ressant de noter les sp\u00e9culations qui sont propos\u00e9es concernant la possible destination op\u00e9rationnelle pr\u00e9cise de ce renforcement. Cela aussi, c’est une indication.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans The Independent<\/em> d’aujourd’hui<\/a>, Alexander Cockburn renforce une hypoth\u00e8se, qui s’appuie par ailleurs sur diverses sp\u00e9culations dans le m\u00eame sens : le renforcement US servirait \u00e0 attaquer l’arm\u00e9e du radical chiite Sadr. Cockburn n’est pas optimiste, bien entendu. Pour lui, une telle initiative a toutes les chances d’aggraver encore la situation, bien entendu (bis), peut-\u00eatre d’une mani\u00e8re d\u00e9cisive. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe so-called surge in US troop levels by 20,000 to 30,000 men on top of the 145,000 soldiers already in the country is unlikely to produce many dividends. It seems primarily designed so that President George Bush does not have to admit defeat or take hard choices about talking to Iran and Syria. But these reinforcements might tempt the US to assault the Mehdi Army.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSomehow many senior US officials have convinced themselves that it is Mr Sadr, revered by millions of Shia, who is the obstacle to a moderate Iraqi government. In fact his legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Shia Iraqis, the great majority of the population, is far greater than the moderate politicians whom the US has in its pocket and who seldom venture out of the Green Zone. Mr Sadr is a supporter of Mr Maliki, whose relations with Washington are ambivalent.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAn attack on the Shia militia men of the Mehdi Army could finally lead to the collapse of Iraq into total anarchy. Saddam must already be laughing in his grave.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 4 janvier 2007 \u00e0 06H23<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

GW Bush continue \u00e0 se pr\u00e9parer pour annoncer sa nouvelle strat\u00e9gie en Irak, et les sp\u00e9culations continuent bon train concernant ce qu’on annonce comme un renforcement des forces US en Irak. C’est la fameuse id\u00e9e popularis\u00e9e par le mot surge : 15.000-20.000, ou 20.000-30.000 hommes de plus, pour renforcer le contingent US en Irak et,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5642,4408,6263],"class_list":["post-68366","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chiites","tag-sadr","tag-surge"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68366","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68366"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68366\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68366"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68366"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68366"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}