{"id":68374,"date":"2007-01-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-01-05T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/05\/rule-the-waves-la-royal-navy-sombre-coulee-par-les-special-relationships\/"},"modified":"2007-01-05T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-01-05T00:00:00","slug":"rule-the-waves-la-royal-navy-sombre-coulee-par-les-special-relationships","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/05\/rule-the-waves-la-royal-navy-sombre-coulee-par-les-special-relationships\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201c<em>Rule the Waves<\/em>\u201d? \u2026 La Royal Navy sombre, coul\u00e9e par les <em>special relationships<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 dans la presse britannique, selon des sources proches du MoD britannique, que la Royal Navy pourrait voir ses effectifs r\u00e9duits de moiti\u00e9. (On attend une d\u00e9cision pour le mois prochain.) Cette \u00e9norme r\u00e9duction d\u00e9truit les capacit\u00e9s britanniques de haute mer pour les r\u00e9duire \u00e0 celles d&rsquo;une marine de guerre c\u00f4ti\u00e8re. La perspective doit \u00eatre plac\u00e9e dans la logique d&rsquo;une crise sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent de la puissance militaire britannique, essentiellement due \u00e0 la folle politique militaire et interventionniste de Tony Blair.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe <em>Daily Telegraph<\/em>, qui publie un article <a href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/main.jhtml;jsessionid=ATMPE1CNVJCCDQFIQMGSFGGAVCBQWIV0?xml=\/news\/2007\/01\/05\/navy05.xml\" class=\"gen\">aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a> sur cette crise, cite Steve Bush, r\u00e9dacteur en chef de <em>Warship World<\/em>. Bush observe que le MoD est en faillite avec les guerres en Irak et en Afghanistan : \u00ab<em>After 10 years of Labour government, the Royal Navy is on its knees without immediate and proper funding. I cannot see how it can recover   especially if Mr Brown becomes the next prime minister.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe qu&rsquo;il faut pr\u00e9ciser, \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 de la justesse de ces attaques contre les travaillistes, est qu&rsquo;on voit mal ce qu&rsquo;auraient fait de mieux les conservateurs puisque la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration des forces britanniques vient directement d&rsquo;un engagement ext\u00e9rieur maximal li\u00e9 aux <em>special relationships<\/em>, auxquelles les conservateurs sont compl\u00e8tement li\u00e9s. Rarement a-t-il \u00e9t\u00e9 autant d\u00e9montr\u00e9 que ces relations avec les USA brisent les capacit\u00e9s militaires, l&rsquo;autonomie et la souverainet\u00e9 des nations,  la britannique en premier.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNotons quelques points, alors que la nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9rale fait \u00e9tat de la possibilit\u00e9\/probabilit\u00e9 du retrait de pr\u00e8s de la moiti\u00e9 des 44 navires de haute mer de la Royal Navy, pour les d\u00e9sarmer ou les vendre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t   \u00ab<em>The Government has admitted that 13 unnamed warships are in a state of reduced readiness, putting them around 18 months away from active service. Today The Daily Telegraph can name a further six destroyers and frigates that are being proposed for cuts.<\/em>\u00bb  Pour l&rsquo;avenir : \u00ab<em>Two of eight advanced air defence Type 45 destroyers on the Navy&rsquo;s order books will not be bought, defence sources said. The order is already six months behind schedule and \u00a3157 million over budget.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t   Il est probable que la Royal Navy devra r\u00e9duire, voire abandonner sa grande mission de projection de force. D&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, le nouveau sch\u00e9ma possible de la Royal Navy impliquerait que cette force navale ne sera plus capable de lancer une exp\u00e9dition navale comme celle qui lui permit de reprendre les Malouines en 1982.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  \u00ab<em>A senior officer, currently serving with the Fleet in Portsmouth, said: What this means is that we are now no better than a coastal defence force or a fleet of dug-out canoes. The Dutch now have a better navy than us.<\/em>\u00bb Le <em>Daily Telegraph<\/em> observe avec d\u00e9pit : \u00ab<em>Meanwhile the French navy, which will be far superior to the Royal Navy after the cuts, will announce before the April presidential elections that a new carrier will be built.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t   Les m\u00eames sources cit\u00e9es laissent craindre la possibilit\u00e9 que les deux nouveaux porte-avions promis en 1998 \u00e0 la Royal Navy pourraient \u00eatre abandonn\u00e9s. Une telle possibilit\u00e9 soul\u00e8ve un autre probl\u00e8me : celui de la commande de 150 (r\u00e9duite \u00e0 132) JSF am\u00e9ricains \u00e0 d\u00e9collage\/atterrissage vertical\/court embarqu\u00e9s. Que reste-t-il de la coh\u00e9rence de cette commande si les nouveaux PA disparaissent? Dans un tel contexte de crise, quel sens a l&rsquo;achat de 132 avions de combat soi-disant super-sophistiqu\u00e9s et, dans tous les cas, avec le prix de cette sophistication (les Britanniques estiment le JSF \u00e0 $104-$115 millions l&rsquo;exemplaire)? Une autre g\u00e2terie des <em>special relationships<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 5 janvier 2007 \u00e0 15H26<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 dans la presse britannique, selon des sources proches du MoD britannique, que la Royal Navy pourrait voir ses effectifs r\u00e9duits de moiti\u00e9. (On attend une d\u00e9cision pour le mois prochain.) Cette \u00e9norme r\u00e9duction d\u00e9truit les capacit\u00e9s britanniques de haute mer pour les r\u00e9duire \u00e0 celles d&rsquo;une marine de guerre c\u00f4ti\u00e8re. La&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6295,6294,250,3319,3704,3345,4214,6292,3344,3050,6293],"class_list":["post-68374","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-banqueroute","tag-flotte","tag-jsf","tag-navy","tag-porte-avions","tag-relationships","tag-royal","tag-rule","tag-special","tag-the","tag-waves"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68374","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68374"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68374\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68374"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68374"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68374"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}