{"id":68399,"date":"2007-01-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-01-11T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/11\/washington-va-t-il-devenir-epique\/"},"modified":"2007-01-11T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-01-11T00:00:00","slug":"washington-va-t-il-devenir-epique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/11\/washington-va-t-il-devenir-epique\/","title":{"rendered":"Washington va-t-il devenir \u00e9pique?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Washington va-t-il devenir \u00e9pique?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t11 janvier 2007 Soudain le ton est dramatique, ou lyrique c’est selon. Une fois prononc\u00e9, alors qu’il n’a rien dit de nouveau que le pire annonc\u00e9, le discours de GW<\/a> se d\u00e9charge de toute sa force dramatique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est ainsi qu’on peut lire dans le New York Times<\/em> de ce jour<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abBy stepping up the American military presence in Iraq, President Bush is not only inviting an epic clash with the Democrats who run Capitol Hill. He is ignoring the results of the November elections, rejecting the central thrust of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group and flouting the advice of some of his own generals, as well as Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbMr. Bush long ago staked his presidency on Iraq, and to the extent he can salvage the war he can also salvage the remaining two years of his administration. So he is taking a risk, challenging not only the Democratic leadership in Congress but also some members of his own party, who are openly skeptical that the new policy will work and who, unlike the president, will be running for re-election.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut there are no guarantees that Mr. Bush’s reading of the country and the Congress will prove correct.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIt’s more than a risk, it’s a riverboat gamble, said Leon E. Panetta, a Democratic member of the Iraq Study Group and former chief of staff to President Bill Clinton. There’s no question that under our system he’s going to be able to deploy these troops without Congress being able to stop him. But he’s going to face so many battles over these next few months, on funding for the war, on every decision he makes, that he’s basically taking the nation into another nightmare of conflict over a war that no one sees any end to.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDepuis l’inauguration du 110\u00e8me Congr\u00e8s, le 5 janvier, les d\u00e9mocrates n’en peuvent croire ni leurs yeux ni leurs oreilles. Serait-il possible que GW Bush, le pr\u00e9sident, suive effectivement cette voie d’ignorer absolument toutes les forces de pression qui p\u00e8sent sur lui, outre le Congr\u00e8s \u00e0 majorit\u00e9 d\u00e9mocrate, \u00abignoring the results of the November elections, rejecting the central thrust of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group and flouting the advice of some of his own generals, as well as Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq<\/em>\u00bb. Le d\u00e9sarroi des d\u00e9mocrates r\u00e9sulte moins du fait qu’ils ne savent exactement comment agir, que du fait que GW Bush les pousse dans une voie o\u00f9 ils ne pourront faire autrement que r\u00e9agir. \u00abThis guy is committed to hara kiri<\/em>\u00bb, grommelait un expert constitutionnel de l’\u00e9quipe du s\u00e9nateur Kennedy. Possible, mais la chose fera des vagues.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn constate qu’apr\u00e8s le discours de GW, les d\u00e9mocrates n’ont pu faire autrement que de r\u00e9agir. Eux, sans doute, ne peuvent ni ne veulent ignorer les pressions diverses, et ils n’ignorent pas le sentiment du public, de leurs \u00e9lecteurs, lorsqu’ils consultent leurs messageries bourr\u00e9es de courriels furieux ou accusateurs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl y a donc eu une cascade de r\u00e9actions<\/a> au discours du pr\u00e9sident. Des r\u00e9actions individuelles et une r\u00e9action collective rassemblant les leaders<\/em> d\u00e9mocrates des deux chambres. (Ces dirigeants du Congr\u00e8s sont respectivement la Speaker<\/em> de la Chambre Nancy Pelosi, le chef de la majorit\u00e9 au S\u00e9nat Harry Reid, le chef de la majorit\u00e9 \u00e0 la Chambre Steny Hoyer et l’assistant au chef de la majorit\u00e9 au S\u00e9nat, Leader Richard Durbin.) Ce dernier document est \u00e9videmment le plus int\u00e9ressant parce qu’il pr\u00e9sente l’engagement solennel de ce que va \u00eatre l’action des d\u00e9mocrates dans les semaines \u00e0 venir:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWhile we all want to see a stable and peaceful Iraq, many current and former senior military leaders have made clear that sending more American combat troops does not advance that goal. Our troops have performed the difficult missions given to them in Iraq with great courage. The Congress and the American people will continue to support them and provide them with every resource they need. But our military forces deserve a policy commensurate with the sacrifices they have been asked to make. Regrettably, the President has not provided that tonight.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn the days ahead, Congress will exercise its Constitutional responsibilities by giving the President’s latest proposal the scrutiny our troops and the American people expect. We will demand answers to the tough questions that have not been asked or answered to date. The American people want a change of course in Iraq. We intend to keep pressing President Bush to provide it.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn d’autres mots : puisqu’il [GW Bush] veut la guerre (entre le Congr\u00e8s et la Maison-Blanche), il faudra bien la faire. <\/p>\n

La force dramatique du discours<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl est difficile de croire tout \u00e0 fait \u00e0 ce qui se passe. Si l’on s’en tient aux termes du communiqu\u00e9, pourtant, il s’agit bien d’une d\u00e9claration de guerre, certes, d’une d\u00e9claration de guerre contrainte et faite dans le mode de la gu\u00e9rilla mais une guerre bel et bien r\u00e9elle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe qu’annoncent les d\u00e9mocrates, ce ne sont pas les grandes d\u00e9cisions (impeachment<\/em>, blocage du budget) mais la gu\u00e9rilla entre les deux pouvoirs, celle qui peut d\u00e9boucher sur des situations explosives. Il s’agit bien de la crise institutionnelle larv\u00e9e qui peut d\u00e9boucher sur la grande crise<\/a> washingtonienne, the mother of all constitutionnal crisis<\/em> dont parle Engelhardt.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa d\u00e9claration de Leon Panetta, surtout, est int\u00e9ressante (\u00abThere’s no question that under our system he’s going to be able to deploy these troops without Congress being able to stop him. But he’s going to face so many battles over these next few months, on funding for the war, on every decision he makes, that he’s basically taking the nation into another nightmare of conflict over a war that no one sees any end to.<\/em>\u00bb) Il est possible que les d\u00e9mocrates n’aient pas cru, jusqu’au bout, jusqu’\u00e0 l’\u00e9vidence que toutes les fuites et toutes les indications illustraient, que Bush ferait son discours dans le sens o\u00f9 il l’a fait. Il est probable que les d\u00e9mocrates n’appr\u00e9cient pas du tout d’\u00eatre plac\u00e9s devant une perspective o\u00f9 rien n’est r\u00e9solu en Irak et o\u00f9 tout est pr\u00eat pour l’\u00e9largissement du conflit \u00e0 l’Iran (essentiellement) et \u00e0 la Syrie (\u00e9ventuellement). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est ce que nous d\u00e9signons comme la force dramatique du discours. Le contenu \u00e9tait connu et l’on envisageait toutes les possibilit\u00e9s d’\u00e9chapper \u00e0 toutes ses cons\u00e9quences et, notamment, pour les d\u00e9mocrates, toutes les cons\u00e9quences for\u00e7ant \u00e0 des engagements antagonistes \u00e0 l’encontre du pr\u00e9sident. Mais la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 du discours conduit \u00e0 l’installation de l’antagonisme entre les deux pouvoirs ; c’est cela, sa force dramatique. L’\u00e9tat d’esprit, la psychologie ont fait un bond gigantesque dans le sens de l’affrontement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette psychologie de l’affrontement compte plus pour l’instant que le fond du d\u00e9bat. L’on ne voit pas ce qui pourrait la dissiper, compte tenu de la pression que les \u00e9v\u00e9nements ext\u00e9rieurs vont continuer \u00e0 faire peser sur Washington. Au contraire, ces circonstances ont toutes les chances de l’exacerber. Ainsi les fils de la crise que personne ne veut vraiment pourraient-ils se nouer sous nos yeux, comme une m\u00e9canique in\u00e9luctable. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Washington va-t-il devenir \u00e9pique? 11 janvier 2007 Soudain le ton est dramatique, ou lyrique c’est selon. Une fois prononc\u00e9, alors qu’il n’a rien dit de nouveau que le pire annonc\u00e9, le discours de GW se d\u00e9charge de toute sa force dramatique. C’est ainsi qu’on peut lire dans le New York Times de ce jour :… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[6316,3285,3228,3009,2891,3198,6307,3099],"class_list":["post-68399","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-affrontement","tag-congres","tag-crise","tag-democrates","tag-grande","tag-gw","tag-institutionnelle","tag-psychologie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68399","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68399"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68399\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68399"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68399"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68399"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}