{"id":68413,"date":"2007-01-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-01-15T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/15\/le-sfo-ne-lache-pas-sa-proie-bae-la-tanzanie-apres-lafrique-du-sud\/"},"modified":"2007-01-15T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-01-15T00:00:00","slug":"le-sfo-ne-lache-pas-sa-proie-bae-la-tanzanie-apres-lafrique-du-sud","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/15\/le-sfo-ne-lache-pas-sa-proie-bae-la-tanzanie-apres-lafrique-du-sud\/","title":{"rendered":"Le SFO ne l\u00e2che pas sa proie (BAE) : la Tanzanie apr\u00e8s l’Afrique du Sud"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le Special Fraud Office a la dent dure et de la suite dans les id\u00e9es. Le Guardian<\/em> aussi, du reste, qui suit fid\u00e8lement les traces corruptrices de l’\u00e9norme conglom\u00e9rat BAE. Les r\u00e9seaux corrupteurs de BAE semblent avoir atteint une constance structurelle qui fait de cette soci\u00e9t\u00e9 quelque chose de compl\u00e8tement \u00e0 part.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette fois (apr\u00e8s Yamamah<\/a> et l’Afrique du Sud<\/a>), il s’agit de la Tanzanie, comme nous explique le Guardian<\/em>. Nous avons d’abord l’expos\u00e9 du d\u00e9lit<\/a>, qui se passe en 2002, qui implique toujours les m\u00eames, o\u00f9 Tony Blair tient toujours le m\u00eame r\u00f4le mirobolant de la vertu d’apparence soumise aux rudes lois de la corruption. Il s’agit d’un march\u00e9 portant sur un syst\u00e8me radar, dont la Tanzanie semble n’avoir jamais eu vraiment besoin, dont 30% du montant semblent avoir servi pour les frais de corruption.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe UK’s biggest arms supplier secretly paid a $12m commission into a Swiss account in a deal which led to Tanzania, one of the world’s poorest countries, buying a controversial military radar system. A Tanzanian middleman, who has a long-standing relationship with military and government figures, has admitted that the sum was covertly moved to a Swiss account by BAE Systems, which is under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe back-door payment represented 30% of the contract value. The east African state had to borrow to finance the deal, which critics said was unnecessary and overpriced.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbTony Blair supported the 2002 sale but former cabinet minister Clare Short says she and the chancellor, Gordon Brown, opposed it. <\/em>[] Yesterday’s admissions by the Tanzanian middleman, Sailesh Vithlani, led Ms Short to call for BAE’s prosecution if the allegations were proved. She said the prime minister had been personally responsible for forcing the licence for the Tanzania deal through the cabinet.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNo 10 insisted on letting this go ahead, when it stank, she said. It was always obvious that this useless project was corrupt.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn second texte, plus d’atmosph\u00e8re, nous donne une id\u00e9e du climat<\/a> justement, r\u00e9gnant autour de cette affaire, et de l’aura de toute-puissance qui accompagne BAE dans cette sorte de tractations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abBehind the sultry languor of Coco Beach and the nonchalant good nature of ordinary Tanzanians, there lies an unexpected climate of fear in Dar es Salaam.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe head of the anti-corruption bureau, Edward Hoseah, goes nowhere without bodyguards. One government contractor says: Our position here is too vulnerable to be seen talking. A European from an NGO says: They’ll throw me out if I go public. And one knowledgeable journalist claims: If I put my name on the radar story, I could be killed.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 15 janvier 2007 \u00e0 22H49<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le Special Fraud Office a la dent dure et de la suite dans les id\u00e9es. Le Guardian aussi, du reste, qui suit fid\u00e8lement les traces corruptrices de l’\u00e9norme conglom\u00e9rat BAE. Les r\u00e9seaux corrupteurs de BAE semblent avoir atteint une constance structurelle qui fait de cette soci\u00e9t\u00e9 quelque chose de compl\u00e8tement \u00e0 part. Cette fois (apr\u00e8s… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3792,705,3858,6332,6219,6331],"class_list":["post-68413","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bae","tag-blair","tag-corruption","tag-radar","tag-sfo","tag-tanzanie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68413","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68413"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68413\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68413"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68413"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68413"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}