is aimed at serving the desperate need of the White House to shift the blame for its failure in Iraq to Iran, and to appear to be taking tough action<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tPorter rel\u00e8ve que des actions contre les Iraniens en Irak ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 prises. De ce point de vue, la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie anti-iranienne n’est pas nouvelle. D’autre part, ce que Porter juge \u00eatre la prudence extr\u00eame des repr\u00e9sentants de l’administration face au Congr\u00e8s montrerait la faiblesse de l’administration sur ce cas, et sa sensation de n’\u00eatre pas assez forte \u00e0 Washington pour tenter une attaque contre l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tSelon Porter :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe contrast between the general impression of steely resolve toward Iran conveyed by Bush and the unusual clarity about the limited geographical scope of the response points to a sophisticated two-level communications strategy prepared by the White House. For those who get their news from television, the message conveyed by Rice was one of effective action against the Iranians supposedly causing harm to U.S. troops; for the Congress and the media, the message conveyed to reporters was much more cautious.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe two-level communications strategy suggests, in turn, that the White House was acutely aware that a single message of menace toward Iran could have triggered a negative congressional response that would have defeated the purpose of the tough rhetorical line.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tQuoi qu’il en soit de cette analyse, le r\u00e9sultat final est sans aucun doute d’avoir introduit le d\u00e9bat sur l’Iran sur la sc\u00e8ne politique washingtonienne, et d’avoir montr\u00e9 combien l’administration est confront\u00e9e \u00e0 un probl\u00e8me grave avec la position du Congr\u00e8s qui en r\u00e9sulte. Jusqu’alors, le Congr\u00e8s n’avait pas pris position sur la question iranienne ; d\u00e9sormais, il l’a fait implicitement, ; de fa\u00e7on hostile \u00e0 des projets d’attaque, et il montre de cette fa\u00e7on que Bush n’a pas les mains libres.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abIronically, therefore, the net effect of the new tough line toward Iran may actually have been to force the administration to admit, if only tacitly, that it is not free under present circumstances even to threaten to go to war against Iran.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 16 janvier 2007 \u00e0 08H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
On rel\u00e8ve une diff\u00e9rence de rh\u00e9torique de l’administration GW \u00e0 l’encontre de l’Iran, selon que cette administration s’adresse au grand public ou aux groupes interm\u00e9diaires (m\u00e9dias, Congr\u00e8s). Dans le premier cas, c’est une rh\u00e9torique belliciste et tr\u00e8s dure, dans le second il y a une plus grande prudence impliquant qu’il n’y aura pas d’attaque US… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2870,3015,3285,3198,2773,6333],"class_list":["post-68417","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-attaque","tag-communication","tag-congres","tag-gw","tag-iran","tag-porter"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68417","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68417"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68417\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68417"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68417"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68417"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}