16 janvier<\/a>. Il s’agit de d\u00e9tails techniques et op\u00e9rationnels concernant le d\u00e9ploiement des porte-avions US. Manifestement, l’appr\u00e9ciation est faite \u00e0 partir d’une source bien inform\u00e9e des habitudes op\u00e9rationnelles de l’U.S. Navy, de l’actuel calendrier des d\u00e9ploiements, etc. Il s’agit de faits op\u00e9rationnels s\u00e9rieux. La conclusion est claire : l’U.S. Navy n’a pas pour l’instant d’intention (pas la mission) de soutenir ou de lancer une attaque. Pour cela, selon l’appr\u00e9ciation, un troisi\u00e8me groupe de porte-avions serait n\u00e9cessaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tVoici les explications d\u00e9taill\u00e9es :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abWe asked a friend out on the West Coast for his assessment of the new deployments, which confirms the actions ARE aimed at Iran, but in a balanced way, all things considered. For something really up, he warns, watch to see a change in deploying the Nimitz:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbCarrier USS John C. Stennis today (16 Jan 07) departs home port Bremerton, Washington, en route to San Diego to pick up its carrier air wing before sailing west to the Persian Gulf. There, the Stennis strike group will join the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower strike group. The Eisenhower recently has been operating off Somalia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb(Stennis strike group had been scheduled to cover routinely for USS Kitty Hawk in the western Pacific this spring while the Yokohama-based carrier underwent repairs. The Pentagon announced 20 Dec 2006 that Stennis strike group would sail early, deploying instead to the Gulf. The Pentagon announced 11 Jan 07 USS Ronald Reagan would skip normal work-up phases and deploy within several weeks to provide the routine coverage in western Pacific during Kitty Hawk’s repairs.)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbLast week the Pentagon also announced deployment to the Persian Gulf region of a Patriot battalion of the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, which is primarily suited for defense against short-range ballistic missile attack. The primary ballistic missile threat in theater is Iran. UK will contribute two minesweepers and a frigate.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbOK…so what does this mean?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe deployments are aimed primarily at Iran. USG cites Iranian material support for attacks on US personnel and states concern that Iran and other opponents may view U.S. as vulnerable. As the new strategy unfolds to clear and hold Baghdad neighborhoods, protecting both Shi’a and Sunni populations while jump-starting economic and political recovery, and as US clears Iranian networks providing material support for attacks on US forces, USG is rational to have theoretical concern for possible retaliatory strikes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tThis concern is amplified at the margins by tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. Scenarios could include opposition strikes on US assets and Persian Gulf shipping.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbIsn’t this going to spur on the crazies in the Amadinejad camp?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThis deployment is carefully calibrated. It could have been larger. Increasing to two carrier strike groups in the AOR serves as a firm signal and deterrent, reminding everyone US has bench strength; the US also still can reach out and touch someone.’ Along with announced deployments of two UK minesweepers and the Patriot battery, it is also an actual contingency force that has significant defensive and offensive capability (e.g. ., could initiate heavy 24 hour air ops if necessary).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbOK. . .what to watch for if the US really thinks bad things are about to happen?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbOn the other hand, increasing to three carrier strike groups would be noticeably more robust’, belligerent and suggestive of intending or anticipating attack. The difference between two and three strike groups is huge. Two is strong and capable, but existing offensive intent is less probable; three is we don’t care about provocation, we’re preparing to fight in this new dimension’.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb(An indicator would be to watch for announcements about Nimitz strike group; Nimitz reportedly has completed the routine pre-deployment work-up and is in San Diego.)<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 17 janvier 2007 \u00e0 09H54<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
La question de la crise iranienne et la question compl\u00e9mentaire d’une possible attaque contre l’Iran commencent \u00e0 se d\u00e9canter apr\u00e8s la pouss\u00e9e de fi\u00e8vre qui a suivi le discours du 10 janvier de GW Bush. Il y a de plus en plus deux types de prospective : celle qui annonce que le renforcement US pr\u00e9pare… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2870,6179,6336,2773,3704],"class_list":["post-68419","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-attaque","tag-clemons","tag-deploiement","tag-iran","tag-porte-avions"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68419","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68419"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68419\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68419"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68419"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68419"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}