{"id":68459,"date":"2007-01-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-01-28T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/28\/rassurez-vous-larmee-us-est-plus-que-jamais-la-meilleure-du-monde\/"},"modified":"2007-01-28T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-01-28T00:00:00","slug":"rassurez-vous-larmee-us-est-plus-que-jamais-la-meilleure-du-monde","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/01\/28\/rassurez-vous-larmee-us-est-plus-que-jamais-la-meilleure-du-monde\/","title":{"rendered":"Rassurez-vous, l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e US est plus que jamais la meilleure du monde"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Audition de quelques g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US le 24 janvier devant la commission des forces arm\u00e9es de la Chambre. Le Marine Corps et l&rsquo;U.S. Army sont sur la sellette. Th\u00e8me du jour : ces deux forces n&rsquo;ont plus les capacit\u00e9s de mener une guerre conventionnelle de haut niveau. Elles ont besoin d&rsquo;argent, de beaucoup d&rsquo;argent (en plus) pour retrouver ces capacit\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tRapport de l&rsquo;AFP du <a href=\"http:\/\/news.yahoo.com\/s\/afp\/20070125\/pl_afp\/usiraqmilitary&#038;printer=1\" class=\"gen\">24 janvier<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>What we are developing right now is the best counterinsurgency force in the world, both army and marine, General James Conway, commandant of the marine corps, told lawmakers Tuesday.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But that&rsquo;s essentially what they&rsquo;re focused on, Conway added, because troops have little time to train for anything else between tours to Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>So we need to be able to train toward other major contingency types of operations, and we&rsquo;re just not doing it right now, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;argument est donc que si les forces arm\u00e9es US ne sont plus capables de conduire une guerre de haute intensit\u00e9, c&rsquo;est parce qu&rsquo;elles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 transform\u00e9es pour devenir <em>the best counterinsurgency force in the world<\/em>. C&rsquo;est fort bien. Cela signifie que les forces US sont en train de gagner en Irak  ou bien \u00e0 quoi sert-il de d\u00e9velopper la meilleure force anti-gu\u00e9rilla du monde si elle est incapable de l&#8217;emporter? <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUn autre officier g\u00e9n\u00e9ral confirme l&rsquo;orientation de la chose en expliquant que les programmes de r\u00e9orientation et de r\u00e9\u00e9quipement des forces sont un succ\u00e8s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, an army deputy chief of staff, told defense reporters this week none of the army&rsquo;s combat brigades are rated as ready for high intensity conflict.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>We have been very successful focusing both equipping and training and manning on the units that are going to combat, but those units have been focused on low intensity conflict, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Their training program has been almost exclusively focused to that end, and even they are not high intensity conflict certified, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe raisonnement \u00e0 la base de toute analyse de la part des dirigeants am\u00e9ricanistes pour juger, dans quelque circonstance et selon quelque crit\u00e8re que ce soit, de la valeur de l&rsquo;outil dont ils disposent,  c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e US,  se con\u00e7oit comme ceci : comment adapter le reste du raisonnement \u00e0 la pr\u00e9misse selon laquelle l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e US est la meilleure du monde? Dans les cas cit\u00e9s ici, nous croyons qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 n\u00e9cessaire de pr\u00e9ciser que la victoire (en Irak) avait \u00e9videmment r\u00e9compens\u00e9 ce beau diagnostic sur la meilleure arm\u00e9e du monde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous aurions tendance \u00e0 juger, vu l&rsquo;aplomb  des d\u00e9clarations qui t\u00e9moigne de l&rsquo;absence de malice, que nous nous trouvons devant un cas caract\u00e9ristique d&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3393\" class=\"gen\">ind\u00e9fectibilit\u00e9<\/a>, comme trait important de la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 28 janvier 2007 \u00e0 13H58<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Audition de quelques g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US le 24 janvier devant la commission des forces arm\u00e9es de la Chambre. Le Marine Corps et l&rsquo;U.S. Army sont sur la sellette. Th\u00e8me du jour : ces deux forces n&rsquo;ont plus les capacit\u00e9s de mener une guerre conventionnelle de haut niveau. Elles ont besoin d&rsquo;argent, de beaucoup d&rsquo;argent (en plus)&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3289,2651,4735,857,3572,6374,2878,2671],"class_list":["post-68459","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-army","tag-du","tag-indefectibilite","tag-irak","tag-marine","tag-meilleure","tag-monde","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68459","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68459"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68459\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68459"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68459"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68459"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}