En apparence, publiquement dans tous les cas, l’attitude isra\u00e9lienne concernant l’Iran et son potentiel nucl\u00e9aire est radicale, extr\u00eame, voire hyst\u00e9rique pour certains (voir Buchanan<\/a>). Une analyse de Gareth Porter, mise en ligne sur Atimes.com<\/em> aujourd’hui<\/a>, propose une autre lumi\u00e8re sur la position isra\u00e9lienne. Le verdict de Porter, historien et analyste de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, est que les Isra\u00e9liens sont beaucoup plus r\u00e9alistes qu’ils ne paraissent et sont pr\u00eats \u00e0 \u00e9ventuellement accepter un Iran nucl\u00e9aire selon le principe de la dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire, — une sorte de MAD (destruction mutuelle assur\u00e9e) au niveau r\u00e9gional. Porter semble notamment penser que la doctrine isra\u00e9lienne au cas où l’Iran deviendrait une puissance nucl\u00e9aire serait de rendre publiques les capacit\u00e9s nucl\u00e9aires isra\u00e9liennes pour en faire un instrument de dissuasion.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Voici un extrait du texte de Porter :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «The internal assessment by the Israeli national-security apparatus of the Iranian threat, however, is more realistic than the government’s public rhetoric would indicate.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Since Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad came to power in August 2005, Israel has effectively exploited his image as someone who is particularly fanatical about destroying Israel to develop the theme of Iran’s threat of a \u00ab\u00a0second Holocaust\u00a0\u00bb by using nuclear weapons.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »But such alarmist statements do not accurately reflect the strategic thinking of Israeli national-security officials. In fact, Israelis began in the early 1990s to use the argument that Iran was irrational about Israel and could not be deterred from a nuclear attack if it ever acquired nuclear weapons, according to an account by independent analyst Trita Parsi on Iranian-Israeli strategic relations to be published in March. Meanwhile, the internal Israeli view of Iran, Parsi said in an interview, \u00ab\u00a0is completely different\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Parsi, who interviewed many Israeli national-security officials for his book, said, \u00ab\u00a0The Israelis know that Iran is a rational regime, and they have acted on that presumption.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »His primary evidence of such an Israeli assessment is that the Israelis purchased Dolphin submarines from Germany in 1999 and 2004, which have been reported to be capable of carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles. It is generally recognized that the only purpose of such cruise-missile-equipped submarines could be to deter an enemy from trying to take out its nuclear weapons with a surprise attack by having a reliable second-strike capability.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Despite the fact that Israel has long been known to possess at least 100 nuclear weapons, Israeli officials refuse to discuss their own nuclear capability and how it relates to deterring Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Retired US Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel Rick Francona, a former Pentagon official who visited Israel last November, recalls that Israeli officials uniformly told his group of eight US military analysts they believed Iran was \u00ab\u00a0perfectly willing to launch a first strike against Israel\u00a0\u00bb if it obtained nuclear weapons. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »But when they were asked about their own nuclear capabilities in general, and the potentially nuclear-armed submarine fleet in particular, Francona said, the Israelis would not comment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »In fact, Israeli strategic specialists do discuss how to deter Iran among themselves. An article in the online journal of a hardline think-tank, the Ariel Center for Policy Research, in August 2004 revealed that \u00ab\u00a0one of the options that [have] been considered should Iran publicly declare itself to have nuclear weapons is for Israel to put an end to what is called its policy of nuclear ambiguity or opacity\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »The author, Shalom Freedman, said that in light of Israel’s accumulation of \u00ab\u00a0over 100 nuclear weapons\u00a0\u00bb and its range of delivery systems for them, even if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons within a few years, the \u00ab\u00a0tremendous disproportion between the strength of Israel and an emergent nuclear Iran should serve as a deterrent\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Even after Ahmadinejad’s election in mid-2005, a prominent Israeli academic and military expert has insisted that Israel can still deter a nuclear Iran. In two essays published in September and October 2005, Dr Ephraim Kam, deputy head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and a former analyst for the Israel Defense Forces, wrote that Iran had to assume that any nuclear attack on Israel would result in very serious US retaliation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Therefore, even though he regarded a nuclear Iran as likely to be more aggressive, Kam concluded it was \u00ab\u00a0doubtful whether Iran would actually exercise a nuclear bomb against Israel — or any other country — despite its basic rejection of Israel’s existence\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Cette position isra\u00e9lienne est plus en conformit\u00e9 avec la politique habituelle r\u00e9elle de ce pays, notamment vis-\u00e0-vis de ses voisins, marqu\u00e9e effectivement par le r\u00e9alisme. La situation que d\u00e9crit l’analyse de Porter est celle d’une rh\u00e9torique extr\u00e9miste utilis\u00e9e contre l’Iran comme un moyen de dissuasion pour tenter d’emp\u00eacher ce pays de devenir une puissance nucl\u00e9aire. Mais cette sorte de dissuasion est peut-\u00eatre plus volatile que la dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire dans la mesure où elle peut frapper et entraîner certaines psychologies, notamment celles d’hommes politiques, vers des positions radicales de confrontation compl\u00e8tement ferm\u00e9es. Les engagements publics deviennent dans ce cas des prisons.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Porter rappelle qu’une interview a \u00e9t\u00e9 donn\u00e9e en novembre dernier au Jerusalem Post<\/em> par Ephraim Sneh, adjoint au ministre de la d\u00e9fense, expliquant que la vraie crainte d’Isra\u00ebl n’est pas une attaque nucl\u00e9aire contre Isra\u00ebl mais le fait qu’un Iran nucl\u00e9aire pourrait d\u00e9courager l’\u00e9migration juive vers Isra\u00ebl et acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer les d\u00e9parts d’Isra\u00e9liens de leur pays («Ahmadinejad could kill the Zionist dream without pushing a button. That’s why we must prevent this regime from obtaining nuclear capability at all costs<\/em>»). En un sens, c’est effectivement reconnaître d’une fa\u00e7on implicite que la rh\u00e9torique extr\u00e9miste d’Isra\u00ebl d\u00e9passe son but de dissuasion et pi\u00e8ge ce pays dans une politique qui devrait \u00eatre conforme \u00e0 sa rh\u00e9torique. Ceux-l\u00e0 m\u00eames (Ephraim Sneh dans ce cas) qui activent cette rh\u00e9torique extr\u00e9miste comme dissuasion estiment que le public, lui, la prendrait pour du comptant au cas où l’Iran deviendrait nucl\u00e9aire et choisirait son attitude vis-\u00e0-vis de l’immigration et de l’\u00e9migration en fonction de sa crainte d’une attaque iranienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mis en ligne le 1er f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 05H41<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La rh\u00e9torique d’Isra\u00ebl contre l’Iran En apparence, publiquement dans tous les cas, l’attitude isra\u00e9lienne concernant l’Iran et son potentiel nucl\u00e9aire est radicale, extr\u00eame, voire hyst\u00e9rique pour certains (voir Buchanan). Une analyse de Gareth Porter, mise en ligne sur Atimes.com aujourd’hui, propose une autre lumi\u00e8re sur la position isra\u00e9lienne. Le verdict de Porter, historien et analyste… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2929,2773,2774,3004,6150],"class_list":["post-68473","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-dissuasion","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-nucleaire","tag-piege"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68473","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68473"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68473\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68473"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68473"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68473"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}