D’abord, nous devons quelques excuses \u00e0 nos lecteurs. Rapportant dans les colonnes immat\u00e9rielles de cette rubrique, hier<\/a>, quelques \u00e9l\u00e9ments de l’intervention que Zbigniew Brzezinski allait faire le m\u00eame jour devant une commission du S\u00e9nat (relations ext\u00e9rieures), nous n’avions pas not\u00e9 l’aspect particuli\u00e8rement extraordinaire (pour un personnage de son statut d’ancien conseiller de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale d’un pr\u00e9sident US) d’une partie de ses d\u00e9clarations. C’est un texte de WSWS.org<\/em> de ce jour<\/a> qui nous rappelle \u00e0 l’ordre \u00e0 ce propos, en observant la force explosive de la d\u00e9claration de Brzezinski (\u00abA political bombshell from Zbigniew Brzezinski<\/em>\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tWSWS.org<\/em> met en \u00e9vidence les pr\u00e9cisions qu’apporte Brzezinski dans ses accusations, observant que \u00abBrzezinski came close to suggesting that the White House was capable of manufacturing a provocation including a possible terrorist attack within the US to provide the casus belli for war<\/em>\u00bb Cet aspect de l’intervention \u00e9crite de Brzezinski a ensuite \u00e9t\u00e9 renforc\u00e9 par certaines r\u00e9ponses du m\u00eame Brzezinski \u00e0 des questions des s\u00e9nateurs. Ce que laisse comprendre, voir sentir<\/strong> ce texte, c’est une atmosph\u00e8re extr\u00eamement tendue qui accr\u00e9dite l’aspect comploteur et ill\u00e9galiste de l’administration GW, particuli\u00e8rement dans cette p\u00e9riode tr\u00e8s intense o\u00f9 elle se sent \u00e0 la fois prise au pi\u00e8ge (catastrophe irakienne, Congr\u00e8s d\u00e9mocrate) et proche d’une opportunit\u00e9 de fuite en avant pour \u00e9chapper \u00e0 cet enfermement. On observe l’absence de diatribe substantielle contre Brzezinski qui termine en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral les textes par ailleurs toujours tr\u00e8s judicieux de ce site ; signe qu’en l’occurrence, l’analyste a pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9 garder l’accent sur le contenu de la d\u00e9claration sans diluer son hypoth\u00e8se dans d’autres consid\u00e9rations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVoici un extrait important du texte signal\u00e9 ici portant sur des pr\u00e9cisions sur l’hypoth\u00e8se envisag\u00e9e :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abMost stunning and disturbing was his description of a plausible scenario for a military collision with Iran. It would, he suggested, involve Iraqi failure to meet the benchmarks, followed by accusations of Iranian responsibility for the failure, then by<\/em> some provocation in Iraq or a terrorist act in the US blamed on Iran<\/em><\/strong>, culminating in a defensive’ US military action against Iran that plunges a lonely America into a spreading and deepening quagmire eventually ranging across Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. [Emphasis added].<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA This was an unmistakable warning to the US Congress, replete with quotation marks to discount the defensive nature of such military action, that the Bush administration is seeking a pretext for an attack on Iran. Although he did not explicitly say so, Brzezinski came close to suggesting that the White House was capable of manufacturing a provocationincluding a possible terrorist attack within the USto provide the casus belli for war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA That a man such as Brzezinski, with decades of experience in the top echelons of the US foreign policy establishment, a man who has the closest links to the military and to intelligence agencies, should issue such a warning at an open hearing of the US Senate has immense and grave significance.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA Brzezinski knows whereof he speaks, having authored provocations of his own while serving as Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser. In that capacity, as he has since acknowledged in published writings, he drew up the covert plan at the end of the 1970s to mobilize Islamic fundamentalist mujaheddin to topple the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan and draw the Soviet Union into a ruinous war in that country.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA Following his opening remarks, in response to questions from the senators, Brzezinski reiterated his warning of a provocation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA He called the senators’ attention to a March 27, 2006 report in the New York Times on a private meeting between the president and Prime Minister Blair, two months before the war, based on a memorandum prepared by the British official present at this meeting. In the article, Brzezinski said, the president is cited as saying he is concerned that there may not be weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq, and that there must be some consideration given to finding a different basis for undertaking the action.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA He continued: I’ll just read you what this memo allegedly says, according to the New York Times: The memo states that the president and the prime minister acknowledged that no unconventional weapons had been found inside Iraq. Faced with the possibility of not finding any before the planned invasion, Mr. Bush talked about several ways to provoke a confrontation.’<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA He described the several ways in which this could be done. I won’t go into that… the ways were quite sensational, at least one of them.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA If one is of the view that one is dealing with an implacable enemy that has to be removed, that course of action may under certain circumstances be appealing. I’m afraid that if this situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, and if Iran is perceived as in some fashion involved or responsible, or a potential beneficiary, that temptation could arise.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA At another point Brzezinski remarked on the conspiratorial methods of the Bush administration and all but described it as a cabal. I am perplexed, he said, by the fact that major strategic decisions seem to be made within a very narrow circle of individualsjust a few, probably a handful, perhaps not more than the fingers on my hand. And these are the individuals, all of whom but one, who made the original decision to go to war, and used the original justifications to go to war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA None of the senators in attendance addressed themselves to the stark warning from Brzezinski. The Democrats in particular, flaccid, complacent and complicit in the war conspiracies of the Bush administration, said nothing about the danger of a provocation spelled out by the witness.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA Following the hearing, this reporter asked Brzezinski directly if he was suggesting that the source of a possible provocation might be the US government itself. The former national security adviser was evasive.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA The following exchange took place:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA Q: Dr. Brzezinski, who do you think would be carrying out this possible provocation?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA A: I have no idea. As I said, these things can never be predicted. It can be spontaneous.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA Q: Are you suggesting there is a possibility it could originate within the US government itself?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA: I’m saying the whole situation can get out of hand and all sorts of calculations can produce a circumstance that would be very difficult to trace.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 2 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 15H02<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" D’abord, nous devons quelques excuses \u00e0 nos lecteurs. Rapportant dans les colonnes immat\u00e9rielles de cette rubrique, hier, quelques \u00e9l\u00e9ments de l’intervention que Zbigniew Brzezinski allait faire le m\u00eame jour devant une commission du S\u00e9nat (relations ext\u00e9rieures), nous n’avions pas not\u00e9 l’aspect particuli\u00e8rement extraordinaire (pour un personnage de son statut d’ancien conseiller de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale d’un… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6391,1006,4926,3285,3198,2773,5534],"class_list":["post-68481","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-audition","tag-brzezinski","tag-complot","tag-congres","tag-gw","tag-iran","tag-provocation"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68481","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68481"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68481\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68481"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68481"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68481"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}