{"id":68487,"date":"2007-02-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-02-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/02\/04\/les-militaires-us-commencent-a-trouver-liranien-comestible\/"},"modified":"2007-02-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-02-04T00:00:00","slug":"les-militaires-us-commencent-a-trouver-liranien-comestible","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/02\/04\/les-militaires-us-commencent-a-trouver-liranien-comestible\/","title":{"rendered":"Les militaires US commencent \u00e0 trouver l&rsquo;Iranien comestible"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Dans l&rsquo;\u00e9trange tragi-com\u00e9die que constitue la perspective d&rsquo;une possible attaque de l&rsquo;Iran, les militaires US ont jusqu&rsquo;ici tenu un r\u00f4le plut\u00f4t apaisant. De Seymour <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=2862\" class=\"gen\">Hersh<\/a> il y a huit mois \u00e0 William S. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3517\" class=\"gen\">Lind<\/a> \u00e0 la fin 2006, la plupart des chroniqueurs s\u00e9rieux renvoyaient l&rsquo;image de militaires extr\u00eamement r\u00e9ticents \u00e0 l&rsquo;id\u00e9e d&rsquo;une attaque de l&rsquo;Iran, cherchant dans tous les cas \u00e0 freiner les ardeurs diverses de l&rsquo;administration GW.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa chose est en train de changer, semble-t-il, notamment \u00e0 cause de l&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3583\" class=\"gen\">imbrication<\/a> des deux conflits, celui de l&rsquo;Irak et l&rsquo;\u00e9ventuel conflit avec l&rsquo;Iran, r\u00e9ussie par GW Bush avec son discours du 10 janvier. Suivant la logique des consignes qui leur sont donn\u00e9es, les militaires en arrivent \u00e0 identifier la situation irakienne et la situation iranienne, et \u00e0 montrer une agressivit\u00e9 grandissante \u00e0 l&rsquo;encontre des Iraniens, comme on le voit dans le texte ci-dessous, en acceptant la th\u00e8se (en partie renforc\u00e9e par leur propre propagande, mais cela est d\u00e9sormais un processus classique nomm\u00e9 virtualisme) d&rsquo;une forte responsabilit\u00e9 iranienne dans la situation irakienne. Il ne faut plus leur demander de r\u00e9fl\u00e9chir aux cons\u00e9quences d&rsquo;un encha\u00eenement vers un conflit majeur avec l&rsquo;Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA l&rsquo;inverse, les services qui, dans les circonstances actuelles, sont sollicit\u00e9s pour engager leur r\u00e9putation dans une pr\u00e9sentation l\u00e9galiste du cas (infiltrations iraniennes en Irak), se montrent tr\u00e8s prudents et tr\u00e8s r\u00e9ticents. D&rsquo;autre part, le d\u00e9partement d&rsquo;Etat, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9chaud\u00e9s par la pr\u00e9paration de l&rsquo;attaque contre l&rsquo;Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est le <em>Daily Telegraph<\/em> qui pr\u00e9sente cette situation, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/main.jhtml;jsessionid=JBAXDRIQMGORTQFIQMFSFFOAVCBQ0IV0?xml=\/news\/2007\/02\/04\/wiran04.xml\" class=\"gen\">aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Angered by the mounting toll of troops killed by ever-more sophisticated devices, US commanders insisted last month that the White House give them authority to target and kill Iranian operatives in Iraq as part of the new 21,500-troop surge&rsquo; strategy ordered by Mr Bush.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But the State Department, headed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and the CIA had argued against openly targeting Iranian agents, most of whom claim to be diplomats based at Teheran&rsquo;s network of consulates, liaison offices and cultural offices in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>They contended that this approach could escalate into direct armed conflict with Iran, which is under intense international pressure to give up its nuclear programme.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The State Department and the CIA, which both objected to the way the Bush administration used pre-war intelligence on Iraq, also wanted to publicise clear evidence of Iranian interference in Iraq as a way of justifying the US stance.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The military&rsquo;s highest echelons really do not want the release of details of what Iran is up to as they don&rsquo;t want the Iranians to know what&rsquo;s working and what&rsquo;s not, the administration adviser said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The military and the State Department and CIA are coming at this from very different approaches. State and the CIA believe we should respect the supposed diplomatic immunity of these Iranians. But the military has had enough and they say to hell with their fake diplomatic immunity&rsquo;.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 4 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 15H15<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Dans l&rsquo;\u00e9trange tragi-com\u00e9die que constitue la perspective d&rsquo;une possible attaque de l&rsquo;Iran, les militaires US ont jusqu&rsquo;ici tenu un r\u00f4le plut\u00f4t apaisant. De Seymour Hersh il y a huit mois \u00e0 William S. Lind \u00e0 la fin 2006, la plupart des chroniqueurs s\u00e9rieux renvoyaient l&rsquo;image de militaires extr\u00eamement r\u00e9ticents \u00e0 l&rsquo;id\u00e9e d&rsquo;une attaque de l&rsquo;Iran,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[857,2773,3538,6400,2671],"class_list":["post-68487","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-irak","tag-iran","tag-militaires","tag-preuve","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68487","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68487"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68487\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68487"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68487"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68487"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}