\t7 f\u00e9vrier 2007 – R\u00e9cemment, nous avions soulign\u00e9 la possibilit\u00e9 que les USA d\u00e9ploient le chasseur Lockheed Martin F-22 en Irak<\/a>. Les plus r\u00e9centes nouvelles vont \u00eatre accueillies avec soulagement par les insurgents<\/em> : le F-22 n’ira sans doute pas en Irak. Comme pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment, c’est Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> du 29 janvier qui nous en informe. (Article sur le site en acc\u00e8s payant<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe texte nous informe des diverses raisons pour lesquelles le F-22 n’ira pas en Irak, essentiellement \u00e0 partir des d\u00e9clarations du chef de l’Air Combat Command, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’USAF Ronald E. Keys (un dur de dur, nous semble-t-il) . Elles sont surprenantes et r\u00e9v\u00e9latrices.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t L’Irak n’est pas la guerre qu’il faut au F-22. \u00abThe stealthy Raptor fighter and intelligence-gathering aircraft is ready for war, but probably not the war we’ve got, says Air Combat Command’s chief, Gen. Ronald E. Keys.<\/em> [] If war breaks out, I’m sending the F-22, Keys told Aviation Week & Space Technology last week. But not for operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. I didn’t buy the F-22 for Iraq<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Le F-22 peut m\u00eame conna\u00eetre des probl\u00e8mes pr\u00e9occupants en Irak, qui peuvent compromettre gravement ses capacit\u00e9s g\u00e9n\u00e9rales d’utilisation. \u00abRight now we get into situations where we jam against improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and it corrupts our radio traffic [and] some line-of-sight UAV operations, Keys says. It’s tough The intense jamming may degrade, perhaps blind, some key F-22 electronic surveillance sensors when operating around the capital city.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Dans tous les cas, le F-22 a d\u00e9j\u00e0 r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 des faiblesses inh\u00e9rentes \u00e0 sa structure, \u00e0 sa conception et \u00e0 ses capacit\u00e9s. La d\u00e9licatesse de fonctionnement de son \u00e9lectronique rend cette \u00e9lectronique vuln\u00e9rable \u00e0 la puissance ou \u00e0 la pression d’\u00e9missions ext\u00e9rieures. La d\u00e9pendance consid\u00e9rable, quasiment exclusive, de l’avion de son \u00e9lectronique compromet de ce fait tout son fonctionnement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abBut a possible vulnerability in the stealth fighter’s legendary electronic surveillance system located in the leading edges of the wings and vertical tails became apparent during operations by the first operational squadron flying in the Chesapeake Bay area. The strong radars on nearby Navy ships were overwhelming the delicate sensors.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbYou’ve got to tune down the<\/em> [ESM sensors’] sensitivity,<\/em>[Keys] says. Making such corrections is one reason it’s a software-[run] airplane. I don’t think it’s a fatal flaw, but we now realize that in some situations we may not be able to see some of the [intelligence] we wanted to because we simply jam it off the air.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t De ce point de vue et en \u00e9largissant l’observation, on apprend que la guerre en Irak est devenue un cas extraordinaire de pollution par le brouillage. La description qu’en fait le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Keys, qui servit en Irak dans la direction de la guerre \u00e9lectronique avant de prendre en main le Air Combat Command, est tr\u00e8s significative.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe primary source of that interference is the jammers that have proliferated to foil IEDs that now cause 70% of the U.S. casualties in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbI don’t see how<\/em> [the F-22’s electronic surveillance system] can be used there, Keys says. I’ve been operating<\/em> [in Iraq and Afghanistan] since the war kicked off with Rivet Joints, and they haven’t figured it out. They have a lot of people sitting in the back-end with lots of analyzers, and they’re still trying to read<\/em> [communications] traffic through jamming.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe problem appears to be one of electronic command and control and giving authority to someone who can make the call about when to jam. That’s an explosive subject, because jamming is invariably being used to save lives.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThere is a burning need for a joint entity to police the battlefield and bring organization to the jamming, they say.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWe have to have more visibility of what’s going on and where, Keys notes. Right now we don’t. We didn’t anticipate there was going to be this level of jamming. Every patrol is out there with personal jammers. We’ve got lots of airplanes that are also jamming. At the same time, we’ve got people trying to listen<\/em> [to insurgent conversations], a lot of it on the same or overlapping frequencies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAir Combat Command officials describe the electronically toxic battlefield as a big, emerging joint problem.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n