Tout le monde conna\u00eet le mot surge<\/em>, l’expression nouvelle strat\u00e9gie (en Irak), le discours du 10 janvier, les remous au Congr\u00e8s et ainsi de suite. On sait moins comment tout cela est n\u00e9, sinon qu’il s’agit, certaines sources l’ont indiqu\u00e9, d’un plan des n\u00e9o-conservateurs qui fut pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 \u00e0 GW le 14 d\u00e9cembre 2006.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCraig Unger publie un excellent article sur la crise courante, dans Vanity Fair<\/em>, num\u00e9ro de mars 2007<\/a>, sous le titre : \u00abFrom the Wonderful Folks Who Brought You Iraq<\/em>\u00bb. Parmi les divers passages nous donnant des d\u00e9tails in\u00e9dits sur la situation, ses origines et ses perspectives, voici celui qui nous raconte l’aventure de ce plan neocon<\/em> qui aboutit \u00e0 la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie en cours et scelle la d\u00e9faite<\/a> de l’ISG, ce plan Baker-Hamilton qui devait tout changer et faire rentrer l’insupportable morveux (GW) dans le droit chemin.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abJust eight days later, on December 14, Bush found a study that was more to his liking. Not surprisingly, it came from the American Enterprise Institute, the intellectual stronghold of neoconservatism. The author, Frederick Kagan, a resident scholar at the A.E.I., is the son of Donald Kagan and the brother of Robert Kagan, who signed PNAC’s famous 1998 letter to President Bill Clinton urging him to overthrow Saddam Hussein. According to Kagan, the project began in late September or early October at the instigation of his boss, Danielle Pletka, vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at A.E.I. She decided it would be helpful to do a realistic evaluation of what would be required to secure Baghdad, Kagan told Vanity Fair.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe project culminated in a four-day planning exercise in early December, Kagan said, that just happened to coincide with the release of the Iraq Study Group report. But he rejected the notion that his study had been initiated by the White House as an alternative to the bipartisan assessment. I’m aware of some of the rumors, Kagan said. This was not designed to be an anti-I.S.G. report. Any conspiracy theories beyond that are nonsense.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb There was no contact with the Bush administration. We put this together on our own I did not have any contact with the vice president’s office prior to well, I don’t want to say that. I have had periodic contact with the vice president’s office, but I can’t tell you the dates. If you are barking up the story that the V.P. put this together, that is not true.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbKagan’s report was sharply at odds with the consensus forged by the top brass in Iraq. Iraq commander General George Casey and General John Abizaid, the head of Central Command (CentCom), had argued that sending additional troops to Iraq would be counterproductive. (Later they both reversed course.) Kagan’s study, on the contrary, suggested that with a massive surge of new troops America could finally succeed. It cites the military’s new counter-insurgency manual, which suggests that a nation can be secured with a force of one soldier for every 40 to 50 inhabitants. That calculus would call for stationing more than 150,000 troops in Baghdad alone (there are currently 17,000 there), far more than is politically feasible today. But Kagan skirts this issue by asserting that it is neither necessary nor wise to try to clear and hold the entire city all at once. Focusing instead on certain areas of Baghdad, he concludes that the deployment of 20,000 additional troops would be enough to pacify significant sections of the city. Even the title of Kagan’s report must have been more appealing to Bush: Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq.’ Soon, it would be announced that Casey and Abizaid were being replaced with more amenable officers: Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Admiral William J. Fallon, respectively. The escalation was on.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa premi\u00e8re chose qui nous frappe dans ces confidences improvis\u00e9es, c’est le caract\u00e8re improvis\u00e9, hasardeux, compl\u00e8tement amateur (ce terme sans jugement de valeur, comme un fait) d’une d\u00e9cision qui implique un potentiel de crise formidable (en Irak, avec l’Iran, \u00e0 Washington entre Congr\u00e8s et ex\u00e9cutif). Notre avis, \u00e0 la lecture de ce passage, est que l’un des \u00e9l\u00e9ments importants du choix de GW, d’apr\u00e8s ce que nous sentons et croyons deviner de la psychologie du personnage, est l’intitul\u00e9 du rapport de Kagan, d’un optimisme roboratif pour un esprit simple (Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq.<\/em>‘, dont Unger nous dit : \u00abEven the title of Kagan’s report must have been more appealing to Bush<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa seconde remarque, c’est de d\u00e9couvrir combien ce plan \u00e9tait en d\u00e9saccord avec la hi\u00e9rarchie militaire et combien celle-ci, finalement, s’est align\u00e9e sur le choix du pr\u00e9sident sans broncher, avec de-ci de-l\u00e0 une r\u00e9compense pour l’un ou l’autre comme reconnaissance pour cette souplesse (Casey nomm\u00e9 chef d’\u00e9tat-major de l’U.S. Army). Bien \u00e9videmment, les militaires ont pris une certaine revanche en introduisant une dimension technologique<\/a> maximale dans le surge<\/em> en Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEn r\u00e9sum\u00e9, une incroyable confusion, un m\u00e9lange des genres et des l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9s presque surr\u00e9aliste, ou bien, si l’on veut, une bouillie pour chats.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 9 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 05H02<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Tout le monde conna\u00eet le mot surge, l’expression nouvelle strat\u00e9gie (en Irak), le discours du 10 janvier, les remous au Congr\u00e8s et ainsi de suite. On sait moins comment tout cela est n\u00e9, sinon qu’il s’agit, certaines sources l’ont indiqu\u00e9, d’un plan des n\u00e9o-conservateurs qui fut pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 \u00e0 GW le 14 d\u00e9cembre 2006. Craig Unger… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3198,857,3382,1104,2642,3440,6263],"class_list":["post-68504","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-gw","tag-irak","tag-kagan","tag-neocons","tag-nouvelle","tag-strategie","tag-surge"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68504","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68504"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68504\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68504"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68504"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68504"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}