{"id":68505,"date":"2007-02-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-02-09T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/02\/09\/pour-liran-stratcom-a-pris-laffaire-en-mains\/"},"modified":"2007-02-09T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-02-09T00:00:00","slug":"pour-liran-stratcom-a-pris-laffaire-en-mains","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/02\/09\/pour-liran-stratcom-a-pris-laffaire-en-mains\/","title":{"rendered":"Pour l&rsquo;Iran, StratCom a pris l&rsquo;affaire en mains"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p> Poursuivons par un deuxi\u00e8me aspect le commentaire de l&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.vanityfair.com\/politics\/features\/2007\/03\/whitehouse200703?printable=true&#038;currentPage=all\" class=\"gen\">article<\/a> de Craig Unger, d\u00e9j\u00e0 signal\u00e9 dans la <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3685\" class=\"gen\">note pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente<\/a>. Nous citons d&rsquo;abord ce deuxi\u00e8me extrait qui nous para\u00eet int\u00e9ressant (tout l&rsquo;article est de cet int\u00e9r\u00eat et de cette haute tenue mais il faut bien choisir). Il concerne l&rsquo;Iran et la possible prochaine attaque contre ce pays et est bas\u00e9 sur des confidences du lieutenant colonel W. Patrick Lang, qui a quitt\u00e9 la Defense Intelligence Agency o\u00f9 il servait comme officier charg\u00e9 du Moyen-Orient, de l&rsquo;Asie du Sud et du terrorisme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Another serious development is the growing role of the U.S. Strategic Command (StratCom), which oversees nuclear weapons, missile defense, and protection against weapons of mass destruction. Bush has directed StratCom to draw up plans for a massive strike against Iran, at a time when CentCom has had its hands full overseeing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shifting to StratCom indicates that they are talking about a really punishing air-force and naval air attack [on Iran], says Lang.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Moreover, he continues, Bush can count on the military to carry out such a mission even without congressional authorization. If they write a plan like that and the president issues an execute order, the forces will execute it. He&rsquo;s got the power to do that as commander-in-chief. We set that up during the Cold War. It may, after the fact, be considered illegal, or an impeachable offense, but if he orders them to do it, they will do it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Lang also notes that the recent appointment of a naval officer, Admiral William Fallon, to the top post at CentCom may be another indication that Bush intends to bomb Iran. It makes very little sense that a person with this background should be appointed to be theater commander in a theater in which two essentially ground&rsquo; wars are being fought, unless it is intended to conduct yet another war which will be different in character, he wrote in his blog. The employment of Admiral Fallon suggests that they are thinking about something that is not a ground campaign.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;information sur la prise en main d&rsquo;une possible op\u00e9ration par le Strategic Command (StratCom) nous para\u00eet tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressante. StratCom regroupe les forces strat\u00e9giques US, \u00e0 capacit\u00e9s g\u00e9n\u00e9rales (nucl\u00e9aires et conventionnelles). L&rsquo;information indique essentiellement que les militaires US ne veulent prendre aucun risque et lancer toute leurs forces pour \u00e9craser, ou tenter d&rsquo;\u00e9craser les capacit\u00e9s nucl\u00e9aires de l&rsquo;Iran dans une op\u00e9ration strat\u00e9gique majeure. C&rsquo;est un plan de force brute, bien dans la mani\u00e8re du Pentagone, exactement dans l&rsquo;esprit du commentaire de Lang (\u00ab<em>Shifting to StratCom indicates that they are talking about a really punishing air-force and naval air attack<\/em> [on Iran].\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa suite, sur la loyaut\u00e9 des militaires US vis-\u00e0-vis de Bush-Cheney, indique effectivement que les militaires se sont compl\u00e8tement align\u00e9s sur le pouvoir apr\u00e8s leurs <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=2862\" class=\"gen\">r\u00e9ticences initiales<\/a>. Toutes ces remarques de Lang laissent l&rsquo;impression assez effrayante d&rsquo;un pouvoir r\u00e9duit \u00e0 des prises de position parcellaires selon des int\u00e9r\u00eats de groupes. Elles semblent sugg\u00e9rer que l&rsquo;op\u00e9ration contre l&rsquo;Iran est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e par ceux-l\u00e0 m\u00eames qui vont l&rsquo;ex\u00e9cuter comme \u00e9tant \u00e0 la limite de la l\u00e9galit\u00e9, qu&rsquo;elle est con\u00e7ue comme un accord interne entre groupes d&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat.  La notion g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, de bien public, etc., semble tr\u00e8s \u00e9trang\u00e8re \u00e0 tout cela. Les grandioses th\u00e9ories strat\u00e9giques et g\u00e9opolitiques sur la possible attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran des analystes divers et vari\u00e9s sont \u00e9clair\u00e9es d&rsquo;une lumi\u00e8re \u00e9trange, dans un climat qui ressemble plus \u00e0 des arrangements entre mafieux. Ce climat contraste \u00e9videmment d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on tragique avec ce qui est en jeu, une attaque militaire majeure contre un pays souverain.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 9 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 05H52<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Poursuivons par un deuxi\u00e8me aspect le commentaire de l&rsquo;article de Craig Unger, d\u00e9j\u00e0 signal\u00e9 dans la note pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente. Nous citons d&rsquo;abord ce deuxi\u00e8me extrait qui nous para\u00eet int\u00e9ressant (tout l&rsquo;article est de cet int\u00e9r\u00eat et de cette haute tenue mais il faut bien choisir). Il concerne l&rsquo;Iran et la possible prochaine attaque contre ce pays&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[625,2773,6416,6417,6415,6104],"class_list":["post-68505","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-fair","tag-iran","tag-lang","tag-stratcom","tag-unger","tag-vanity"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68505","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68505"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68505\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68505"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68505"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68505"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}