La question de la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 du F-22 \u00e0 un environnement de brouillage (jamming<\/em>) qui ne lui est pas destin\u00e9 suscite quelques commentaires. (Nous avons d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 ce th\u00e8me dans un r\u00e9cent<\/a> Faits & Commentaires.) Le colonel Dan Smith, retir\u00e9 de l’U.S. Army, analyste \u00e0 Foreign Policy In Focus<\/em> et chercheur \u00e0 l’association Friends Committee on National Legislation, publie un article aujourd’hui<\/a> sur ce sujet, sur le site Atimes.com<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSes paragraphes de conclusion sont les suivants :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abUSAF General Ronald E Keys is concerned that the surveillance suite of the US$350 million F-22 may not be able to operate around Baghdad. Although nominally a fighter aircraft, the F-22 also can act as a signals intelligence interceptor, which would be its role in Iraq. Keys notes, however, that the electronic spectrum around Baghdad is polluted by the myriad jamming devices that coalition forces primarily employed to thwart remote detonations of the improvised explosive devices that have inflicted 70% of all US fatalities in that war.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe potential problem was discovered when the first F-22s were operating near US Navy ships off the Atlantic coast. Navy radars overwhelmed the F-22’s automated sensors. Even now, larger, multi-station, purpose-built electronic-intelligence-gathering airplanes encounter difficulties around the Iraqi capital because of the extreme density of jamming devices. Supporters of the F-22 propose that one headquarters should coordinate F-22 intelligence-collection missions with the use of both airborne and ground-based jammers.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAn alternative to the F-22 is the MQ-9 Predator. These carry both sensors and bombs and missiles, allowing the remote operator to see’ where the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is flying, avoid hazards, and deliver ordnance on target’. The differences and the choices are plain. One super-fast, super-expensive ($350 million each) manned airplane cannot, at this point, do a better job of collecting information about and reacting to insurgent movements than an $8.3 million UAV can.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbConsidering that political insiders are projecting a $700 billion budget for the Pentagon and the war on terror’ supplemental requests, new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ought to end Cold War programs like the F-22 before the rest of the money is lost to unneeded procurement.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAnd the future? Humans went from one-on-one fighting to massing armies of people. The next step was massing machines to kill people and then to kill masses of people with indiscriminate weapons. What we could use now are weapons that self-destruct before they are used, like the F-22 if it is effectively mothballed, followed by weapons that self-destruct in the computer design stage before they are built. That would save lives and money. Eventually, the reverse process could take us all the way back to not even thinking about weapons.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCes r\u00e9flexions comme cet article montrent que la question d’un environnement \u00e9lectronique toxique pour les syst\u00e8mes d’arme avanc\u00e9s attire l’attention, que le probl\u00e8me constat\u00e9 \u00e0 propos du F-22 est d’une r\u00e9elle importance. Une remarque d’une source militaire est que le probl\u00e8me \u00abdevrait s’av\u00e9rer tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieux et poser des interrogations existentielles quant au d\u00e9veloppement des technologies avanc\u00e9es, leur usage, leur int\u00e9r\u00eat, etc.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl faut ajouter, pour se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer \u00e0 un de nos sujets favoris, que le JSF, bien que de capacit\u00e9s beaucoup moins puissantes et d’autonomie d’action radicalement r\u00e9duite, est dans la m\u00eame cat\u00e9gorie que le F-22. Il en d\u00e9pendra en partie op\u00e9rationnellement. Le JSF devrait par cons\u00e9quent se heurter au m\u00eame probl\u00e8me existentiel, et doublement puisqu’il d\u00e9pend en partie du F-22. Cela donnera de quoi r\u00e9fl\u00e9chir, s’ils en ont le temps et l’opportunit\u00e9, et s’ils en sont inform\u00e9s, aux coop\u00e9rants non-US du programme, particuli\u00e8rement les Europ\u00e9ens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 10 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 10H34<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La question de la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 du F-22 \u00e0 un environnement de brouillage (jamming) qui ne lui est pas destin\u00e9 suscite quelques commentaires. (Nous avons d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 ce th\u00e8me dans un r\u00e9cent Faits & Commentaires.) Le colonel Dan Smith, retir\u00e9 de l’U.S. Army, analyste \u00e0 Foreign Policy In Focus et chercheur \u00e0 l’association Friends Committee on National… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6421,6419,249,857,6420,250],"class_list":["post-68509","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aveugle","tag-brouillage","tag-f-22","tag-irak","tag-jamming","tag-jsf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68509","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68509"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68509\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68509"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68509"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68509"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}