On conna\u00eet d\u00e9sormais le grand cas qu’il faut faire du budget du Pentagone pour l’ann\u00e9e 2008, et comment ce budget gargantuesque<\/a> est en m\u00eame temps un budget de famine<\/a>. Il est int\u00e9ressant de voir, dans ce contexte budg\u00e9taire si \u00e9tonnant, ce qu’on dit en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’avenir de notre programme pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9, le JSF\/F-35.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tRassurez-vous, la com\u00e9die n’est pas finie. Nous ne sommes pas au bout de notre chronique des aventures du JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’excellente et authoritative<\/em> publication Jane’s Defence Weekly<\/em> (en date du 14 f\u00e9vrier) consacre une partie de son analyse du FY2008 au JSF, sous le titre de \u00abJSF is new target<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abHowever, the JSF programme emerged drastically poorer from the long-term budget planning process that produced the FY08 spending request.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe air force, which is the JSF’s largest customer and has a huge influence on average unit production cost for the entire programme, delivered the biggest blow to the aircraft. To save money after FY12, the air force has decided to truncate its annual purchases to a maximum of 48 per year. The original plan called for full-rate production of 48 aircraft in FY12, which would continue to ramp up to a maximum of 110 aircraft per year.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSecond, the navy has dramatically restructured its short-term order acquisition plans for JSF, reducing orders over the next four years by 58 aircraft. Instead, the navy wants to partly fill the gap by ordering an additional 19 F\/A-18E\/Fs, including a request for 12 Super Hornets in the FY08 supplemental.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEn pr\u00e9sence d’un budget FY2008 jug\u00e9 catastrophique pour elle, il n’est plus question que l’USAF dissimule ou minimise les difficult\u00e9s de certains de ses programmes. D’o\u00f9 l’insistance des diff\u00e9rents canaux officieux de communication de l’USAF \u00e0 propos du cas du JSF\/F-35A et des menaces qui p\u00e8sent sur le programme. On en trouve un exemple dans le digest quotidien de l’Air Force Association, dans son \u00e9dition du 9 f\u00e9vrier<\/a> sous la signature du r\u00e9dacteur en chef de Air Force Magazine<\/em>, John A. Tirpak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe Wrong Number:<\/em><\/strong> The Fiscal 2008 Air Force budget request forecasts a maximum of 48 F-35s to be bought well into the next decade. That’s the wrong number, Air Combat Command chief Gen. Ronald Keys told AFA Air Warfare Symposium attendees on Friday. The bare minimum buy would have to be at least 80 a year in order to avoid doing yet another massive service life extension program on USAF’s F-16s, Keys reported. The ideal number would be 110 per year to modernize the fighter force in a reasonable amount of time, he said. Fortunately, the the train wreck doesn’t come inside the budget cycle, meaning the current future years defense plan, so there’s time to try to get the numbers right, Keys said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbPest Control:<\/em><\/strong> The Air Force’s budget enemies have finished beating up on the F-22 now that the aircraft is in the field and working beautifully, and the buy has been truncated to 183 airplanes, says Gen. Ron Keys, head of Air Combat Command. So that means they’ve moved on to the F-35, hoping to delay it long enough so that the price goes up and becomes unaffordable, asserted Keys, adding, There are always termites out there looking for something to feed on.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 12 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 16H44<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On conna\u00eet d\u00e9sormais le grand cas qu’il faut faire du budget du Pentagone pour l’ann\u00e9e 2008, et comment ce budget gargantuesque est en m\u00eame temps un budget de famine. Il est int\u00e9ressant de voir, dans ce contexte budg\u00e9taire si \u00e9tonnant, ce qu’on dit en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’avenir de notre programme pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9, le JSF\/F-35. Rassurez-vous, la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6412,250,3319,41],"class_list":["post-68520","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-fy2008","tag-jsf","tag-navy","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68520","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68520"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68520\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68520"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68520"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68520"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}