{"id":68525,"date":"2007-02-13T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-02-13T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/02\/13\/thinking-the-unthinkable-vraiment\/"},"modified":"2007-02-13T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-02-13T00:00:00","slug":"thinking-the-unthinkable-vraiment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/02\/13\/thinking-the-unthinkable-vraiment\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cThinking the unthinkable<\/em>\u201d, vraiment ?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00ab\u00a0Thinking the unthinkable<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0, vraiment ?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

L’affaire de la crise iranienne est tr\u00e8s surr\u00e9aliste. Elle est compr\u00e9hensible seulement par l’acceptation d’hypoth\u00e8ses inhabituelles comme celle d’un syst\u00e8me avan\u00e7ant par sa propre dynamique d’une part ; celle de l’existence d’un virtualisme aliment\u00e9 par une machinerie massive de d\u00e9sinformation consentie d\u00e9formant totalement la perception des milieux dirigeants d’autre part. Ainsi voit-on la dynamique de la guerre continuer \u00e0 avancer tandis que les manifestations \u00e9videntes de l’absurdit\u00e9 de ce projet, directement li\u00e9es \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, s’accumulent sans qu’il semble y avoir la moindre connexion possible entre les deux situations. Il y a notamment, pour la manifestation de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, sinon de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, le domaine de plus en plus fourni des affirmations de la possibilit\u00e9 de \u00ab\u00a0vivre\u00a0\u00bb avec un Iran nucl\u00e9aire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

C’est ce que Defense News<\/em> appelle, le 12 f\u00e9vrier, «Thinking the Unthinkable<\/em>», — et qui semble l’\u00eatre de moins en moins, puisque tout le monde y pense. Le texte donne en tous points le cr\u00e9dit qu’elle m\u00e9rite \u00e0 l’intervention plus ou moins d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e de Chirac, confirmant que celle-ci a bris\u00e9 un tabou<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«In a January 31 interview in Paris, French President Jacques Chirac appeared to endorse this view when he speculated that Iran would be unlikely to commit suicide by actually using the limited nuclear arsenal it could acquire in future. In highly controversial remarks, Chirac said Iranian possession of one or two nuclear bombs was unlikely to pose a grave danger, due to Israel’s so-called second-strike capabilities.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»\u00ab\u00a0Where will it drop it, this bomb? On Israel?\u00a0\u00bb Chirac was quoted as telling The New York Times and other publications. \u00ab\u00a0It would not have gone 200 meters into the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«Although the Elys\u00e9e Palace was quick to reiterate official French opposition to a nuclear-capable Iran, Chirac’s comments reflected a growing tendency to contemplate the so-called \u00ab\u00a0day after.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

L’article \u00e9nonce \u00e9galement plusieurs cas en cours de r\u00e9flexion dans les milieux strat\u00e9giques isra\u00e9liens sur la possibilit\u00e9 de rapports strat\u00e9giques avec l’Iran en cas de possession de l’arme nucl\u00e9aire par ce pays. Cette situation marque plus que dans n’importe quel autre pays le foss\u00e9 s\u00e9parant la position ultra-radicale du gouvernement (refus absolu de la possibilit\u00e9 que l’Iran ait la bombe) et celle des experts : «While the Israeli government remains adamantly opposed to the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, experts here are beginning to consider strategies for coping with the day after Tehran attains nuclear power status.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Defense News<\/em> mentionne une intervention du directeur de l’INSS (Institute for National Security Studies) isra\u00e9lien, qui prend en compte la possibilit\u00e9 d’un Iran devenant nucl\u00e9aire \u00e0 cause des capacit\u00e9s militaires trop r\u00e9duites des USA et d’Isra\u00ebl pour l’en emp\u00eacher. Le raisonnement est assez paradoxal par rapport \u00e0 ce qu’on sait de la r\u00e9putation de ces deux puissances puisqu’il revient \u00e0 plaider d’une fa\u00e7on d\u00e9fensive la capacit\u00e9 d’Isra\u00ebl et des USA de dissuader l’Iran devenu nucl\u00e9aire, et ainsi d’\u00e9tablir une situation de dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire r\u00e9ciproque.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»In a mid-January briefing with reporters here, INSS Director Zvi Shtauber cited an erosion of Israeli and U.S. conventional deterrence in the region following their respective wars in Lebanon and Iraq that could limit allied efforts to dissuade Iran from its nuclear weapon goals. However, if and when Iran attains such a capability, \u00ab\u00a0deterrence then assumes a whole new meaning\u00a0\u00bb in terms of the ability to defend and possibly retaliate against strategic attack, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»\u00ab\u00a0Israeli and American deterrence will prove enormously valuable in the context of a nuclear-capable Iran,\u00a0\u00bb Kam said. \u00ab\u00a0Firstly, Iran assumes Israel has a second-strike capability and will have to take into account that Israel will respond immediately. And secondly, Iran will have to consider America’s commitment to Israel’s security, especially if subsequent American administrations are as clear as President [George W.] Bush has been about defending Israel against an Iranian nuclear attack. I don’t think even [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad would want to sacrifice millions of his own people by actually using this capability.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Mis en ligne le 13 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 17H26<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00ab\u00a0Thinking the unthinkable\u00ab\u00a0, vraiment ? L’affaire de la crise iranienne est tr\u00e8s surr\u00e9aliste. Elle est compr\u00e9hensible seulement par l’acceptation d’hypoth\u00e8ses inhabituelles comme celle d’un syst\u00e8me avan\u00e7ant par sa propre dynamique d’une part ; celle de l’existence d’un virtualisme aliment\u00e9 par une machinerie massive de d\u00e9sinformation consentie d\u00e9formant totalement la perception des milieux dirigeants d’autre part.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[779,2929,2773,2774,3004],"class_list":["post-68525","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chirac","tag-dissuasion","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-nucleaire"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68525","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68525"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68525\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68525"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68525"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68525"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}