{"id":68528,"date":"2007-02-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-02-14T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/02\/14\/la-strategie-de-lenchainement-automatique-de-lattaque\/"},"modified":"2007-02-14T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-02-14T00:00:00","slug":"la-strategie-de-lenchainement-automatique-de-lattaque","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/02\/14\/la-strategie-de-lenchainement-automatique-de-lattaque\/","title":{"rendered":"La strat\u00e9gie de l&rsquo;encha\u00eenement automatique de l&rsquo;attaque"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>La crise iranienne et la possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran sont d\u00e9sormais le pot commun et la rengaine de notre actualit\u00e9. Le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.harpers.org\/sb-war-with-iran-1-1171385486.html\" class=\"gen\">13 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>, Ken Silverstein, de <em>Harper&rsquo;s Magazine<\/em>, a mis en ligne les avis de trois experts ind\u00e9pendants.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous retenons celui de A. Richard Norton, professeur de relations internationales \u00e0 l&rsquo;universit\u00e9 de Boston. Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 un des conseillers de l&rsquo;Iraq Study Group. Il doit publier prochainement <em>Hezbollah: A Short History<\/em> (Princeton University).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNorton pr\u00e9sente la th\u00e8se de l&rsquo;automatisme de la crise et de l&rsquo;attaque. Pour lui, \u00e0 partir du moment o\u00f9 des forces US sont rassembl\u00e9es dans une position strat\u00e9gique d&rsquo;attaque face \u00e0 l&rsquo;Iran (dans le Golfe), il devient inconcevable de ne pas s&rsquo;en servir, sous peine de se repr\u00e9senter qu&rsquo;on subit ainsi une d\u00e9faite diplomatique et strat\u00e9gique majeure,  et d&rsquo;ainsi la subir, par la perception elle-m\u00eame. En un sens, on cr\u00e9e une situation d&rsquo;obligation d&rsquo;attaque, par le simple encha\u00eenement de la disposition des forces sur place. C&rsquo;est un <em>remake<\/em> postmoderne de la mobilisation c&rsquo;est la guerre, constat paradoxal fameux, valant pour la Russie tsariste en 1914 (\u00e0 partir du moment o\u00f9 le processus de mobilisation, tr\u00e8s long et socialement et politiquement tr\u00e8s d\u00e9stabilisant, \u00e9tait lanc\u00e9, une d\u00e9mobilisation n&rsquo;\u00e9tait plus concevable \u00e0 cause du chaos cr\u00e9\u00e9 ; l&rsquo;encha\u00eenement vers la guerre \u00e9tait automatique).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>In recent weeks, the Bush Administration has dramatically improved its capacity for striking Iran. It is doubtful that a decision to go to war has been made, but in the weeks ahead officials and war advocates will describe an attack on Iran as both feasible and necessary, particularly if Iran persists in developing its isotope-enrichment program. Even born-again critics of the Iraq war, notably Hillary Clinton, go to pains to emphasize that a nuclear-capable Iran is intolerable and that all options must be kept open to deal with Iran. Israel&rsquo;s concerns weigh significantly in Washington decision-making as well, and the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons capacity is understood in Israel to be an existential threat. Although a credible case may be made for deterring Iran&rsquo;s nuclear ambitions through non-military means, neither the Bush Administration nor the Israeli government has embraced that possibility.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Remember that in 199091 and then again in 2003 the very fact that the United States assembled a formidable array of forces in the Gulf region became an argument for using those forces and launching wars. The United States will soon have two carrier task forces on station, and perhaps a third carrier task force will soon be deployed. It will be difficult for the United States to step down from its combative perch without Iran accepting some fairly significant concessions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The idea that the U.S. could bomb Iran surgically, gain Iranian compliance, and then bolster the American position in the Middle East is risky in the extreme. A U.S. attack would undermine pragmatic voices in Iran, revive Iranian nationalism, provide incentives for Iran to make life extremely difficult for the U.S. in Iraq and elsewhere, and probably impede the international trade in petroleum. Support for the United States is already weak among Iraq&rsquo;s Shiite community. The idea that America could align with a majority-Shiite government in Baghdad and simultaneously attack Iran is delusional. If America loses mass support among Iraqi Shiite, then the movie is over.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa conclusion du professeur Norton est sans appel : \u00ab<em>Surveying U.S. history, one is hard-pressed to find presidential decisions as monumentally ill-informed and counterproductive as the decision to invade and occupy Iraq; however, a decision to go to war against Iran would arguably surpass the Iraq war as the worst foreign policy decision ever made by an American president.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 14 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 15H19<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La crise iranienne et la possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran sont d\u00e9sormais le pot commun et la rengaine de notre actualit\u00e9. Le 13 f\u00e9vrier, Ken Silverstein, de Harper&rsquo;s Magazine, a mis en ligne les avis de trois experts ind\u00e9pendants. Nous retenons celui de A. Richard Norton, professeur de relations internationales \u00e0 l&rsquo;universit\u00e9 de Boston. Il&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2870,6431,5036,2773,5206],"class_list":["post-68528","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-attaque","tag-enchainement","tag-harper","tag-iran","tag-norton"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68528","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68528"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68528\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68528"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68528"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68528"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}