A propos de la conf\u00e9rence de presse du 14 f\u00e9vrier \u00e0 la Maison-Blanche, au cours de laquelle GW nous donnait ses consid\u00e9rations<\/a> sur sa solitude, Robert Dreyfuss tire une r\u00e9flexion sur TomPaine.com<\/em>, le 15 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>, o\u00f9 il constate les difficult\u00e9s consid\u00e9rables du Pr\u00e9sident dans la t\u00e2che qu’il semble s’\u00eatre confi\u00e9e de r\u00e9duire \u00e0 merci, d’une fa\u00e7on ou l’autre, les Iraniens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t(On comprend combien la faiblesse de l’argument de Bush est en rapport direct avec ses consid\u00e9rations sur sa solitude, sur sa difficult\u00e9 d’\u00e9valuer la situation sur le terrain, en Irak.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDreyfuss met en \u00e9vidence que le Pr\u00e9sident est isol\u00e9 ; que les puissantes structures d’influence et de d\u00e9sinformation, dont il disposait en 2002 (en pr\u00e9paration de l’attaque contre l’Irak) n’existent plus ; que ses arguments sont extr\u00eamement faibles par rapport \u00e0 ceux dont il disposait en 2002 pour lancer l’attaque contre l’Irak (d’o\u00f9 le titre du commentaire de Dreyfuss : \u00abBreakdown At The Iraq Lie Factory<\/em>\u00bb). Dreyfuss d\u00e9peint le d\u00e9sarroi consid\u00e9rable de Bush, son incapacit\u00e9 de d\u00e9velopper un raisonnement acceptable, sa confusion, etc. Cela n’a rien \u00e0 voir avec 2002, avec les certitudes roboratives du pr\u00e9sident triomphant, avec son patriotisme enflamm\u00e9 soutenu par une majorit\u00e9 \u00e9crasante d’Am\u00e9ricains. Au terme de cette analyse se d\u00e9gage l’impression d’un amateurisme complet, d’une consid\u00e9rable impuissance d’action d’influence. On voit difficilement comment Bush et son \u00e9quipe pourraient parvenir \u00e0 monter un argumentaire acceptable pouvant justifier une logique conduisant \u00e0 une attaque de l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWithout his Orwellian apparatus behind him, the president spent most of his hour-long news conference yesterday shrugging and smirking, jutting his jaw out with false bravado, joshing inappropriately with reporters asking deadly serious questions and stumbling over his words. It was painful to listen to him trying to justify the nonsensical claims that Iran and its paramilitary Quds Force are somehow responsible for the chaos in Iraq:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhat we do know is that the Quds force was instrumental in providing these deadly IEDs to networks inside of Iraq. We know that. And we also know that the Quds force is a part of the Iranian government. That’s a known. What we don’t know is whether or not the head leaders of Iran ordered the Quds force to do what they did.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbPressed about what the head leaders are doing, he went on:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbEither they knew or didn’t know, and what matters is, is that they’re there. What’s worse, that the government knew or that the government didn’t know? What’s worse, them ordering it and it happening, or them not ordering it and it happening?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIf that makes no sense to you, well, that’s because the whole thing makes no sense. It’s a farcical replay of Iraq 2002, when the White House demonized Saddam Hussein with fake intelligence, turning him into a menacing al-Qaida backer armed with weapons of mass destruction. This time, however, the lie factory has been dismantled. All by himself, the president is trying to turn Iran into a scary, al-Qaida-allied, nuke-wielding menace. But he’s not fooling anyone. The potent war president of 2002-2003 is now an incoherent, mewling Wizard of Oz-like figure, and people are paying attention to the man behind the curtain.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbUnlike 2002, when the White House fired salvo after salvo of fake intelligence about Iraq, today it can’t even stage its lies properly. Like the incompetents who couldn’t organize a two-car funeral, the remaining Iran war hawks in the administration held a briefing in Baghdad on Sunday to present alleged evidence that Iran is masterminding the insurgency in Iraq. But it was a comedy of errors that convinced no one. Twice, at least, the administration had earlier postponed or canceled the much-promoted event, designed to reveal the supposed secrets behind Iran’s actions in Iraq. When it was finally held, it was not in Washington, but in Baghdad, with not a single White House official, no U.S. diplomat, no State Department official, no CIA official and no one from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Instead, a couple of anonymous military officers held a background-only briefing, barring cameras and tape recorders, to present some blurry photographs of bomb-looking thingsand not a shred of evidence of Iranian government involvement.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 16 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 13H43<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" A propos de la conf\u00e9rence de presse du 14 f\u00e9vrier \u00e0 la Maison-Blanche, au cours de laquelle GW nous donnait ses consid\u00e9rations sur sa solitude, Robert Dreyfuss tire une r\u00e9flexion sur TomPaine.com, le 15 f\u00e9vrier, o\u00f9 il constate les difficult\u00e9s consid\u00e9rables du Pr\u00e9sident dans la t\u00e2che qu’il semble s’\u00eatre confi\u00e9e de r\u00e9duire \u00e0 merci, d’une… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6440,6439,3198,857,2773,3364],"class_list":["post-68534","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-argument","tag-dreyfuss","tag-gw","tag-irak","tag-iran","tag-presse"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68534","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68534"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68534\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68534"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68534"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68534"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}