18 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>. Cockburn nous fait un rapide et court rappel historique puis une r\u00e9cente \u00e9volution du Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Le rappel historique est le compte-rendu d’une attaque sur une route, contre un convoi, \u00e0 l’aide d’une voiture pi\u00e9g\u00e9e. Impressionnants et efficaces, ces IED contre lesquels se coltine le Pentagone. A part que le compte-rendu est britannique, qu’il date de 1921 en Irak. Bref, rien de nouveau et, depuis que l’explosif et la gu\u00e9rilla existent, l’IED existe : \u00abIEDs have not changed much in the decades that followed. They have been used everywhere from Cyprus to Vietnam. They are cheap and easy to make, and can be detonated by a single person.<\/em>\u00bb Le branle-bas du Pentagone contre la nouvelle menace IED, avec ses investissements colossaux, est bien ce qu’il est : effectivement colossal, malgr\u00e9 tout pitoyable et, dans tous les cas, simplement path\u00e9tique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Lorsque les Am\u00e9ricains arriv\u00e8rent, triomphants, en Irak, ils rencontr\u00e8rent l’IED. Cela n’\u00e9tait pas pr\u00e9vu. \u00abThey came as a nasty shock to the incoming US soldiers who invaded Iraq in 2003 because they were so well equipped to fight the Soviet army American military procurement long ago detached itself from real conditions on the battlefield.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Plus pr\u00e8s de nous, nous apprend Cockburn, voil\u00e0 que l’IED n’existe pas. Ce qui est proclam\u00e9 aujourd’hui comme la plus grave menace contre la plus grande puissance du monde et argument potentiel de l’\u00e9crasement de l’Irak \u00e9tait, en 2004, tout simplement interdit d’antenne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abIn early 2004 I met some US combat engineers, or sappers, charged with the lethal job of finding these bombs, which were nicknamed convoy killers. Because the Pentagon was in a state of denial about their very existence, the sappers had received no training in locating them. A sergeant told me that he had obtained with great difficulty an old but still valid US army handbook, printed during the Vietnam War, about IEDs. The book had not been reissued because to do so might appear to contradict the Pentagon’s line that Iraq was not like Vietnam.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 19 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 15H42<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
On sait que l’IED (Improvised Explosive Devices, en gros et notamment, les voitures-pi\u00e9g\u00e9es, suicides, etc.) est tout en haut sur la liste des menaces pour le Pentagone, largement au-dessus des sous-marins lanceurs d’engins balistiques et des bombardiers furtifs bourr\u00e9s de bombes thermonucl\u00e9aires. Cette cat\u00e9gorisation mena\u00e7ante a pris des proportions \u00e9tonnantes. L’IED n’est rien moins que… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1135,4684,857,3783,3194],"class_list":["post-68545","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-cockburn","tag-ied","tag-irak","tag-manhattan","tag-pentagone"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68545","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68545"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68545\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68545"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68545"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68545"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}