Renunciation of reality.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tGreenway pose cette question qui para\u00eet fondamentale : Bush attaquera-t-il ou non l’Iran? Les hypoth\u00e8ses examin\u00e9es pour percer ce myst\u00e8re formidable qui demande des moyens terrifiants et des d\u00e9cisions politiques essentielles, qui devraient nous conduire \u00e0 des faits g\u00e9opolitiques essentiels, des faits objectifs ais\u00e9ment mesurables, nous conduisent au contraire \u00e0 une \u00e9trange question. Il s’agit de la question de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abI heard one of America’s foremost experts on Iran, Gary Sick of Columbia University, say on National Public Radio that he didn’t think war was on the way because he didn’t believe that the White House had completely renounced reality. And there you have the nub of the question.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbPessimists argue that the hallmark of the Bush presidency is the renunciation of reality.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBush turned his back on the realists’ that made up his father’s national security team. He ignored the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations for de-escalation and containing America’s failure in Iraq, as well as its recommendations for talks with Iran and Syria. Vice President Dick Cheney is still in denial about Iraq and is still talking about progress being made while the raveling of Iraq unfolds before him.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tSuivent \u00e0 nouveau des consid\u00e9rations objectives sur les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s politiques mais cette incursion dans la psychologie semble avoir fix\u00e9 l’enjeu de la chose. Toutes les hypoth\u00e8ses et les analyses semblent effectivement soumises \u00e0 cette \u00e9trange question : le pr\u00e9sident acceptera-t-il ou non la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 ? comme on dirait : acceptera-t-il ou non que l’Iran ait la bombe ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLa question porte sur le concept m\u00eame de r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Elle revient \u00e0 dire : Bush a le choix entre la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 et quelque chose d’autre que la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, pour prendre une d\u00e9cision r\u00e9elle<\/strong> de l’importance qu’on sait. Cette remarque implicite, dont on mesure la force extraordinaire et le caract\u00e8re extraordinairement insolite, semble pourtant d\u00e9crire ce qui est devenu une sorte de facteur objectif du d\u00e9bat autour de la crise iranienne aux USA. C’est une situation \u00e9trange, qui d\u00e9crit un comportement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral la prise de d\u00e9cision dans une telle crise o\u00f9 le fait de l’acceptation ou pas de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 semble effectivement \u00eatre devenu un des aspects importants de la d\u00e9lib\u00e9ration strat\u00e9gique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’esprit semble d\u00e9sormais accepter le m\u00e9lange de la perception objective du monde et des supputations autour de la subjectivit\u00e9 extr\u00eame d’une psychologie malade. Tout se passe comme si un \u00e9l\u00e9ment d’une extr\u00eame subjectivit\u00e9 \u00e9tait int\u00e9gr\u00e9 dans le processus de la d\u00e9cision comme s’il \u00e9tait un \u00e9l\u00e9ment compl\u00e8tement objectif.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tUne sorte de faut faire avec tr\u00e8s in\u00e9dit, sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent, stup\u00e9fiant si l’on consid\u00e8re son importance et la place qu’il occupe dans la perception de l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 21 f\u00e9vrier 2007 \u00e0 05H43<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
La question de la crise iranienne est certainement, dans la p\u00e9riode actuelle, l’une des plus fascinantes quant \u00e0 son moteur et \u00e0 ses motifs du point de vue des USA. Un article de H.D.S. Greenway, dans l’International Herald Tribune (The Boston Globe) d’aujourd’hui nous le dit d\u00e8s son titre : \u00abRenunciation of reality.\u00bb Greenway pose… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3198,2773,5899],"class_list":["post-68549","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-gw","tag-iran","tag-realite"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68549","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68549"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68549\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68549"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68549"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68549"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}