{"id":68584,"date":"2007-03-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-03-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/02\/que-faire-du-traite-inf\/"},"modified":"2007-03-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-03-02T00:00:00","slug":"que-faire-du-traite-inf","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/02\/que-faire-du-traite-inf\/","title":{"rendered":"Que faire du trait\u00e9 INF ?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Que faire du trait\u00e9 INF ?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

Apr\u00e8s les agitations diverses autour de la question des syst\u00e8mes BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) en Europe, en Pologne (et en Tch\u00e9quie) plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, il y a des indications s\u00e9rieuses sur un vigoureux d\u00e9bat en cours en Russie. Le th\u00e8me : faut-il ou non sortir du trait\u00e9 INF (FNI) de d\u00e9cembre 1987, sur l’\u00e9limination des forces nucl\u00e9aires interm\u00e9diaires ? Martin Sieff, de UPI, analyse ce d\u00e9bat, et son texte est repris dans Spacewar.com<\/em> ce 2 mars<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«A remarkable strategic debate has opened up in the Russian media about the merits and pitfalls of withdrawing from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. As we reported in BMD Focus last week, Russia’s most senior generals have already publicly served notice that the Kremlin is prepared to pull out of the more than 19-year-old INF, which has been a cornerstone of superpower detente since it was signed on Dec. 8, 1987. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\u00ab\u00a0If a political decision is taken to quit the treaty, the Strategic Missile Forces are ready to carry out this task,\u00a0\u00bb SMF Commander Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov told a news conference in Moscow on Feb. 19, according to a report from the RIA Novosti news agency.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«Solovtsov’s statement followed hard on the heels of a warning the previous week from his boss, four-star Army Gen. Yury Baluyevsky, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, that Russia may unilaterally scrap the nearly-20-year-old INF.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»\u00ab\u00a0It is possible for a party to abandon the treaty (unilaterally) if it provides convincing evidence that it is necessary to do so,\u00a0\u00bb Baluyevsky said Feb. 15. \u00ab\u00a0We currently have such evidence.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»RIA Novosti explicitly linked this threat to the Bush administration’s determination to push ahead with plans to build a base for ground-abased anti-ballistic missile interceptors in Poland and a radar tacking facility to guide them in the neighboring Czech Republic.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Sieff note qu’un article de l’analyste Andrei Kislyakov, publi\u00e9 par Novosti, repris par UPI et par SpaceWar.com<\/em> (et disponible par le m\u00eame lien<\/a> qui conduit \u00e0 l’analyse de Sieff) argumente fermement en faveur du maintien de la Russie dans le trait\u00e9 INF, notamment selon des arguments techniques et budg\u00e9taires (difficult\u00e9s et coût d’une op\u00e9ration de relance d’un programme de missiles nucl\u00e9aires interm\u00e9diaires type-SS-20 modernis\u00e9s).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

C’est surtout l’ouverture et, disons, l’aspect pluraliste et d\u00e9mocratique du d\u00e9bat que Sieff met en \u00e9vidence. Mais il s’agit d’un d\u00e9bat qui est conduit dans l’establishment<\/em> russe \u00e0 partir d’une position de force de la Russie, nullement \u00e0 partir de la position de faiblesse du temps d’Eltsine. Il d\u00e9bouchera sans aucun doute sur une position affirm\u00e9e, claire et qui tiendra compte d’abord des int\u00e9r\u00eats russes. La d\u00e9cision qui en sera tir\u00e9e, qui sera une \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9ponse offensive\u00a0\u00bb de la Russie, constituera un pas important dans l’\u00e9volution de la crise Euromissiles-II.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«But Kislyakov’s article is of prime importance for several other reasons. First, it confirms that a healthy, open debate on major national security issues still exists in Russia’s print and electronic media.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»Second, it raises important issues of what Russia’s spending priorities should be given its impressive and once again expanding, but still finite aerospace industrial resources.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»Third, the debate Kislyakov has opened is of note because it is not about responding from weakness, but about different ways of responding to strategic developments from strength. Industrially and financially, militarily and strategically, Russia is once again on the global upswing after a quarter century of relative and absolute decline.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»Debates how to respond to challenges from a position of strength are very different from debates about to how to respond to problems from positions of weakness. The arguments now being heard in Moscow are much more likely to lead to effective answers.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Mis en ligne le 2 mars 2007 \u00e0 16H07<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Que faire du trait\u00e9 INF ? Apr\u00e8s les agitations diverses autour de la question des syst\u00e8mes BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) en Europe, en Pologne (et en Tch\u00e9quie) plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, il y a des indications s\u00e9rieuses sur un vigoureux d\u00e9bat en cours en Russie. Le th\u00e8me : faut-il ou non sortir du trait\u00e9 INF (FNI) de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3453,3228,6484,6486,2730,6487,4495],"class_list":["post-68584","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anti-missiles","tag-crise","tag-euromissiles-ii","tag-inf","tag-russie","tag-ss-20","tag-traite"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68584","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68584"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68584\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68584"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68584"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68584"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}