{"id":68586,"date":"2007-03-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-03-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/03\/une-horreur-diplomatique-lambassade-us-a-bagdad\/"},"modified":"2007-03-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-03-03T00:00:00","slug":"une-horreur-diplomatique-lambassade-us-a-bagdad","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/03\/une-horreur-diplomatique-lambassade-us-a-bagdad\/","title":{"rendered":"Une \u201chorreur diplomatique\u201d : l&rsquo;ambassade US \u00e0 Bagdad"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>L&rsquo;ambassade US \u00e0 Bagdad est un <em>must<\/em> r\u00e9sumant la monstruosit\u00e9 et les erreurs de la campagne am\u00e9ricaniste en Irak. Un texte du Washington <em>Post<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2007\/03\/01\/AR2007030101497_pf.html\" class=\"gen\">2 mars<\/a> donne quelques pr\u00e9cisions qui confirment largement ce jugement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  L&rsquo;ambassade de Bagdad est, de loin, la premi\u00e8re mission diplomatique US \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tranger : en personnel (1.000, contre 590 \u00e0 l&rsquo;ambassade de Mexico, 430 \u00e0 l&rsquo;ambassade de P\u00e9kin et 429 \u00e0 l&rsquo;ambassade de Londres) ; en budget <strong>de fonctionnement<\/strong> ($923 millions, contre $49 millions \u00e0 celle de P\u00e9kin, $36 millions \u00e0 celle de Mexico, $31 millions \u00e0 celle de Londres).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  La moiti\u00e9 du personnel d\u00e9pend du d\u00e9partement d&rsquo;Etat, le reste d&rsquo;une vingtaine de d\u00e9partements et d&rsquo;agences. Le d\u00e9partement le plus repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 parmi ce reste est celui de la justice (90 fonctionnaires), l&rsquo;agence la plus repr\u00e9sent\u00e9e est la CIA (nombre inconnu).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  Malgr\u00e9 les primes exorbitantes offertes, le d\u00e9partement d&rsquo;Etat est en manque chronique de personnel pour ses rotations et envisage m\u00eame des assignations autoritaires : \u00ab<em>The teeming embassy masks a desperate need for civilians to aid the reconstruction effort. To lure more, federal employees are offered 70 percent more than their base salaries for Iraq service, plus overtime, or special premiums for working long hours, according to the Office of Personnel Management. It is possible for senior employees to earn more than the secretary of state, who makes $186,600 a year.<\/em> [Steve Kashkett, State Department vice president for the American Foreign Service Association] <em>said 1,700 diplomats have stepped up for Iraq service since 2003  about 20 percent of those eligible to go. The State Department has discussed drafting personnel.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  Un bon jugement sur cette ambassade d\u00e9mente est donn\u00e9 par l&rsquo;ancien secr\u00e9taire d&rsquo;Etat Lawrence Eagleburger, r\u00e9publicain, proche de James Baker et membre de l&rsquo;Iraq Study Group : \u00ab<em>I defy anyone to tell me how you can use that many people. It is nuts . . . it&rsquo;s insane and it&rsquo;s counterproductive . . . and it won&rsquo;t work. I&rsquo;ve been around the State Department long enough to know you can&rsquo;t run an outfit like that.<\/em>\u00bb Conclusion et d\u00e9finition de Eagleburger : \u00ab<em>We&rsquo;re throwing people and money at something without estimating what the culture demands. It&rsquo;s hubris.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 3 mars 2007 \u00e0 08H49<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;ambassade US \u00e0 Bagdad est un must r\u00e9sumant la monstruosit\u00e9 et les erreurs de la campagne am\u00e9ricaniste en Irak. Un texte du Washington Post du 2 mars donne quelques pr\u00e9cisions qui confirment largement ce jugement. L&rsquo;ambassade de Bagdad est, de loin, la premi\u00e8re mission diplomatique US \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tranger : en personnel (1.000, contre 590 \u00e0&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6489,632,3889,3888,3938,2671],"class_list":["post-68586","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-ambassade","tag-bagdad","tag-detat","tag-departement","tag-eagleburger","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68586","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68586"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68586\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68586"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68586"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68586"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}