{"id":68592,"date":"2007-03-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-03-05T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/05\/sept-guerres-victorieuses-en-5-ans\/"},"modified":"2007-03-05T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-03-05T00:00:00","slug":"sept-guerres-victorieuses-en-5-ans","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/05\/sept-guerres-victorieuses-en-5-ans\/","title":{"rendered":"Sept guerres (victorieuses) en 5 ans"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">Sept guerres (victorieuses) en 5 ans<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>L&rsquo;histoire r\u00e9cente, surtout celle qui se presse autour du 9\/11, est aussi passionnante qu&rsquo;elle reste \u00e0 faire. Nous avons suivi le conseil de notre lecteur \u00ab\u00a0Rakk\u00a0\u00bb, <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/forum.php\">le 4 mars 2007<\/a> sur notre &lsquo;Forum&rsquo;, et avons consult\u00e9 l&rsquo;interview du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Clark sur le point indiqu\u00e9. Nous avons retrouv\u00e9 la transcription sur <em>Democracy Now !<\/em> le <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.democracynow.org\/article.pl?sid=07\/03\/02\/1440234\">2 mars 2007<\/a> (en effet, Clark est interview\u00e9 par Amy Goodman). Nous avons pens\u00e9 que nos lecteurs aimeraient avoir imm\u00e9diatement acc\u00e8s au passage concern\u00e9, &mdash; que voici :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"normal\" style=\"font-size:1.05em\">\n<p><p><strong><em>AMY GOODMAN:<\/em><\/strong> <em>Do you see a replay in what happened in the lead-up to the war with Iraq &mdash; the allegations of the weapons of mass destruction, the media leaping onto the bandwagon?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong><em>GEN. WESLEY CLARK:<\/em><\/strong> <em>Well, in a way. But, you know, history doesn&rsquo;t repeat itself exactly twice. What I did warn about when I testified in front of Congress in 2002, I said if you want to worry about a state, it shouldn&rsquo;t be Iraq, it should be Iran. But this government, our administration, wanted to worry about Iraq, not Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>I knew why, because I had been through the Pentagon right after 9\/11. About ten days after 9\/11, I went through the Pentagon and I saw Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. I went downstairs just to say hello to some of the people on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the generals called me in. He said, \u00ab\u00a0Sir, you&rsquo;ve got to come in and talk to me a second.\u00a0\u00bb I said, \u00ab\u00a0Well, you&rsquo;re too busy.\u00a0\u00bb He said, \u00ab\u00a0No, no.\u00a0\u00bb He says, \u00ab\u00a0We&rsquo;ve made the decision we&rsquo;re going to war with Iraq.\u00a0\u00bb This was on or about the 20th of September. I said, \u00ab\u00a0We&rsquo;re going to war with Iraq? Why?\u00a0\u00bb He said, \u00ab\u00a0I don&rsquo;t know.\u00a0\u00bb He said, \u00ab\u00a0I guess they don&rsquo;t know what else to do.\u00a0\u00bb So I said, \u00ab\u00a0Well, did they find some information connecting Saddam to al-Qaeda?\u00a0\u00bb He said, \u00ab\u00a0No, no.\u00a0\u00bb He says, \u00ab\u00a0There&rsquo;s nothing new that way. They just made the decision to go to war with Iraq.\u00a0\u00bb He said, \u00ab\u00a0I guess it&rsquo;s like we don&rsquo;t know what to do about terrorists, but we&rsquo;ve got a good military and we can take down governments.\u00a0\u00bb And he said, \u00ab\u00a0I guess if the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem has to look like a nail.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, \u00ab\u00a0Are we still going to war with Iraq?\u00a0\u00bb And he said, \u00ab\u00a0Oh, it&rsquo;s worse than that.\u00a0\u00bb He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, \u00ab\u00a0I just got this down from upstairs\u00a0\u00bb &mdash; meaning the Secretary of Defense&rsquo;s office &mdash; \u00ab\u00a0today.\u00a0\u00bb And he said, \u00ab\u00a0This is a memo that describes how we&rsquo;re going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.\u00a0\u00bb I said, \u00ab\u00a0Is it classified?\u00a0\u00bb He said, \u00ab\u00a0Yes, sir.\u00a0\u00bb I said, \u00ab\u00a0Well, don&rsquo;t show it to me.\u00a0\u00bb And I saw him a year or so ago, and I said, \u00ab\u00a0You remember that?\u00a0\u00bb He said, \u00ab\u00a0Sir, I didn&rsquo;t show you that memo! I didn&rsquo;t show it to you!\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong><em>AMY GOODMAN:<\/em><\/strong> <em>I&rsquo;m sorry. What did you say his name was?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong><em>GEN. WESLEY CLARK:<\/em><\/strong> <em>I&rsquo;m not going to give you his name.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong><em>AMY GOODMAN<\/em><\/strong>: <em>So, go through the countries again.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong><em>GEN. WESLEY CLARK:<\/em><\/strong> <em>Well, starting with Iraq, then Syria and Lebanon, then Libya, then Somalia and Sudan, and back to Iran. So when you look at Iran, you say, \u00ab\u00a0Is it a replay?\u00a0\u00bb It&rsquo;s not exactly a replay&hellip;<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>L&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat dans l&rsquo;interview de Clark, nous semble-t-il, se trouve dans les motivations des attaques et, d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, dans le climat qui r\u00e9gnait au Pentagone dans les jours qui ont suivi 9\/11. L&rsquo;impression g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est d&rsquo;une part d&rsquo;une grande confusion (du style : pourquoi vont-ils attaquer l&rsquo;Irak ? \u00ab\u00a0<em>J&rsquo;imagine  qu&rsquo;ils ne savent pas quoi faire d&rsquo;autre<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0) ; d&rsquo;autre part, d&rsquo;une r\u00e9elle incertitude et de l&rsquo;abdication de toute volont\u00e9 devant la dynamique de moyens, &mdash; dynamique aux effets bien mal mesur\u00e9s certes ( \u00ab\u00a0<em>C&rsquo;est comme les terroristes : on ne sait pas comment les g\u00e9rer mais comme on a une bonne arm\u00e9e on peut renverser des gouvernements<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il y a par contre l&rsquo;extraordinaire certitude dans la puissance militaire US. Envisager 7 invasions en 5 ans, lorsqu&rsquo;on mesure ce que nous dit la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 depuis 5 ans, est \u00e9difiant. D\u00e8s ces premiers instants, toutes les faiblesses am\u00e9ricanistes apparaissent : vanit\u00e9, aveuglement, autisme, improvisation, lourdeur bureaucratique, absence d&rsquo;imagination.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 5 mars 2007 \u00e0 05H50<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Sept guerres (victorieuses) en 5 ans L&rsquo;histoire r\u00e9cente, surtout celle qui se presse autour du 9\/11, est aussi passionnante qu&rsquo;elle reste \u00e0 faire. Nous avons suivi le conseil de notre lecteur \u00ab\u00a0Rakk\u00a0\u00bb, le 4 mars 2007 sur notre &lsquo;Forum&rsquo;, et avons consult\u00e9 l&rsquo;interview du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Clark sur le point indiqu\u00e9. Nous avons retrouv\u00e9 la transcription&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[354,370,2623,3168,6492,2645,3650,857,2773,3216,3194,6491],"class_list":["post-68592","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-354","tag-370","tag-bureaucratie","tag-clark","tag-conquete","tag-guerre","tag-hegemonie","tag-irak","tag-iran","tag-neocon","tag-pentagone","tag-projets"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68592","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68592"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68592\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68592"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68592"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68592"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}