5 mars<\/a>, et pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment la position du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Pace.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abDuring a White House meeting last week, a group of governors asked President Bush and Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about their backup plan for Iraq. What would the administration do if its new strategy didn’t work?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe conclusion they took away, the governors later said, was that there is no Plan B. I’m a Marine, Pace told them, and Marines don’t talk about failure. They talk about victory.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbPace had a simple way of summarizing the administration’s position, Gov. Phil Bredesen (D-Tenn.) recalled. Plan B was to make Plan A work.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCela dit officiellement comme ouverture du texte, suit une cascade de propositions de Plan B, montrant qu’il s’agit l\u00e0 d’une sp\u00e9culation majeure de la communaut\u00e9 US de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Le plus original \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard est le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Gates, qui d\u00e9roge \u00e0 la r\u00e8gle non \u00e9crite pour les officiels de traiter les situations per\u00e7ues comme extr\u00eamement d\u00e9licates. (\u00abI would be irresponsible if I weren’t thinking about what the alternatives might be, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates acknowledged last month to Congress, where many favor gradual or immediate withdrawal.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 7 mars 2007 \u00e0 23H34<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
En avril 1973, deux journalistes belges r\u00e9alis\u00e8rent une interview du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Goodpaster, occupant alors la fonction de SACEUR (Supreme Commander Europe, ou commandant en chef des forces de l’OTAN). Il \u00e9tait alors tr\u00e8s fortement question du retrait de 100.000 soldats US d’Europe, sur la pression du Congr\u00e8s (notamment l’action du s\u00e9nateur Manfield). La question fut… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3109,3984,6498,857,4519,2681],"class_list":["post-68599","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-b","tag-gates","tag-goodpaster","tag-irak","tag-pace","tag-plan"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68599","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68599"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68599\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68599"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68599"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68599"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}