ce jour<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abConventional military theory calls these conflicts fourth generation wars (4GW), succeeding conventional, nuclear and guerrilla ones. They are wholly new, characterised by a blurred line between civil and military realms, an absence of any clear enemy, a disregard of national boundaries, the exploitation of terror to incur overreaction and a reliance on primitive ethnic and religious sympathy to achieve a political goal.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAbove all, 4GW involves trapping the enemy into a blundering counterproductive response, much as a cunning wrestler uses the superior weight of an opponent to bring about his fall. The American and British responses to 9\/11 ignored all the maxims of 4GW.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbA 4GW army is not about capture and hold, nor even winning hearts and minds, since its objective is not to defeat an army or dominate territory.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt is to prevent the dissemination of ideas and restrict the manoeuvre of those who plot terrorism. Such an army is light, mobile and possibly secret. Its interventions barely qualify for the term military but are rather diplomatic, economic and propagandist. If an army stays too long on foreign soil after its initial thrust it becomes a hated occupier. Its gains are consolidated by contractors, aid workers, journalists and spies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbA 4GW victory may be no more than a tilt in the balance of power within a regime, to encourage the suppression of a terrorist cell. Such wars are not pursued by threats, sanctions or military assault, so often welcomed by an embattled enemy. America’s most effective 4GW was to support the mujaheddin (later the Taliban) to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan in the late 1980s hardly anyone knew.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tIl n’est pas inint\u00e9ressant d’ajouter \u00e0 ces quelques extraits du commentaire de Jenkins, un commentaire ajout\u00e9 \u00e0 son texte par un lecteur. Encourageant pour la compr\u00e9hension du concept.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abSimon Jenkins states military theory calls these conflicts fourth generation wars (4GW), succeeding conventional, nuclear and guerrilla ones. Rubbish! 4GW was first published in 1989, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.’ (Lind et al) Four Generations began with Peace of Westphalia (1648);arguing that this established a state monopoly on war. Previously, different entities fought wars (families, cities, etc) First Generation War runs roughly to 1860(Napoleonic line and column tactics). 2GW is massed firepower: WW1 is typical. 3GW is manoeuver (Blitzkreig tactics in WW2). In 4GW, the state loses its monopoly on war and we return to an era of warfare reminiscent of pre-1648 with non-state actors and intra-state rather than inter-state war dominating. There is some empirical evidence to support. Guerilla warfare, terrorism, civil war etc are typical 4GW examples. Hence the generations should read line and column, massed firepower and manoeuver!<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAndy, London, UK<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 11 mars 2007 \u00e0 12H03<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
La d\u00e9finition du concept de guerre de 4\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration (G4G), qui pr\u00e9tend englober le type de guerre en cours aujourd’hui, semble \u00eatre un exercice sans fin. Chaque auteur, chaque chroniqueur, y apporte sa vision et sa conception. Plus s\u00fbrement que toute analyse, cela rend compte de la confusion d’un temps historique o\u00f9 la notion de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5701,4954,1012],"class_list":["post-68610","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-g4g","tag-jenkins","tag-lind"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68610","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68610"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68610\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68610"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68610"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68610"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}