{"id":68615,"date":"2007-03-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-03-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/12\/le-syndrome-madeleine-albright\/"},"modified":"2007-03-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-03-12T00:00:00","slug":"le-syndrome-madeleine-albright","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/12\/le-syndrome-madeleine-albright\/","title":{"rendered":"Le \u201csyndrome Madeleine Albright\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Un commentateur venu du Center of Defense Information et publiant comme contributeur ext\u00e9rieur de UPI, Charles V. Pena, avait donn\u00e9 un commentaire sur le budget <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3677\" class=\"gen\">FY2008<\/a> du Pentagone, le <a href=\"http:\/\/wpherald.com\/articles\/3587\/1\/Outside-View-More-US-military-spending-brings-less-security\/US-can-afford-to-spend-less-on-defense-and-still-be-secure.html\" class=\"gen\">28 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPena met en \u00e9vidence l&rsquo;inefficacit\u00e9 et l&rsquo;improductivit\u00e9 de cet \u00e9norme budget. D&rsquo;une part, ce budget alimente des structures et des syst\u00e8mes compl\u00e8tement inad\u00e9quats pour les missions demand\u00e9es aux forces arm\u00e9es. D&rsquo;autre part, les co\u00fbts pharaoniques des syst\u00e8mes et de toutes les fili\u00e8res de soutien et de logistique de ces syst\u00e8mes conduisent \u00e0 des situations de p\u00e9nurie dans des circonstances tr\u00e8s d\u00e9licates. Le r\u00e9sultat est une sorte d&rsquo;\u00e9norme puissance-Potemkine qui cultive l&rsquo;apparence de la force et axe tout sur des premi\u00e8res frappes qu&rsquo;on veut d\u00e9cisives, mais qui laissent ces forces dans des situations parfois d\u00e9licates lorsque ce r\u00e9sultat n&rsquo;est pas atteint.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPena met \u00e9galement en \u00e9vidence un aspect psychologique tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressant, l&rsquo;effet psychologique de cette apparence de puissance sur le pouvoir civil, qui a tendance \u00e0 pr\u00eater \u00e0 la puissance militaire des vertus qu&rsquo;elle n&rsquo;a pas et est conduit \u00e0 avoir la tentation de s&rsquo;en servir d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on immod\u00e9r\u00e9e. C&rsquo;est ce que Pena nomme le syndrome Madeleine Albright, d&rsquo;apr\u00e8s la remarque que fit la future secr\u00e9taire d&rsquo;Etat (alors ambassadeur US \u00e0 l&rsquo;ONU) \u00e0 Colin Powell lorsqu&rsquo;il \u00e9tait encore g\u00e9n\u00e9ral d&rsquo;active et pr\u00e9sident du Comit\u00e9 des chefs d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major, en 1993 (la phrase d&rsquo;Albright est rapport\u00e9e dans les m\u00e9moires de Powell).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Ultimately, larger defense budgets are both unnecessary and unwise because they do not target the al-Qaida terrorist threat.  Most current defense spending continues to fund a large U.S. military presence deployed to all four corners of the globe, including the U.S. occupation of Iraq that is a rallying cry for jihad  much the same as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was in the 1980s.  But having such a large military results in the Madeleine Albright syndrome: What&rsquo;s the point of having this superb military that you&rsquo;re always talking about if we can&rsquo;t use it? In other words, it tempts policymakers to engage in unnecessary military interventions and deployments, which in turn are a source of the terrorist threat to the United States.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 12 mars 2007 \u00e0 15H55<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Un commentateur venu du Center of Defense Information et publiant comme contributeur ext\u00e9rieur de UPI, Charles V. Pena, avait donn\u00e9 un commentaire sur le budget FY2008 du Pentagone, le 28 f\u00e9vrier. Pena met en \u00e9vidence l&rsquo;inefficacit\u00e9 et l&rsquo;improductivit\u00e9 de cet \u00e9norme budget. D&rsquo;une part, ce budget alimente des structures et des syst\u00e8mes compl\u00e8tement inad\u00e9quats pour&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1007,3127,6412,6509,3194,1391],"class_list":["post-68615","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-albright","tag-budget","tag-fy2008","tag-pena","tag-pentagone","tag-powell"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68615","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68615"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68615\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68615"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68615"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68615"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}