ce jour<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tD’abord, et peut-\u00eatre d’une fa\u00e7on inattendue pour une commentatrice d’un journal conservateur qu’on croirait d’habitude favorable \u00e0 la composante nucl\u00e9aire, Alice Miles plaide passionn\u00e9ment contre la modernisation de la composante nucl\u00e9aire que veut faire ent\u00e9riner Tony Blair. Ce qui est plus surprenant encore, c’est l’un des arguments qu’elle emploie dans le cours de sa plaidoirie, dans le passage ci-apr\u00e8s (soulign\u00e9 en gras par nous) :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abBut can somebody tell me, how has our nuclear deterrent made us safer over the last two decades? Is Norway, is Argentina, less safe than the UK? Do you feel safer in London than in Lisbon? The Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, claimed at the weekend: It’s not nearly as straightforward as people suggest. They sleep soundly in their beds at night because we have nuclear weapons. What a pathetic argument; what highly enriched rot. Many of us would feel safer without them. So, Prime Minister, answer me this: can you think of another way to help our security, other than by spending \u00a320 billion on new submarines?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbI can. I can think of trying to engage with the Muslim world instead of using the bully-boy tactics of bombing and threatening it.<\/em> I can think of unlinking our foreign policy from that of the United States to enable us to take some some defence decisions alone.<\/em><\/strong> I can think of leading by example and reducing our nuclear firepower as a step towards complete disarmament, to encourage other states not to develop theirs. I can think of using our fabled influence with the US to press for disarmament, not rearmament.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tObservons que la logique interne de la situation est respect\u00e9e : effectivement, on peut soutenir sans difficult\u00e9 que le refus de moderniser le Trident<\/em> (avec du mat\u00e9riel US, cela va sans dire) repr\u00e9sente un acte d’ind\u00e9pendance britannique vis-\u00e0-vis des USA. Et, bien s\u00fbr, l’argument qu’un acte d’ind\u00e9pendance des USA est un moyen de renforcer la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du Royaume-Uni doit \u00eatre accept\u00e9 dans la mesure o\u00f9 l’ind\u00e9pendance est effectivement un garant de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Mais c’est toute la logique qui est renvers\u00e9e, et l’esprit m\u00eame de cette logique perverti : la d\u00e9pendance britannique fait que, pour rendre ce pays plus ind\u00e9pendant des USA, et donc plus fort en principe, il faudrait prendre une d\u00e9cision qui, incontestablement, et quoi qu’on pense de l’armement nucl\u00e9aire, l’affaiblisse en puissance brute et en statut international. On a rarement mis aussi bien en \u00e9vidence de fa\u00e7on involontaire les effets terribles de cette d\u00e9pendance britannique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Avec la cerise sur le g\u00e2teau que ce soit dans un journal conservateur \u00e9galement qu’on trouve cette affirmation exc\u00e9d\u00e9e qu’enfin le Royaume-Uni pourrait prendre seul une d\u00e9cision de d\u00e9fense (\u00abI can think of unlinking our foreign policy from that of the United States to enable us to take some some defence decisions alone<\/em>\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 14 mars 2007 \u00e0 06H25<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Les ravages de la d\u00e9pendance britannique des USA, surtout depuis le renouvellement massif de cette d\u00e9pendance avec Tony Blair depuis le 11 septembre 2001, sont tr\u00e8s visibles dans la forme de la pens\u00e9e qui s’exprime \u00e0 l’occasion du d\u00e9bat sur le renouvellement du Trident. Un exemple de la chose est visible dans la chronique de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[705,3019,6518,3004,3345,3344,2852,4775,2758],"class_list":["post-68621","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-blair","tag-defense","tag-miles","tag-nucleaire","tag-relationships","tag-special","tag-times","tag-trident","tag-uk"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68621","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68621"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68621\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68621"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68621"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68621"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}