{"id":68628,"date":"2007-03-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-03-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/16\/le-jsf-vu-par-le-gao-le-moby-dick-des-programmes-de-defense\/"},"modified":"2007-03-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-03-16T00:00:00","slug":"le-jsf-vu-par-le-gao-le-moby-dick-des-programmes-de-defense","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/16\/le-jsf-vu-par-le-gao-le-moby-dick-des-programmes-de-defense\/","title":{"rendered":"Le JSF vu par le GAO : le \u201cMoby Dick<\/em>\u201d des programmes de d\u00e9fense"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le 15 mars, le Government Accountability Office (GAO) a publi\u00e9 un rapport, le troisi\u00e8me qui lui ait \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9 par le Congr\u00e8s, sur le programme JSF. La m\u00eame philosophie d’appr\u00e9ciation du GAO est poursuivie et amplifi\u00e9e dans ce rapport, dont on peut trouver, sur le site du GAO, un Abstract<\/a> aussi bien que le texte<\/a> lui-m\u00eame, au complet. Le GAO est de plus en plus inquiet sur les conditions de d\u00e9veloppement du programme, dont il confirme la monstruosit\u00e9 en chiffres et en parts de d\u00e9veloppement des programmes militaires :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab[The JSF programm is] the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most expensive aircraft acquisition program. DOD currently estimates it will spend<\/em> $623 billion<\/em><\/strong> to develop, procure, and operate and support the JSF fleet. The JSF aircraft, which includes a variant design for each of the services, represents<\/em> 90 percent<\/em><\/strong> of the remaining planned investment for DOD’s major tactical aircraft programs.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous donnons ci-apr\u00e8s l’essentiel de l’Abstract<\/em> que pr\u00e9sente le GAO :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe JSF program has delivered and flown the first development aircraft. However, cost and schedule goals established in the fiscal year 2004 rebaselined program have not been met. Total JSF program acquisition costs (through 2027) have increased by $31.6 billion and now DOD will pay 12 percent more per aircraft than expected in 2004. The program has also experienced delays in several key events, including the start of the flight test program, delivery of the first production representative development aircraft, and testing of critical missions systems. Delays in the delivery of initial development aircraft were driven by incomplete engineering drawings, changes in design, manufacturing inefficiencies, and parts shortages. Despite these delays, the program still plans to complete development in 2013, compressing the amount of time available for flight testing and development activities. Also, the program projects it will meet all but one key performance requirement line of sight communications that is currently dependent on other capabilities being developed outside the JSF program. Accurately predicting JSF costs and schedule and ensuring sufficient funding will likely be key challenges facing the program in the future. JSF continues to pursue a risky acquisition strategy that concurrently develops and produces aircraft. While some concurrency may be beneficial to efficiently transition from development to production, the degree of overlap is significant on this program. Any changes in design and manufacturing that require modifications to delivered aircraft or to tooling and manufacturing processes would result in increased costs and delays in getting capabilities to the warfighter. Low-rate initial production will begin this year with almost the entire 7-year flight test program remaining to confirm the aircraft design. Confidence that investment decisions will deliver expected capability within cost and schedule goals increases as testing proves the JSF will work as expected. The JSF program also faces funding uncertainties as it will demand unprecedented funding over the next 2 decades more than $12.6 billion a year on average through 2027.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl faut noter encore que le rapport n’a pas b\u00e9n\u00e9fici\u00e9 des derni\u00e8res informations du DoD sur le programme. On peut admettre que l’\u00e9tat du programme qu’il d\u00e9crit est vieux d’\u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s un an. Entre temps, le GAO suppose, \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de son exp\u00e9rience, que l’\u00e9tat inqui\u00e9tant du programme qu’il d\u00e9crit s’est aggrav\u00e9 : \u00abAt the time of our review, DOD was still preparing its new cost estimate to be included in the program’s Selected Acquisition Report dated December 31, 2006, expected to be delivered to the Congress by April 2007. Because the new cost estimate for the JSF program will not be available until after this report is issued we are unable to make informed judgments on those estimated costs. It should be noted that after our 2006 report was issued on March 15, 2006, DOD released its December 2005 Selected Acquisition Report, which showed an increase of over $19 billion in estimated JSF program costs.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’impression que donne ce rapport, encore une fois en confirmation constante de ce que le GAO juge du programme, est celle d’un programme JSF de plus en plus tendu<\/strong> entre les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s techniques et budg\u00e9taires et les imp\u00e9ratifs des promesses et annonces faites depuis des ann\u00e9es concernant le programme JSF-virtualiste. C’est un cas presque parfait de confrontation entre le r\u00e9el et le virtuel, entre le v\u00e9ritable programme JSF tel qu’il est en train de prendre forme et le JSF-virtualiste dont il est fait une ardente promotion depuis des ann\u00e9es, accompagn\u00e9e d’une narrative<\/em> surr\u00e9aliste sur ses capacit\u00e9s, son avenir, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous avons beaucoup insist\u00e9 sur ce JSF-virtualiste, autant dans la fa\u00e7on<\/a> dont le programme a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9par\u00e9, que dans la fa\u00e7on dont il a \u00e9t\u00e9 et est utilis\u00e9 comme instrument de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re (voir cet aspect sur notre site, extrait de notre Lettre d’Analyse de defensa<\/em>, en fran\u00e7ais<\/a> et, extrait de notre Lettre d’Analyse Context<\/em>, en anglais<\/a>). Combien de temps le programme supportera-t-il cette tension ? Le GAO n’est pas tr\u00e8s optimiste. Le Congr\u00e8s, domin\u00e9 par les d\u00e9mocrates, pourrait suivre l’avis du GAO. Comme ce Congr\u00e8s n’ose pas<\/a> s’attaquer \u00e0 la politique ext\u00e9rieure de Bush, il y a de fortes chances qu’il se replie, pour exprimer son opposition, sur les mati\u00e8res qui lui sont ch\u00e8res, le micromanagment<\/em> et les d\u00e9rives budg\u00e9taires des programmes du Pentagone. Le JSF est un gros poisson \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, un cachalot, une baleine, une sorte de Moby Dick<\/em> des programmes de d\u00e9fense. C’est Moby Dick<\/em> que nous d\u00e9crit le GAO.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 16 mars 2007 \u00e0 07H16<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le 15 mars, le Government Accountability Office (GAO) a publi\u00e9 un rapport, le troisi\u00e8me qui lui ait \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9 par le Congr\u00e8s, sur le programme JSF. La m\u00eame philosophie d’appr\u00e9ciation du GAO est poursuivie et amplifi\u00e9e dans ce rapport, dont on peut trouver, sur le site du GAO, un Abstract aussi bien que le texte… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3285,6522,568,4248,250,6521],"class_list":["post-68628","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-congres","tag-dicj","tag-dod","tag-gao","tag-jsf","tag-moby"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68628","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68628"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68628\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68628"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68628"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68628"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}