{"id":68648,"date":"2007-03-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-03-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/22\/rumsfeld-le-nihilisme-americaniste-a-letat-pur\/"},"modified":"2007-03-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-03-22T00:00:00","slug":"rumsfeld-le-nihilisme-americaniste-a-letat-pur","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/03\/22\/rumsfeld-le-nihilisme-americaniste-a-letat-pur\/","title":{"rendered":"Rumsfeld, le nihilisme am\u00e9ricaniste \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tat pur ?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Voici un beau trio : Donald Rumsfeld, l&rsquo;ancien secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense ; Andrew Cockburn, \u00e9crivain et historien ; P\u00e9p\u00e9 Escobar, chroniqueur et reporteur. Le troisi\u00e8me pr\u00e9sente sur le site <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Middle_East\/IC21Ak11.html\" class=\"gen\">Atimes.com<\/a> une critique d&rsquo;un livre de mon second, dont le sujet est la vie, la carri\u00e8re et le caract\u00e8re de mon premier. <em>Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall and Catastrophic Legacy<\/em> semble \u00eatre une de ces \u00e9tudes historiques et psychologiques n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 la bonne compr\u00e9hension d&rsquo;une \u00e9poque, en plus d&rsquo;un \u00eatre. Rumsfeld est une personnalit\u00e9 fascinante par l&rsquo;accomplissement, l&rsquo;extr\u00e9mit\u00e9 sans doute difficile \u00e0 rendre compl\u00e8tement de son caract\u00e8re, tout cela pour le pire ou le meilleur avec la tendance qu&rsquo;on imagine. Cockburn semble avoir largement contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 la bonne compr\u00e9hension de Rumsfeld, dans tous les cas Escobar nous y fait croire,  lui, Escobar, est si souvent d&rsquo;un avis excellent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;extrait ci-dessous de l&rsquo;article d&rsquo;Escobar nous conduit \u00e0 penser que Rumsfeld est certainement une personnalit\u00e9 qui se rapproche tr\u00e8s fortement du mod\u00e8le de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9ricain (\u00e0 la mani\u00e8re o\u00f9 le Congr\u00e8s, pour honorer la m\u00e9moire de John Wayne, ordonna de frapper une m\u00e9daille \u00e0 son effigie en 1979, avec ces simples mots : <em>John Wayne, American<\/em>). Sa fa\u00e7on de m\u00e9priser le sens des choses et des actes pour se concentrer, avec une puissance de buffle, sur le seul accomplissement est une marque indubitable du nihilisme de cet \u00e9tat d&rsquo;esprit transform\u00e9 en comportement au nom de la glorification de l&rsquo;action.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall and Catastrophic Legacy is a book of no-nonsense reportage to be read in one sitting. Much of what it presents is not new. The kicker is how it connects the dots. The picture emerges of a ruthless opportunist, fueled by a toxic ego and blind ambition, a master of very nasty rudeness who perfected the killer technique of inflicting hours of rapid and often disconnected questions on the people under him. What for? To win the game  whatever the game might be. Rumsfeld was a shock to the system  the ultimate operative, the ultimate fixer.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Rumsfeld the corporate honcho  at the G D Searle pharmaceutical firm  easily molded into Rumsfeld the warlord. Public-interest lawyer James Turner revealingly tells Cockburn (p 65) how Rumsfeld \u00a0\u00bbis not interested in facts, not interested in truth, not interested in finding out what the fundamental realities are, but is much, much more interested in setting a goal and then, by will and force, pulling all the resources that he could possibly pull together to achieve that goal\u00a0\u00bb. The goal may be to get a dodgy sweetener  aspartame  on the market, or to invade and control Iraq with a nimble strike force. In the process, the not-so-smooth operator adds value: when St Louis-based chemical behemoth Monsanto bought G D Searle, the family of founder Gideon Daniel Searle got between US$600 million and $900 million; and Rumsfeld, after a decade of faithful work, was $10 million flush.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Rumsfeld is also revealed as a karma chameleon  the Boy George of Washington politics. The Rumsfeld who was ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  when he was rabidly pro-European according to a senior official, and very close with the French ambassador  years later would morph, in the run-up to the war on Iraq, into a growling beast deriding France and Germany  the EU engine  as Old Europe.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 22 mars 2007 \u00e0 08H51<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Voici un beau trio : Donald Rumsfeld, l&rsquo;ancien secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense ; Andrew Cockburn, \u00e9crivain et historien ; P\u00e9p\u00e9 Escobar, chroniqueur et reporteur. Le troisi\u00e8me pr\u00e9sente sur le site Atimes.com une critique d&rsquo;un livre de mon second, dont le sujet est la vie, la carri\u00e8re et le caract\u00e8re de mon premier. Rumsfeld: His Rise,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6536,1135,4900,5173,5944,3099,569],"class_list":["post-68648","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-caractere","tag-cockburn","tag-escobar","tag-livre","tag-nihilisme","tag-psychologie","tag-rumsfeld"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68648","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68648"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68648\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68648"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68648"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68648"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}