{"id":68685,"date":"2007-04-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-04-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/04\/04\/pas-si-loin-de-lultimatum\/"},"modified":"2007-04-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-04-04T00:00:00","slug":"pas-si-loin-de-lultimatum","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/04\/04\/pas-si-loin-de-lultimatum\/","title":{"rendered":"Pas si loin de l&rsquo;ultimatum"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Apr\u00e8s un petit tour de quelques jours o\u00f9 fut \u00e9voqu\u00e9e, au travers de diverses d\u00e9clarations, la possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une coop\u00e9ration entre la Russie et les USA dans le syst\u00e8me anti-missiles \u00e0 installer en Europe, et apr\u00e8s une r\u00e9action finalement tr\u00e8s r\u00e9serv\u00e9e des Russes, les Am\u00e9ricains mettent les choses au point. Leur mani\u00e8re est habituelle,  tranch\u00e9e, sans concession, conform\u00e9ment aux plans pr\u00e9vus. Ce n&rsquo;est pas un ultimatum mais  ce n&rsquo;en est pas si loin ; dans tous les cas, c&rsquo;est une mise au point qui nous dit qu&rsquo;il ne semble pas que les Am\u00e9ricains abandonneront leurs projets de d\u00e9ploiement. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Tout cela par la bouche de Eric Edelman, sous-secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense charg\u00e9 de la politique, comme nous le rapporte une d\u00e9p\u00eache AFP relay\u00e9e par <a href=\"http:\/\/www.spacewar.com\/reports\/US_To_Pursue_Missile_Shield_With_Or_Without_Moscow_Nod_999.html\" class=\"gen\">Spacewar.com<\/a>, en date du 3 avril. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<MI>We want to cooperate with Russia, said Eric Edelman, undersecretary of defense for policy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But that being said, I don&rsquo;t think if for some reason we&rsquo;re unable to reach a commonly agreed way ahead, that we would want to accede to Russia being able to dictate what we do bilaterally with other countries or what NATO does as an alliance.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The United States believes that the threat posed by Iran starts to mature in around 2015, Edelman said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>And that&rsquo;s one of the reasons we&rsquo;re moving ahead now is we want to have a capability in place to meet that threat and the timeline it&rsquo;s developing on.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Edelman recalled that Russia has, under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the right to maintain around 100 interceptors around Moscow.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>I think they&rsquo;ve got about, I think 85 or 86 nuclear-tipped interceptors deployed. Don&rsquo;t see how that&rsquo;s been a threat to the stability of Europe over the last 35 years, Edelman said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The fact that we&rsquo;re going to have potentially 10 &#8230; non-nuclear, non-explosive kinetic vehicles in Poland  I don&rsquo;t think that&rsquo;s a threat to Russia.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes pr\u00e9cisions de Edelman sont tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressantes. Elles montrent que le Pentagone ne pense pas en termes de perception strat\u00e9gique, dans le cadre politique des relations multilat\u00e9rales, mais bien en termes techniques bruts de poids de la quincaillerie. Selon cette comptabilit\u00e9, il a \u00e9videmment raison, les antimissiles en Pologne et en Tch\u00e9quie ne changent rien \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9quilibre des forces. Mais l&rsquo;argument qui est discut\u00e9 aujourd&rsquo;hui est celui de la d\u00e9stabilisation g\u00e9ographique. Les Am\u00e9ricains l&rsquo;ignorent compl\u00e8tement, comme si la g\u00e9ographie (et notamment l&rsquo;Europe) n&rsquo;existait pas, et comme si seules les armes comptaient. (Les missiles anti-missiles du trait\u00e9 ABM sont contenus dans le seul cadre des relations strat\u00e9giques USA-URSS et n&rsquo;ont rien \u00e0 voir, au niveau de la perception, avec la situation europ\u00e9enne.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t On avait d\u00e9j\u00e0 per\u00e7u ce d\u00e9couplage avec la crise des euromissiles en 1977. Les Am\u00e9ricains ne voyaient pas, \u00e0 l&rsquo;origine, en quoi les SS-20 d\u00e9stabilisaient la situation strat\u00e9gique, puisque, en capacit\u00e9s offensives et en m\u00e9gatonnage,  la situation ne changeait gu\u00e8re. Ce fut la perception par les Allemands d&rsquo;une d\u00e9stabilisation r\u00e9gionale, g\u00e9ographique, qui les obligea \u00e0 finalement intervenir.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 4 avril 2007 \u00e0 17H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Apr\u00e8s un petit tour de quelques jours o\u00f9 fut \u00e9voqu\u00e9e, au travers de diverses d\u00e9clarations, la possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une coop\u00e9ration entre la Russie et les USA dans le syst\u00e8me anti-missiles \u00e0 installer en Europe, et apr\u00e8s une r\u00e9action finalement tr\u00e8s r\u00e9serv\u00e9e des Russes, les Am\u00e9ricains mettent les choses au point. Leur mani\u00e8re est habituelle, tranch\u00e9e, sans&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4056,5433,6564,3107,398,2730],"class_list":["post-68685","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-antimissiles","tag-bmd","tag-edeelman","tag-euromissiles","tag-europe","tag-russie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68685","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68685"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68685\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68685"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68685"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68685"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}