round<\/em> d’observation, entre le discours du 10 f\u00e9vrier de Poutine (\u00e0 Munich) et la fin mars, avec les offres US de coop\u00e9ration qu’ils ont rejet\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tOn peut rapidement mentionner trois axes dans la position russe, qui permettent de d\u00e9velopper c\u00f4te \u00e0 c\u00f4te une position structurelle (strat\u00e9gique) tr\u00e8s ferme et tr\u00e8s dure et une position conjoncturelle tr\u00e8s souple.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t La position structurelle, strat\u00e9gique, tr\u00e8s dure et tr\u00e8s ferme est appuy\u00e9e sur un constat : les USA (l’OTAN) n’ont pas suivi la voie de leurs promesses de la fin de la Guerre froide. \u00abYevgeny Myasnikov, a senior research scientist at Moscow’s Centre for Arms Control, told the Guardian. Russia has been deeply disappointed by what has happened after 1991. Nato started to expand, and the US started to think it had won the cold war. We had hoped for a partnership. But it didn’t happen.<\/em>\u00bb Les Russes y voient une trahison des promesses qui avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 faites, trahison qui se concr\u00e9tise aujourd’hui : \u00abIn an interview with the Guardian, the Kremlin’s chief spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said Moscow felt betrayed by the Pentagon’s move. We were extremely concerned and disappointed. We were never informed in advance about these plans. It brings tremendous change to the strategic balance in Europe, and to the world’s strategic stability.<\/em>[] We feel ourselves deceived<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Compl\u00e9ment de ce qui pr\u00e9c\u00e8de : l’appr\u00e9ciation strat\u00e9gique de l’initiative US est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e comme extr\u00eamement d\u00e9stabilisante. Il ne fait aucun doute pour les Russes qu’elle est destin\u00e9e \u00e0 r\u00e9duire la puissance sovi\u00e9tique, l’argument des missiles nord-cor\u00e9ens et iraniens \u00e9tant constamment repouss\u00e9, voire ridiculis\u00e9. (L’initiative US \u00abwill change the world’s strategic stability <\/em>[ Dmitry Peskov said it] brings tremendous change to the strategic balance in Europe, and to the world’s strategic stability.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Moscou pr\u00e9pare des mesures militaires pour contrer les plans du Pentagone. Ces mesures sont pour l’instant mod\u00e9r\u00e9es et n’impliquent rien de fondamentalement dramatique. \u00abThe Kremlin has not publicly spelt out its plans. But defence experts said its response is likely to include upgrading its nuclear missile arsenal so that it is harder to shoot down, putting more missiles on mobile launchers, and moving its fleet of nuclear submarines to the north pole, where they are virtually undetectable. Russia could also bring the new US silos within the range of its Iskander missiles launched potentially from the nearby Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, they add.<\/em>\u00bb Importante pr\u00e9cision donn\u00e9e par Peskov, qui impliquerait que, pour l’instant, la Russie ne veut pas d\u00e9velopper une nouvelle cat\u00e9gorie de missiles de th\u00e9\u00e2tre (type SS-20 modernis\u00e9) qui conduirait \u00e0 une sortie du trait\u00e9 INF : \u00abPotentially we will have to create alternatives to this but with low cost and higher efficiency. Any response would be within existing technologies, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Au niveau diplomatique tactique, les Russes affirment le principe d’une ouverture constante : \u00abAs well as military counter-measures, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, also wanted dialogue and negotiations, <\/em>[ Dmitry Peskov] added.<\/em>\u00bb La chose s’adresse aux USA, mais surtout aux Europ\u00e9ens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 11 avril 2007 \u00e0 09H57<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Les Russes ne veulent surtout pas laisser enterrer la question des antimissiles tandis que la pouss\u00e9e de bulldozer du Pentagone, continue tr\u00e8s bureaucratiquement \u00e0 faire avancer son initiative. Dans le Guardian d’aujourd’hui, ils d\u00e9veloppent (par la voix de Dmitry Peskov, porte-parole du Kremlin) la position russe apr\u00e8s un premier round d’observation, entre le discours du… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4056,5433,6484,3659,916,2883,2730],"class_list":["post-68702","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-antimissiles","tag-bmd","tag-euromissiles-ii","tag-guardian","tag-poutine","tag-riposte","tag-russie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68702","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68702"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68702\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68702"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68702"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68702"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}