{"id":68705,"date":"2007-04-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-04-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/04\/12\/a-propos-du-iskander-ss-26\/"},"modified":"2007-04-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-04-12T00:00:00","slug":"a-propos-du-iskander-ss-26","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/04\/12\/a-propos-du-iskander-ss-26\/","title":{"rendered":"A propos du <em>Iskander<\/em> (SS-26)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Nous signalions l&rsquo;article du <em>Guardian<\/em> consacr\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;attitude russe dans la crise euromissiles-II, dans un Bloc-Notes d&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3887\" class=\"gen\">hier<\/a>. Parmi les observations qu&rsquo;on peut lire figure celle qui concerne les contre-mesures militaires des Russes, face au d\u00e9ploiement US d&rsquo;antimissiles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous rappelons notre commentaire, avec les citations ad\u00e9quates :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Moscou pr\u00e9pare des mesures militaires pour contrer les plans du Pentagone. Ces mesures sont pour l&rsquo;instant mod\u00e9r\u00e9es et n&rsquo;impliquent rien de fondamentalement dramatique. The Kremlin has not publicly spelt out its plans. But defence experts said its response is likely to include upgrading its nuclear missile arsenal so that it is harder to shoot down, putting more missiles on mobile launchers, and moving its fleet of nuclear submarines to the north pole, where they are virtually undetectable. Russia could also bring the new US silos within the range of its Iskander missiles launched potentially from the nearby Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, they add. Importante pr\u00e9cision donn\u00e9e par Peskov, qui impliquerait que, pour l&rsquo;instant, la Russie ne veut pas d\u00e9velopper une nouvelle cat\u00e9gorie de missiles de th\u00e9\u00e2tre (type SS-20 modernis\u00e9) qui conduirait \u00e0 une sortie du trait\u00e9 INF : Potentially we will have to create alternatives to this but with low cost and higher efficiency. Any response would be within existing technologies&rsquo;, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous voulons revenir sur un point, qui impliquerait que notre plume a \u00e9t\u00e9 peut-\u00eatre (en partie) un peu trop rapide, ou, dans tous les cas, pas assez pr\u00e9cise lorsque nous \u00e9crivions que l&rsquo;absence de d\u00e9veloppement d&rsquo;un nouveau missile type SS-20 pourrait sembler impliquer que les Russes ne sortiraient pas du trait\u00e9 INF. L&rsquo;affirmation doit \u00eatre nuanc\u00e9e \u00e0 la vue d&rsquo;un d\u00e9tail important, reproduit plus haut, selon lequel les Russes pourraient \u00e9galement envisager le d\u00e9ploiement de missiles <em>Iskander<\/em> dans l&rsquo;enclave de Kaliningrad.  Du coup, nous nous sommes int\u00e9ress\u00e9s au missile en question, le SS-26 <em>Iskander<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUne bonne source est le site de la FAS (Federation of American Scientists), qui, dans ses archives, consacre un <a href=\"http:\/\/www.fas.org\/nuke\/guide\/russia\/theater\/ss-26.htm\" class=\"gen\">article<\/a> bien document\u00e9 au SS-26.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous en extrayons ce passage :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The road-mobile SS-X-26 is the second attempt to replace the `Scud&rsquo;, since the first attempt, the Oka SS-23 SPIDER, was eliminated under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The operational requirements for the SS-26 are probably similar to those of the original SS-23. One of the major questions concerning the program is the missile&rsquo;s range, which is almost certainly less than the 500 km range limit established by the INF Treaty. The SS-26 may include a longer range (greater than 400 km) variant for the Russian forces, and a shorter range (less than 300 km) variant for export.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The new TEL is probably based on the new BAZ-6909 family of trucks, first publicly displayed at a commercial transport show in Moscow in August 1995. Two missiles are carried on each launcher, though the delay between firing each round is unclear. The new TEL is apparently based on the the 9P71 Oka TEL, though the new SS- X-26 TEL has been designed with the INF Treaty in mind, with several external changes that clearly differentiate the two vehicles to prevent treaty compliance problems. The nose of the vehicle has been extended forward, the chassis lengthened, and the access door arrangement has been changes. The tactical parameters of the two vehicles are probably similar.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In 1996 Russian television reports depicted the first launch of the SS-X-26, which is a direct evolution of the SS-23 Oka. It appears probable that new features will be incorporated into the design. The SS-X-26 appears to have several different conventional warheads, including a cluster munition warhead, a fuel-air explosive enhanced-blast warhead, a tactical earth penetrator for bunker busting and an electro-magnetic pulse device for anti-radar missions. Given the relatively small warhead, improved terminal precision is a major system requirement, which could be achieved by active terminal sensor such as a millimetre wave radar, satellite terminal guidance using GLOSNASS, an improved inertial platform, or some combination of these approaches. As of 1999 it appeared that this system had entered operational service with the Russian Army.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQuelques constats techniques:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  Le SS-26 est, pour les Russes, l&rsquo;arme id\u00e9ale dans cette crise, pour contrer le d\u00e9ploiement des antimissiles US en Pologne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  Son ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 (son autonomie est-elle,  selon les versions en service,  de 300 km, de 400 km ou plus, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire \u00b1 500 km?) le place aux bornes des limites du trait\u00e9 INF (autonomie de 500 kilom\u00e8tres pour le minimum) et ouvre la voie \u00e0 toutes les contestations possibles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  L&#8217;emplacement d&rsquo;un tel d\u00e9ploiement, dans l&rsquo;enclave de Kaliningrad qui est un ancien territoire de la Prusse orientale, est lourd d&rsquo;une tr\u00e8s forte symbolique politique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 12 avril 2007 \u00e0 09H46<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Nous signalions l&rsquo;article du Guardian consacr\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;attitude russe dans la crise euromissiles-II, dans un Bloc-Notes d&rsquo;hier. Parmi les observations qu&rsquo;on peut lire figure celle qui concerne les contre-mesures militaires des Russes, face au d\u00e9ploiement US d&rsquo;antimissiles. Nous rappelons notre commentaire, avec les citations ad\u00e9quates : \u00abMoscou pr\u00e9pare des mesures militaires pour contrer les plans&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6484,6486,6582,2730,6583],"class_list":["post-68705","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-euromissiles-ii","tag-inf","tag-iskander","tag-russie","tag-ss-26"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68705","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68705"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68705\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68705"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68705"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68705"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}