{"id":68717,"date":"2007-04-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-04-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/04\/16\/une-tactique-russe-dans-laffaire-euromissiles-ii-saturer-les-americains-de-possibilites-de-riposte-asymetrique\/"},"modified":"2007-04-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-04-16T00:00:00","slug":"une-tactique-russe-dans-laffaire-euromissiles-ii-saturer-les-americains-de-possibilites-de-riposte-asymetrique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/04\/16\/une-tactique-russe-dans-laffaire-euromissiles-ii-saturer-les-americains-de-possibilites-de-riposte-asymetrique\/","title":{"rendered":"Une tactique russe dans l’affaire euromissiles-II : saturer les Am\u00e9ricains de possibilit\u00e9s de riposte \u201casym\u00e9trique\u201d ?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un article de Novosti du 16 avril, de Nikolai Khorunzhiy, repris le m\u00eame jour par Spacewar.com<\/a>, d\u00e9veloppe diverses possibilit\u00e9s de riposte russe au d\u00e9ploiement d’antimissiles par les USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe rappel historique assorti de cons\u00e9quences sur de possibles d\u00e9veloppements actuels, et qui concerne les rapports de la Russie avec le trait\u00e9 INF\/FNI, est int\u00e9ressant :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn 2001, when Russia discussed its asymmetrical response to the United States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (which followed in 2002), Lt. Gen. Vyacheslav Romanov, head of the Russian general staff’s center for nuclear security, declared that Russia would respond to the American deployment of a national ABM system by redeploying its intermediate- and shorter-range missile force – that is, the missiles that were aimed at Western Europe throughout the Cold War.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOn the following day, the then Defense Minister, Igor Sergeyev, refuted this statement by his subordinate in very strong terms, calling the very idea that Russia might deploy its intermediate- and shorter-range missiles absurd.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbToday’s proposal is more flexible: quit the INF Treaty but equip intermediate- and shorter-range missiles with conventional warheads instead of nukes ostensibly in this case, they would not threaten Europe or China. But if the United States refuses to modify the treaty, and gives Russia the chance to forget all about it that is, have nuclear-tipped missiles – Europe and even China will blame Washington for not taking their interests into account.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAs distinct from all-purpose strategic missiles, intermediate- and shorter-range missiles have a definite range up to 5,500 km that enables them to reach both China and Europe. What is the difference between replacing nukes with conventional warheads on ICBMs, as Rumsfeld suggested, and on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles? Both moves would lower the threshold for their use.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThere is one more proposal: to offer countries with intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, that is, China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Middle Eastern nations, to sign a treaty, and if any of them rejects the idea, to declare that Russia will withdraw from the INF Treaty but agrees with the United States that such missiles should only be deployed on the territory of the countries that possess them (in other words, there should be no U.S. missiles of that range in Europe). But what if the United States rejects this idea?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRussia does not even have any plans to develop these missiles, whereas the United States is intensively developing submarine-based medium-range missiles. Moreover, frightened Europe will turn to its big brother for protection. In that case, the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles would create a worse headache for the Russian strategic nuclear force than it did in the 1980s, because now NATO is much closer to the Russian border, and its missiles could reach our launch sites in a matter of minutes.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn autre aspect du texte qui est int\u00e9ressant est celui o\u00f9 l’auteur, \u00e9voquant les diverses possibilit\u00e9s de riposte russe au niveau des armements, en annonce une nouvelle, apr\u00e8s avoir cit\u00e9 la relance du SS-20 (RSD-10) et le cas (limit\u00e9 selon lui) du SS-26<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe purpose of politically menacing medium-range ballistic missiles may be served just as well with much cheaper air-launched cruise missiles. The Rosbalt agency wrote that two years ago, Russia conducted a successful test of its X-555 cruise missile with a range of up to 5,000 km, circular error probable of 18-26 meters, and speed of Mach 0.77. It flies at tree-top level 40 m to 110 m which allows it to evade ABM systems. In early February, the ARMS-TASS news agency reported that India and Russia had begun joint research and development on a cruise missile that can fly several times the speed of sound.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn a l’impression, avec ces divers textes et ces diverses hypoth\u00e8ses apparaissant au niveau de textes non-officiels, mais n\u00e9anmoins bien inform\u00e9s, d’une offensive indirecte des Russes dans le sens d’une saturation des \u00e9valuations US sur les r\u00e9actions russes \u00e0 craindre. On sait que la bureaucratie US a l’habitude de sur-r\u00e9agir \u00e0 cette sorte de menace contre ses propres syst\u00e8mes. On peut envisager une cha\u00eene sans fin de syst\u00e8mes de protection US des bases antimissiles US install\u00e9es en Europe (missiles Patriot<\/em>, F-15 \u00e9quip\u00e9s en mode anti-cruise missiles, etc.), avec les co\u00fbts et les complications diplomatiques qui vont avec.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 16 avril 2007 \u00e0 16H49<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un article de Novosti du 16 avril, de Nikolai Khorunzhiy, repris le m\u00eame jour par Spacewar.com, d\u00e9veloppe diverses possibilit\u00e9s de riposte russe au d\u00e9ploiement d’antimissiles par les USA. Ce rappel historique assorti de cons\u00e9quences sur de possibles d\u00e9veloppements actuels, et qui concerne les rapports de la Russie avec le trait\u00e9 INF\/FNI, est int\u00e9ressant : \u00bbIn… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6592,4056,3745,5662,6484,2970,5204,2883,2730],"class_list":["post-68717","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aksander","tag-antimissiles","tag-asymetrique","tag-cruise","tag-euromissiles-ii","tag-missiles","tag-novosti","tag-riposte","tag-russie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68717","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68717"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68717\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68717"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68717"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68717"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}