25 avril<\/a>) que c’est le contraire. Agha montre que les principaux acteurs de la r\u00e9gion, m\u00eame lorsqu’ils d\u00e9noncent l’occupation US (l’Arabie) s’en servent pour leurs propres desseins et pour leurs int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques. Agha montre assez ais\u00e9ment que les r\u00e9gimes mod\u00e9r\u00e9s arabes, quelle que soit leur rh\u00e9torique officielle, s’arrangent effectivement de la pr\u00e9sence US qui emp\u00eache tel ou tel acteur, notamment l’Iran, d’affirmer une compl\u00e8te pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rance sur la r\u00e9gion. Et puis il y a les autres, dont les positions sont parfois paradoxales.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tVoici quelques-unes des affirmations de Agha :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abParadoxically, the competing axis of so-called rogue states made up of Syria and Iran also wants the US to stay. So long as America remains mired in Iraq’s quicksand, they think, it will be difficult for it to embark on a similar adventure nearby. This is true not only politically the quagmire standing as a stark reminder of the invasion’s failure but also militarily: US capabilities will remain stretched for as long as the occupation continues.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbMoreover, American forces in Iraq present relatively soft targets for retaliation in case Iran or Syria is attacked. In short, whether or not Syria and Iran are correct in their calculations, the occupation of Iraq is seen as the most effective insurance policy against a possible US attack against them.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbInside Iraq, this is a period of consolidation for most political groups. They are building up their political and military capabilities, cultivating and forging alliances, clarifying political objectives and preparing for impending challenges. It is not the moment for all-out confrontation. No group has the confidence or capacity decisively to confront rivals within its own community or across communal lines. Equally, no party is genuinely interested in a serious process of national reconciliation when they feel they can improve their position later on. A continued American presence is consistent with both concerns – it can keep clashes manageable and be used to postpone the need for serious political engagement.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbShias in government would like the US to stay long enough for them to tighten their grip on the levers of state power and build a loyal military. Those Shias who are not in power would like them to stay long enough to avoid a premature showdown with their rivals. Militant Shia groups can simultaneously blame the occupation forces for their community’s plight and attack them to mobilise further support. Pro-Iranian Shias, meanwhile, retaliate against anti-Iranian US moves with attacks on Americans in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAl-Qaida and its affiliates arguably benefit most from the occupation. They established themselves, brought in recruits, sustained operations against the Americans and expanded. The last thing they want is for the Americans to leave and deny them targets and motivation for new members. Other Sunni armed groups need the Americans for similar reasons and for protection against Shias. For Sunni politicians, the occupation prevents a total Shia takeover of state institutions and helps increase their influence.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tAgha termine par le plus \u00e9trange des constats, mais non, pas si \u00e9trange que cela, plut\u00f4t conforme \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de l’\u00e9volution de la situation. La chose n’est \u00e9trange que pour ceux qui continuent \u00e0 psalmodier l’hymne \u00e0 la gloire de la puissance invincible de l’am\u00e9ricanisme. Ce constat se r\u00e9sume par un vieux dicton arabe, dot la signification doit \u00eatre \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s ceci : le magicien a \u00e9t\u00e9 envo\u00fbt\u00e9 par sa propre magie : \u00abIn this grim picture, the Americans appear the least sure and most confused. With unattainable objectives, wobbly plans, changing tactics, shifting alliances and ever-increasing casualties, it is not clear any longer what they want or how they are going to achieve it. By setting themselves up to be manipulated, they give credence to an old Arab saying: the magic has taken over the magician.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 28 avril 2007 \u00e0 10H44<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Les Am\u00e9ricains d\u00e9battent pour savoir quand et comment quitter l’Irak, contre le seul GW Bush, de plus en plus isol\u00e9 dans sa volont\u00e9 d’y rester jusqu’\u00e0 la victoire finale. Les populations arabes de la r\u00e9gion, qui voient les USA comme des envahisseurs, sont furieuses et ne songent qu’\u00e0 une chose : voir les Am\u00e9ricains partir.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[857,3316,3317,6622,2779,2671],"class_list":["post-68749","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-irak","tag-moyen","tag-orient","tag-oxford","tag-puissance","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68749","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68749"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68749\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68749"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68749"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68749"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}