{"id":68807,"date":"2007-05-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-05-17T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/05\/17\/on-a-trouve-le-czar-wars-et-il-nest-pas-loin-detre-anti-war\/"},"modified":"2007-05-17T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-05-17T00:00:00","slug":"on-a-trouve-le-czar-wars-et-il-nest-pas-loin-detre-anti-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/05\/17\/on-a-trouve-le-czar-wars-et-il-nest-pas-loin-detre-anti-war\/","title":{"rendered":"On a trouv\u00e9 le \u201cczar wars<\/em>\u201d, et il n’est pas loin d’\u00eatre anti-war"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’extraordinaire et rocambolesque aventure de d\u00e9nicher un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral qui accepte la fonction de superviser deux guerres perdues d’avance et caract\u00e9ris\u00e9es par un foutoir immens\u00e9ment globalis\u00e9 s’ach\u00e8ve par la d\u00e9signation d’un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral trois \u00e9toiles notoirement oppos\u00e9 \u00e0 la strat\u00e9gie de surge<\/em> suivie par GW Bush en Irak. Il s’agit du lieutenant-g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Douglas Lute.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’article de Robert Parry, sur ConsortiumNews.com<\/em> le 17 mai<\/a>, nous restitue l’essentiel de cette affaire, selon une approche enrichissante. Il est manifeste qu’on trouve l\u00e0, une fois de plus d\u00e9montr\u00e9s, la faiblesse du pouvoir civil \u00e0 Washington et le d\u00e9sordre r\u00e9gnant par cons\u00e9quent dans la hi\u00e9rarchie militaire et dans les \u00e9lites.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abHow should the American people interpret the extraordinary fact that George W. Bush couldn’t convince a single retired four-star general to sign up as the new war czar for coordinating the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and finally had to settle for an active-duty three-star general who had opposed Bush’s surge in Iraq?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAfter an embarrassing failure to convince at least five former generals, including one of the original surge architects, retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, to take the new high-powered job, Bush finally gave the war czar role to Army Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, a known critic of Bush’s troop escalation in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThough Bush insists that he’s a commander guy who follows the advice of experienced generals, the appointment of Lute belies Bush’s claim. The reality is that last December Bush and his neoconservative advisers overruled the judgments of the two field commanders for Iraq and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in ordering the surge.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBush then replaced the field commanders, Gens. John Abizaid and George Casey, with Admiral William Fallon and Gen. David Petraeus. That allowed the President to resume the fiction, at least temporarily, that he listens to his commanders while castigating his Democratic critics as politicians in Washington who think they know best.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAbizaid, Casey, the Joint Chiefs, and new war czar Lute opposed the surge because they felt it would prove counterproductive, easing the pressure on the Iraqi army to take responsibility and on Iraq’s government to make necessary political concessions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn August 2005, Lute, the chief operation officer for the Joint Chiefs, argued for a significant reduction in U.S. troop levels. You simply have to back off and let the Iraqis step forward, Lute told the Financial Times. You have to undercut the perception of occupation in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn January 2006, Lute told PBS interviewer Charlie Rose that the U.S. military wanted to see a smaller, lighter, less prominent U.S. force structure in Iraq, both to deflect concerns about the U.S. occupation and to avoid a dependency syndrome inside Iraq’s government. [Washington Post, May 16, 2007]<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe views of Lute and many other U.S. commanders were reflected in the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which reported in December 2006 that the situation in Iraq was grave and deteriorating and recommended a drawdown of U.S. military forces combined with a stronger commitment to train Iraqi forces and renewed diplomatic talks with Iraq’s neighbors.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBush bristled at the implied criticism of his work as war president, declaring: This business about graceful exit just simply has no realism to it whatsoever.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 17 mai 2007 \u00e0 15H37<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’extraordinaire et rocambolesque aventure de d\u00e9nicher un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral qui accepte la fonction de superviser deux guerres perdues d’avance et caract\u00e9ris\u00e9es par un foutoir immens\u00e9ment globalis\u00e9 s’ach\u00e8ve par la d\u00e9signation d’un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral trois \u00e9toiles notoirement oppos\u00e9 \u00e0 la strat\u00e9gie de surge suivie par GW Bush en Irak. Il s’agit du lieutenant-g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Douglas Lute. L’article de Robert… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6692,857,6691,4464,6693],"class_list":["post-68807","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-czar","tag-irak","tag-lute","tag-parry","tag-wars"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68807","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68807"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68807\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68807"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68807"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68807"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}