{"id":68823,"date":"2007-05-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-05-23T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/05\/23\/les-contradictions-britanniques-legs-de-la-politique-blair\/"},"modified":"2007-05-23T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-05-23T00:00:00","slug":"les-contradictions-britanniques-legs-de-la-politique-blair","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/05\/23\/les-contradictions-britanniques-legs-de-la-politique-blair\/","title":{"rendered":"Les contradictions britanniques, legs de la politique Blair"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Il y a au Royaume-Uni, une \u00e9volution de la diplomatie qui doit beaucoup aux dix ann\u00e9es de pouvoir de Tony Blair. On y trouve la contradiction du m\u00e9lange d&rsquo;une duplicit\u00e9 forcen\u00e9e, du maniement et de la manipulation de tous les moyens possibles pour parvenir \u00e0 des fins sp\u00e9cifiques pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme vertueuses (l&rsquo;affaire irakienne notamment), et, d&rsquo;autre part, des buts affich\u00e9s et qui influencent effectivement une partie de cette diplomatie britannique de soutien \u00e0 certains principes et valeurs postmodernes comme les droits de l&rsquo;homme, la d\u00e9mocratie, etc. Il en r\u00e9sulte des hiatus \u00e9tonnants qui amoindrissent consid\u00e9rablement l&rsquo;habilet\u00e9 et l&rsquo;efficacit\u00e9 de cette diplomatie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est le cas de l&rsquo;actuelle offensive britannique, qui met <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/russia\/article\/0,,2085774,00.html\" class=\"gen\">Moscou en fureur<\/a>, pour obtenir l&rsquo;extradition de l&rsquo;ancien officier Andrei Lugovo\u00ef, dans l&rsquo;affaire de l&rsquo;assassinat \u00e0 Londres d&rsquo;un autre ancien officier du KGB, Alexander Litvinenko. Les Britanniques n&rsquo;ont pas \u00e9t\u00e9 et ne sont pas avares de coups de menton vertueux dans cette affaire o\u00f9 l&rsquo;on ne transige pas avec les principes. On veut bien consid\u00e9rer l&rsquo;argument mais en en mesurant sa relativit\u00e9 \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re, par exemple, de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3922\" class=\"gen\">la manipulation<\/a> de l&rsquo;affaire <em>Yamamah<\/em>-BAE et de ses suites par le gouvernement britannique. C&rsquo;est le signe que, lorsqu&rsquo;il le faut, l&rsquo;habitude imm\u00e9moriale et compr\u00e9hensible de consid\u00e9rer les principes de fa\u00e7on relative subsiste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL\u00e0 o\u00f9 appara\u00eet un \u00e9trange aveuglement montrant qu&rsquo;effectivement la politique blairiste a consid\u00e9rablement perverti le fonctionnement de l&rsquo;<strong>hypocrisie efficace<\/strong> des Britanniques, c&rsquo;est lorsqu&rsquo;on oppose la d\u00e9gradation des rapports UK-Russie \u00e0 cause des affaires type Litvinenko-Lugovo\u00ef et les obligations de bonnes relations avec la Russie qui attendent Londres dans un futur tr\u00e8s proche. C&rsquo;est un article du <em>Daily Telegraph<\/em> de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/money\/main.jhtml;jsessionid=OTP1OZYAVY2JHQFIQMGCFFWAVCBQUIV0?xml=\/money\/2007\/05\/23\/cngazprom23.xml\" class=\"gen\">ce jour<\/a> sur la d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 venir des Britanniques du gaz russe qui nous \u00e9claire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>With North Sea oil and gas in decline, imports from Norway will pick up some of the slack, but in the longer term Britain and much of western Europe will become increasingly dependent on Russia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>This has put Gazprom in a powerful position. So influential has Gazprom become that critics talk of Russia&rsquo;s pipeline troops or gas guerillas. Moscow is no longer a military superpower. But this resource-rich country is fast becoming an energy superpower.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Mark Spelman, head of global strategy at the consultancy Accenture, says: I don&rsquo;t think that we recognise the pace at which things are going to move over the next four to five years. In the middle of the next decade we will suddenly wake up and say to ourselves: wow, look at how many assets Gazprom owns, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The company is already targeting the UK. Gazprom owns 10pc of the interconnector pipeline between Belgium and Britain, ensuring it can get gas into the UK. And the proposed Nord Stream pipeline through Germany and Holland into the UK, will provide even more gas.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Last year, Gazprom bought a UK energy retailer, Pennine Natural Gas, which supplies industrial users such as Headingley Cricket Ground, and is it now targeting NHS hospitals.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Gazprom also has a thriving UK-based trading arm, dealing in gas, oil, and emissions credits. According to one source: There was a time when Gazprom seemed to be in Ofgem&rsquo;s office [the regulator] every other day trying to understand how the UK energy market worked.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Gazprom&rsquo;s expansion in mainland Europe is moving far faster than the UK. The company has done asset swaps in Italy, Hungary, and Germany with the likes of Eni and Eon. Similar asset swaps are expected in the UK.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Infrastructure restrictions mean that Gazprom supplies about 2pc of UK gas, but this will rise<\/em> <strong><em>to 10pc and then 15pc<\/em><\/strong> <em>in the short to medium term.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes commentateurs s&rsquo;\u00e9tendent beaucoup sur les tactiques, les effets et les cons\u00e9quences des rachats de <em>Gasprom<\/em> au Royaume-Uni. Ils ne s&rsquo;interrogent pas sur l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de la politique britannique qui place sa diplomatie en mauvaise position pour traiter avec les Russes, \u00e0 cause de certains engagements moraux, alors que ces m\u00eames engagements moraux s&rsquo;effacent devant de soi-disant imp\u00e9ratifs de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 quand il s&rsquo;agit essentiellement de prot\u00e9ger une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 (BAE) dont l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> britannique, particuli\u00e8rement en l&rsquo;occurrence Blair et les cercles proches de lui, est prisonnier pour son fonctionnement et la d\u00e9fense de ses int\u00e9r\u00eats de caste. Le r\u00e9alisme britannique ne s&rsquo;est pas effac\u00e9 devant les valeurs, il a simplement chang\u00e9 de registre. Il est difficile de penser que l&rsquo;intelligence et le sens des int\u00e9r\u00eats nationaux y trouvent leur compte.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 23 mai 2007 \u00e0 07H55<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Il y a au Royaume-Uni, une \u00e9volution de la diplomatie qui doit beaucoup aux dix ann\u00e9es de pouvoir de Tony Blair. On y trouve la contradiction du m\u00e9lange d&rsquo;une duplicit\u00e9 forcen\u00e9e, du maniement et de la manipulation de tous les moyens possibles pour parvenir \u00e0 des fins sp\u00e9cifiques pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme vertueuses (l&rsquo;affaire irakienne notamment), et,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3792,705,5171,4967,6176,6703,6704,2730,5210,4364],"class_list":["post-68823","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bae","tag-blair","tag-gasprom","tag-gaz","tag-litvinenko","tag-lugovoi","tag-principes","tag-russie","tag-valeurs","tag-yamamah"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68823","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68823"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68823\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68823"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68823"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68823"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}