{"id":68832,"date":"2007-05-25T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-05-25T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/05\/25\/ave-fabius-maximus-whats-new\/"},"modified":"2007-05-25T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-05-25T00:00:00","slug":"ave-fabius-maximus-whats-new","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/05\/25\/ave-fabius-maximus-whats-new\/","title":{"rendered":"Ave<\/em> Fabius Maximus, what’s new<\/em> ?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Parmi les nombreux auteurs int\u00e9ressants du site tr\u00e8s repr\u00e9sentatif du mouvement dissident au sein des forces arm\u00e9es US National & Defense Interest<\/a>, l’auteur anonymus<\/em> Fabius Maximus est r\u00e9put\u00e9 pour ses analyses incisives et sans concession. Dans son article du 22 mai<\/a>, il s’attaque \u00e0 une cible d\u00e9sormais favorite : les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux des forces arm\u00e9es US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSa th\u00e8se est simple :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Par rapport \u00e0 ce qu’ils pourraient faire, les insurg\u00e9s, r\u00e9sistants, etc., sont particuli\u00e8rement incomp\u00e9tents et inefficaces.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Pourtant, les forces arm\u00e9es US sont dans une situation catastrophique. La cause en est donc l’extraordinaire incomp\u00e9tence du commandement US, pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux, absolument incapables d’envisager la moindre situation qui ne soit pas renseign\u00e9e dans leur manuel op\u00e9rationnel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-apr\u00e8s, un passage de l’article intitul\u00e9 \u00abThe American Way of War<\/em>\u00bb, avec citation du priv\u00e9 Philip Marlowe (Humphrey Bogard) extraite de The Big Sleep<\/em> (\u00abMy, my, my! Such a lot of guns around town and so few brains.<\/em>\u00bb), passage sur l’investissement de Bagdad en 2003:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe events surrounding the fall of Iraq’s capital are difficult to imagine, even after four years have passed. US forces again proved invincible on the field of battle. They rolled up to Baghdad, occupied it and waited for orders. Then the capitol fell into disorder, with looting and burning of key infrastructure.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbApparently the Pentagon’s senior generals the best-educated generals ever to lead an Army failed to prepare for one of history’s most common scenarios. As a result they read reports from their field commanders and watched as victory tipped over to what might become a crushing defeat. Perhaps for the next war our top generals’ briefing books should include DVD’s of War and Peace and Gone with the Wind. Watching the burning of Moscow and Atlanta might remind them to plan for this contingency.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIt’s not yet clear why and how this occurred, except in one respect. Our military is a full member of 21st Century American society no separate military culture here and its top leaders produce excuses suitable for a Superpower, featuring the new American mantra: It’s not our fault. An expert at RAND said it well:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhile it can be argued that U.S. military planners could not have been expected to anticipate the emergence of an insurgency any more than they could have foreseen the widespread disorders, looting, and random violence that followed the fall of Baghdad, that is precisely the nub of the problem. The fact that military planners apparently didn’t consider the possibility that sustained and organized resistance could gather momentum and transform itself into an insurgency reflects a pathology that has long affected governments and militaries everywhere Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, RAND (2004)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRAND’s sponsors likely appreciated the diplomatic phrasing while it can be argued. Much nicer than suggesting that our generals should have foreseen the scenario that has dominated post-WW-II wars, guerrilla warfare against foreign occupiers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAdditional evidence for their incompetence is the failure to adequately scale up the military’s health care system as the war continued. This is clearly a failure that goes to the highest levels of the military.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuant \u00e0 l’incomp\u00e9tence de l’insurrection et de la r\u00e9sistance irakiennes, surpass\u00e9e par celle des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux am\u00e9ricanistes, nous serions tent\u00e9s d’y voir la magie de notre fameuse guerre de la 4\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration (G4G). Nous pensons qu’on peut s’interroger sur les effets d’une d\u00e9faite rapide de l’U.S. Army en Irak, apr\u00e8s la pseudo-victoire d’avril 2003. D’une part, la puissance de feu US l’aurait-elle permise? D’autre part, une telle d\u00e9faite, si elle avait eu lieu, n’aurait-elle pas \u00e9t\u00e9 moins grave que la d\u00e9faite-crise larv\u00e9e que subissent aujourd’hui les forces arm\u00e9es US, avec les r\u00e9percussions \u00e0 Washington?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn d’autres termes, le secret de la G4G<\/a> n’est-il pas de fixer l’adversaire dans un bourbier et de le faire durer le plus longtemps possible plut\u00f4t que de le vaincre, et d’ailleurs, tout le monde ne se r\u00e9jouit-il pas de voir l’embourbement US en Irak se poursuivre? Nous ne disons pas qu’il s’agit d’une tactique d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e. On n’organise pas une mauvaise tactique, un peu mauvaise mais pas trop mauvaise, pour fixer l’adversaire sans subir soi-m\u00eame de revers insupportables, c’est sans doute la chose militaire la plus difficile du monde. Dans ce cas, la G4G ne ferait-elle pas partie de la vision maistrienne<\/a> de la p\u00e9riode: faire durer le d\u00e9sarroi chez l’ennemi, plus que la d\u00e9faite, pour le d\u00e9structurer de l’int\u00e9rieur? Cela correspond \u00e0 la d\u00e9finition des experts de la G4G (Lind), qui attaque les structures \u00e9tatiques de l’ennemi bien plus que ses forces arm\u00e9es, mais par l’interm\u00e9diaire \u00e9ventuel des forces arm\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 25 mai 2007 \u00e0 13H47<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Parmi les nombreux auteurs int\u00e9ressants du site tr\u00e8s repr\u00e9sentatif du mouvement dissident au sein des forces arm\u00e9es US National & Defense Interest, l’auteur anonymus Fabius Maximus est r\u00e9put\u00e9 pour ses analyses incisives et sans concession. Dans son article du 22 mai, il s’attaque \u00e0 une cible d\u00e9sormais favorite : les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux des forces arm\u00e9es US.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5604,5701,5160,6708,857,5605,2671],"class_list":["post-68832","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-fabius","tag-g4g","tag-generaux","tag-incompetence","tag-irak","tag-maximus","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68832","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68832"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68832\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68832"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68832"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68832"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}