{"id":68842,"date":"2007-05-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-05-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/05\/29\/pourquoi-ne-pas-parler-de-euromissiles-ii-au-g-8\/"},"modified":"2007-05-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-05-29T00:00:00","slug":"pourquoi-ne-pas-parler-de-euromissiles-ii-au-g-8","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/05\/29\/pourquoi-ne-pas-parler-de-euromissiles-ii-au-g-8\/","title":{"rendered":"Pourquoi ne pas parler de \u201ceuromissiles-II\u201d au G-8 ?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>La question des anti-missiles US en Europe,  ce que nous nommons euromissiles-II,  est toujours un sujet sensible dans les relations transatlantiques, particuli\u00e8rement pour les Allemands. Une chronique du pr\u00e9sident du SPD Kurt Beck dans l&rsquo;International <em>Herald Tribune<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iht.com\/articles\/2007\/05\/28\/opinion\/edbeck.php\" class=\"gen\">28 mai<\/a> revient sur le cas pour deux propositions implicites :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  On devrait parler de cette question lors du prochain G-8 de la fin de la semaine prochaine en Allemagne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  On ne devrait pas craindre d&rsquo;envisager l&rsquo;abandon du programme si des consultations m\u00e8nent \u00e0 cette recommandation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe pr\u00e9sident du SPD, partenaire de l&rsquo;actuelle majorit\u00e9 au pouvoir \u00e0 Berlin, explique ainsi cette hypoth\u00e8se de l&rsquo;abandon du programme :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>A disarmament policy initiated by the West would generate considerable confidence and enhance our credibility when urging others to take steps to disarmament. But we must get strategic partners like Russia on board. Without them we will not be able to solve any of the pressing international problems.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>That brings me to the current plans to deploy a U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. If we are talking about common security then we need to have joint discussion on key means of attaining it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The consultation processes within NATO and in the NATO-Russia Council must be extended. That means not only informing the members of these organizations about one&rsquo;s own plans, but also entertaining a willingness to abandon them if necessary.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>There is a need, in other words, for joint consultation on whether the strategic analysis that may point to the need for such a missile defense system is indeed correct. There are considerable doubts about this in Europe &#8211; including in Poland and the Czech Republic.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The fact that the responsible subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives also has major reservations about the project has been met with great interest here in Germany.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Serious thought needs to be given to the political price for such a unilaterally enforced missile defense project  which is intended to respond to a threat that so far does not exist.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The project is inflicting great harm on the current climate between Russia and the United States\/Europe, just when we need new confidence, indeed a new phase of d\u00e9tente.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Moreover, serious doubts have been expressed as to whether the defense system actually functions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The United States has so far invested over $100 billion in the development of a defensive shield. That is a huge sum which, spent differently, could have achieved more for the security of the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The world has arrived at a crossroads. It would be a ground-breaking decision if, acting in trans-Atlantic accord, we were to pave the way for a new round of global disarmament. In doing so, we would be sure of the support of the peoples of our countries and far beyond.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette proposition est du type pav\u00e9 dans la marre. Elle intervient alors que la tension transatlantique (USA-Allemagne) est grande \u00e0 cause du conflit sur la lutte contre la crise climatique avant la prochaine r\u00e9union du G-8. Il n&rsquo;est pas assur\u00e9 que les chr\u00e9tiens-d\u00e9mocrates et Merkel appr\u00e9cient qu&rsquo;on mette en avant cet autre grave sujet de m\u00e9sentente. D&rsquo;autre part, c&rsquo;est un signe que le SPD, ou l&rsquo;actuelle direction du parti dans tous les cas, consid\u00e8re cette affaire comme plus que jamais essentielle, notamment \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des tensions avec la Russie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un acte de plus vers l&rsquo;institutionnalisation de  la crise dans le contexte le plus large possible des relations internationales, hors de son confinement actuel dans son contexte technique et dans les relations qui vont avec. Il est \u00e0 premi\u00e8re vue peu probable que la suggestion de Kurt Beck soit retenue, \u00e0 moins que les Russes jugent de leur int\u00e9r\u00eat de soulever le probl\u00e8me au sommet du G-8. Il reste que le fait de poser le probl\u00e8me dans le cadre du G-8 est une indication de la difficult\u00e9 grandissante de le laisser \u00e9voluer dans le seul cadre technique et de relations bilat\u00e9rales mineures (USA-Pologne et USA-Tch\u00e9quie).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 29 mai 2007 \u00e0 05H37<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La question des anti-missiles US en Europe, ce que nous nommons euromissiles-II, est toujours un sujet sensible dans les relations transatlantiques, particuli\u00e8rement pour les Allemands. Une chronique du pr\u00e9sident du SPD Kurt Beck dans l&rsquo;International Herald Tribune du 28 mai revient sur le cas pour deux propositions implicites : On devrait parler de cette question&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3453,6537,5433,6484,6719,6720,2730,6721,2804],"class_list":["post-68842","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anti-missiles","tag-beck","tag-bmd","tag-euromissiles-ii","tag-g-8","tag-kurt","tag-russie","tag-spd","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68842","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68842"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68842\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68842"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68842"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68842"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}