Le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Sanchez commanda le th\u00e9\u00e2tre d’op\u00e9ration irakien de l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2003 \u00e0 l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2004. Il se retira de l’U.S. Army \u00e0 l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2006 apr\u00e8s avoir refus\u00e9 une quatri\u00e8me \u00e9toile<\/a> que lui proposait Rumsfeld. Il craignait d’avoir \u00e0 faire face \u00e0 un processus de confirmation chaotique et vou\u00e9 \u00e0 l’\u00e9chec devant le S\u00e9nat, notamment \u00e0 cause du scandale d’Abou Ghraib (tortures) mis \u00e0 jour durant son commandement. La d\u00e9p\u00eache d’AFP du 3 juin<\/a> qui rend compte des d\u00e9clarations de Sanchez qui nous int\u00e9ressent reste assez vague et confuse sur cette circonstance, ce qui implique un aspect pol\u00e9mique \u00e9vident.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLes d\u00e9clarations de Sanchez sont radicales et concernent deux sujets : la situation en Irak et l’actuelle direction am\u00e9ricaniste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Concernant l’Irak, Sanchez est abrupt. Les USA doivent oublier tout espoir de gagner la guerre. \u00abI think if we do the right things politically and economically with the right Iraqi leadership we could still salvage at least a stalemate, if you will not a stalemate but at least stave off defeat, retired Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez said in an interview.<\/em> [] Sanchez called the situation in Iraq bleak, which he blamed on the abysmal performance in the early stages and the transition of sovereignty. He included himself among those who erred in Iraq’s crucial first year after the toppling of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Le plus int\u00e9ressant dans les d\u00e9clarations de Sanchez concerne la direction de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale des USA, c’est-\u00e0-dire tous les responsables de ces questions bien au-del\u00e0 du seul Bush. \u00abI am absolutely convinced that America has a crisis in leadership at this time, Sanchez told AFP after a recent speech in San Antonio, Texas. We’ve got to do whatever we can to help the next generation of leaders do better than we have done over the past five years, better than what this cohort of political and military leaders have done, adding that he was referring to our national political leadership in its entirety not just President George W. Bush.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa prise de position du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Sanchez est du plus haut int\u00e9r\u00eat en raison de son caract\u00e8re syst\u00e9mique, qui implique effectivement une crise du syst\u00e8me. Si Sanchez se r\u00e9f\u00e8re avec espoir \u00e0 la prochaine g\u00e9n\u00e9ration en esp\u00e9rant qu’elle fera mieux que l’actuelle, on voit mal ce qui pour l’instant diff\u00e9rencie ce souhait du simple vu pieux. Il y a effectivement un aspect syst\u00e9mique particuli\u00e8rement \u00e9prouvant dans le constat que fait Sanchez de l’\u00e9chec de la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration actuellement au pouvoir, et l’on ne distingue nulle part l’amorce d’une auto-critique qui ferait esp\u00e9rer un redressement. Au contraire, les attitudes g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement rencontr\u00e9es consistent \u00e0 rejeter la responsabilit\u00e9 des \u00e9checs, quand les \u00e9checs sont reconnus, sur des circonstances ext\u00e9rieures, voire sur la d\u00e9loyaut\u00e9 des adversaires refusant de se plier aux r\u00e8gles de combat US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSanchez va peut-\u00eatre \u00e9crire un livre de souvenirs sur son ann\u00e9e de commandement en Irak. On le lira avec int\u00e9r\u00eat. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 4 juin 2007 \u00e0 14H25<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Sanchez commanda le th\u00e9\u00e2tre d’op\u00e9ration irakien de l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2003 \u00e0 l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2004. Il se retira de l’U.S. Army \u00e0 l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2006 apr\u00e8s avoir refus\u00e9 une quatri\u00e8me \u00e9toile que lui proposait Rumsfeld. Il craignait d’avoir \u00e0 faire face \u00e0 un processus de confirmation chaotique et vou\u00e9 \u00e0 l’\u00e9chec devant le S\u00e9nat, notamment \u00e0 cause… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3228,4255,6741,857,4120],"class_list":["post-68865","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-crise","tag-defaite","tag-direction","tag-irak","tag-sanchez"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68865","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68865"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68865\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68865"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68865"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68865"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}