{"id":68890,"date":"2007-06-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-06-10T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/06\/10\/garantie-de-securite-et-precedents-historiques\/"},"modified":"2007-06-10T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-06-10T00:00:00","slug":"garantie-de-securite-et-precedents-historiques","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/06\/10\/garantie-de-securite-et-precedents-historiques\/","title":{"rendered":"Garantie de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents historiques"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Garantie de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents historiques<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t10 juin 2007  Avant et apr\u00e8s le G8, GW Bush s&rsquo;est rendu en Tch\u00e9quie et en Pologne, les deux pays choisis pour avoir l&rsquo;honneur d&rsquo;abriter les \u00e9l\u00e9ments europ\u00e9ens du syst\u00e8me anti-missiles global des USA. Il faut noter que l&rsquo;accueil a \u00e9t\u00e9 contrast\u00e9 : enthousiaste en Tch\u00e9quie, r\u00e9serv\u00e9 en Pologne. Il semble que les Polonais, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3835\" class=\"gen\">\u00e0 l&rsquo;image<\/a> de l&rsquo;ancien ministre de la d\u00e9fense Sikorski, commencent \u00e0 s&rsquo;interroger avec force sur les avantages de leur alliance privil\u00e9gi\u00e9e avec les USA. Les Polonais attendent des gestes de r\u00e9ciprocit\u00e9 de la part des USA, notamment que les difficult\u00e9s sans nombre sur les visas des Polonais se rendant aux USA soient lev\u00e9es. Jusqu&rsquo;ici, pas beaucoup de r\u00e9sultats.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSur cette partie polonaise de la tourn\u00e9e de GW, voici quelques commentaires d&rsquo;un texte de IPS.News du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ipsnews.net\/print.asp?idnews=38114\" class=\"gen\">9 mai<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>During Bush&rsquo;s short stop-over to meet with Polish President Lech Kaczynski Friday, both officials insisted on their commitment to the project that would place a radar in the Czech Republic and an anti-missile base in Poland to protect the free world from missile attacks by rogue states.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But Polish backing for the project comes amidst growing concern by pundits and the media alike that Warsaw&rsquo;s faithful support and military contributions to U.S. interventions abroad have not been reciprocated by Washington  which does not allow Poles to enter the United States without a visa.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Radowlaw Sikorski, former minister of national defence, was clear in reminding Poles that Iraq and Afghanistan were our gestures of friendship towards the United States. The shield will be another gesture. The time has come for a tangible gesture of reciprocity.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The discussions were, however, given a jolt by a surprise offer from Russia  which had until now staunchly opposed the missile defence project, doubting the rationale given  to Washington to build the infrastructure at its radar station in Qabala, Azerbaijan.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Bush promised to study the interesting proposal.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The surprise proposal really changed a lot. The Eastern European visit might not be important after this, Jan Drahokoupil, analyst at the Czech Economy and Society Trust, told IPS. We have to wait to see what [President Vladimir] Putin&rsquo;s proposal actually means.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn Tch\u00e9quie, au contraire, l&rsquo;accueil des dirigeants, avant le sommet du G8, avait \u00e9t\u00e9 enthousiaste. C&rsquo;est pour ce pays que le commentaire ci-apr\u00e8s de Zolt\u00e1n Dujisin, d&rsquo;IPS, vaut surtout.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>U.S. President George W. Bush this week discussed a U.S. missile base in Eastern Europe with Polish and Czech officials, but the results were merely words, and the two European countries showed some naivety as international players.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>There were great expectations from two of Washington&rsquo;s most faithful allies, but the young democracies revealed, each in their own way, that they are still learning how to deal with the world&rsquo;s superpower.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<h3>La Tch\u00e9coslovaquie et son pass\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaniste<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;opposition \u00e0 la base de radar du r\u00e9seau anti-missiles est tr\u00e8s forte en Tch\u00e9quie et un r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum est loin d&rsquo;\u00eatre impossible, avec un r\u00e9sultat certainement tr\u00e8s d\u00e9licat pour l&rsquo;engagement de ce pays. Les dirigeants tch\u00e8ques, allant au plus grossier, ont choisi comme argument politique d\u00e9cisif d&rsquo;exalter le r\u00f4le de lib\u00e9rateur historique de la Tch\u00e9coslovaquie et de d\u00e9fenseurs des libert\u00e9s non moins historique des USA. Pour eux, l&rsquo;engagement avec les USA vaut une garantie de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de la puissance US et leur argumentation est qu&rsquo;en effet cette garantie a exist\u00e9 dans le pass\u00e9, ne serait-ce que dans l&rsquo;attitude de soutien et d&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat des USA pour la Tch\u00e9coslovaquie. Les trois dates qui viennent \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit pour justifier cette plaidoirie sont celles de mai 1945 (lib\u00e9ration de la Tch\u00e9coslovaquie), de f\u00e9vrier 1948 (coup de Prague, prise de pouvoir par les communistes) et d&rsquo;ao\u00fbt 1968 (invasion sovi\u00e9tique apr\u00e8s le printemps de Prague). Les rappels historiques permettent d&rsquo;appr\u00e9cier les pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents de l&rsquo;attitude US vis-\u00e0-vis des pays d&rsquo;Europe de l&rsquo;Est (de la Tch\u00e9coslovaquie).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Pour mai 1945<\/strong>, il devrait \u00eatre connu que les Am\u00e9ricains ont \u00e9t\u00e9 les premiers \u00e0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=2200\" class=\"gen\">sacrifier <\/a> l&rsquo;Est de l&rsquo;Europe \u00e0 la domination sovi\u00e9tique, \u00e0 la conf\u00e9rence de Yalta. A cette lumi\u00e8re, l&rsquo;anecdote suivante, sur l&rsquo;\u00e9tonnante servilit\u00e9 des actuels dirigeants tch\u00e8ques, pourrait para\u00eetre succulente aux gourmets de cette sorte de circonstance :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Concerned that the Americans could get the feeling that nobody here would remember who liberated the country and then has never occupied it, Czech Defence Minister Vlasta Parkanova tried to charm the U.S. president by offering him a CD with a pro-U.S. song performed by the minister herself.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>This was an illustration of the Czech government&rsquo;s approach to Bush, Drahokoupil told IPS.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The song, which borrows the melody of a famous Czech hit celebrating Yuriy Gagarin&rsquo;s arrival to space in 1961, was televised with images of U.S. and Czech flags, a radar installation and a Czech government building in the background.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Tell the guys who live on the stars; tell the guys who live in outer space. Tell them that we want to live in peace, but we prefer clothes from Uncle Sam, the minister&rsquo;s lyrics go, before ending with a we know who has freed us back then in May 1945.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tZolt\u00e1n Dujisin termine cette h\u00e9ro\u00efque p\u00e9roraison par la pr\u00e9cision suivante : \u00ab<em>About 144,000 Soviet soldiers died during Czechoslovakia&rsquo;s liberation. The number of U.S. casualties is estimated to be between 180 and 290 soldiers.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Pour f\u00e9vrier 1948<\/strong> et contrairement \u00e0 la l\u00e9gende, le coup de Prague n&rsquo;amena chez les Am\u00e9ricains aucune agitation particuli\u00e8re. Dans son excellent livre <em>Harry Truman &#038; the War Scare of 1948<\/em> (St Martin&rsquo;s Press, 1993), Frank Kofsky observe que la situation tch\u00e9coslovaque n&rsquo;avait jamais vraiment inqui\u00e9t\u00e9 les Am\u00e9ricains jusqu&rsquo;en 1948. En novembre 1947, Keenan avait donn\u00e9 au secr\u00e9taire d&rsquo;Etat George Marshall une analyse o\u00f9 il reconnaissait et admettait l&rsquo;influence pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rante de Moscou, PC ou pas au pouvoir. Yalta r\u00e9gnait absolument et il n&rsquo;\u00e9tait pas question d&rsquo;y interf\u00e9rer, et la seule pr\u00e9occupation de Marshall concernait les pays d&rsquo;Europe de l&rsquo;Ouest, zone d&rsquo;influence US selon Yalta<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>What is of enormous significance, moreover, is that<\/em> <strong><em>Marshall continued to adhere to the same position even as the Communists were taking power in Prague<\/em><\/strong>. <em>He was, a he telegraphed the US ambassador in Paris in February 24, 1948, concerned at the probable repercussions in Western European countries of a successful coup in Czechoslovakia <\/em>[CZ]<MI> as there was a real possibility that such a development in CZ would encourage action in Western European countries. But that consideration aside, the secretary of state, like the director of the CIA, saw litlle change ao any sort coming about as a result of this development :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In so far as international affairs are concerned, a seizure of power by the Communist Party of CZ would not materialy alter in this respect the situation which has existed in the last three years. CZ has faithfully followed the Soviet policy in the United Nations and elsewhere and the establishment of a Communist regime would merely crystallize and confirm for the future previous Czech policy.<\/em>\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Ao\u00fbt 1968<\/strong>, troisi\u00e8me et dernier point \u00e9voqu\u00e9. On a une bonne image de l&rsquo;attitude et de la r\u00e9action US au moment de l&rsquo;invasion de la Tch\u00e9coslovaquie du 21 ao\u00fbt 1968, par ces extraits du livre <em>La m\u00e9sentente apprivois\u00e9e, de Gaulle et les Allemands, 1963-1969<\/em>, de Benedikt Schoenbrun, (PUF 2007, d&rsquo;apr\u00e8s une th\u00e8se universitaire de l&rsquo;auteur).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab[En juillet-ao\u00fbt 1968, l]<em>e pr\u00e9sident Johnson accorde \u00e0 d&rsquo;autres sujets<\/em> [que la Tch\u00e9coslovaquie] <em>la priorit\u00e9 politique dans ses relations avec Moscou, notamment \u00e0 des conversations sur les r\u00e9ductions <\/em>[des armements]. <em>L&rsquo;\u00e9ventualit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une invasion sovi\u00e9tique en Tch\u00e9coslovaquie appara\u00eet m\u00eame sous l&rsquo;angle d&rsquo;une g\u00eane dans les discussions que Johnson envisage avec Kossyguine puisque les deux \u00e9v\u00e9nements ne devraient pas avoir lieu durant la m\u00eame p\u00e9riode. Le ministre de la d\u00e9fense, Clark Clifford, rassure son pr\u00e9sident \u00e0 ce sujet. Dans une, deux ou trois semaines, dit-il, l&rsquo;affaire tch\u00e9coslovaque sera r\u00e9solue. Sans aucune g\u00eane, Clifford poursuit : la situation tch\u00e9coslovaque est tellement enflamm\u00e9e que les sovi\u00e9tiques inciseront cet abc\u00e8s d&rsquo;une mani\u00e8re ou d&rsquo;une autre et je pense qu&rsquo;il ne barrera plus la route.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe soir du 20 ao\u00fbt, \u00ab<em>exactement \u00e0 l&rsquo;heure o\u00f9 l&rsquo;invasion commence<\/em>\u00bb, Johnson re\u00e7oit l&rsquo;ambassadeur Dobrynine qui lui lit le communiqu\u00e9 officiel sovi\u00e9tique. Johnson dit qu&rsquo;il doit d&rsquo;abord consulter ses conseillers avant que les USA prennent une attitude officielle. Puis on discute<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Ce soir du 20 ao\u00fbt, le pr\u00e9sident am\u00e9ricain ne fait pas preuve d&rsquo;une grande force de caract\u00e8re. Il continue de s&rsquo;entretenir avec l&rsquo;ambassadeur Dobrynine, de fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s d\u00e9tendue et personnelle, notamment de ses petits enfants et de vieilles chansons. Johnson veut aussi fixer, le soir m\u00eame, un sommet sovi\u00e9to-am\u00e9ricain en URSS pour discuter du d\u00e9sarmement. Jusque l\u00e0, le Kremlin a refus\u00e9 d&rsquo;acc\u00e9der au souhait d&rsquo;un pr\u00e9sident qui devra quitter la Maison-Blanche dans quelques mois. C&rsquo;est seulement le 19 ao\u00fbt que Dobrynine a finalement apport\u00e9 une r\u00e9ponse positive. Donc, le soir du 20 ao\u00fbt, l&rsquo;ambassadeur sovi\u00e9tique rentre chez lui surpris du calme de la r\u00e9action am\u00e9ricaine \u00e0 l&rsquo;annonce de l&rsquo;invasion de la Tch\u00e9coslovaquie.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Garantie de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents historiques 10 juin 2007 Avant et apr\u00e8s le G8, GW Bush s&rsquo;est rendu en Tch\u00e9quie et en Pologne, les deux pays choisis pour avoir l&rsquo;honneur d&rsquo;abriter les \u00e9l\u00e9ments europ\u00e9ens du syst\u00e8me anti-missiles global des USA. Il faut noter que l&rsquo;accueil a \u00e9t\u00e9 contrast\u00e9 : enthousiaste en Tch\u00e9quie, r\u00e9serv\u00e9 en Pologne.&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3453,6758,2827,3328,4839,2671],"class_list":["post-68890","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-anti-missiles","tag-garantie","tag-pologne","tag-prague","tag-tchecoslovaquie","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68890","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68890"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68890\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68890"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68890"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68890"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}