Sans trop de roulements de tambour ni de sonneries de trompette, les Britanniques font savoir que, toutes r\u00e9flexions faites, ils repoussent l’entr\u00e9e en service de leur JSF \u00e0 d\u00e9collage\/atterrissage vertical\/court (ADAC\/V), version F-35B, de trois ans<\/strong>, soit, de 2014 \u00e0 2017. Par rapport aux promesses initiales (1995-98), on approche la d\u00e9cennie de retard pour l’entr\u00e9e en service de cette version du JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’\u00e9norme d\u00e9lai britannique serait en partie d\u00fb, selon l’explication donn\u00e9e, \u00e0 des questions budg\u00e9taires. Mais tout cela est expliqu\u00e9, dans Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> du 11 juin 2007<\/a>, dans des termes tr\u00e8s incertains et extr\u00eamement l\u00e9nifiants, qui nous permettent d’envisager bien des hypoth\u00e8ses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe U.K. will delay service entry of the Joint Strike Fighter by three years, to 2017, and is exploring options for further postponing the Harrier GR9’s retirement.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe ministry had been planning to introduce the Joint Combat Aircraft, as the U.K. refers to the Lockheed Martin F-35, into service in December 2014. British industry officials close to the program suggest the latest delay has resulted at least in part from budgetary issues related to Equipment Program 07 deliberations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAt the same time, consideration is being given to the option for pushing the Harrier GR9 out of service date (OSD) beyond 2018-19. Industry executives involved in the program confirm the Defense Ministry is examining extending the aircraft’s service life again, and possibly industry producing additional Pegasus turbofan engines for the type.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe GR9 OSD was initially 2015, but financial and operational capability issues have forced this date to be delayed. The latest variant of the Harrier is on its first combat deployment in Afghanistan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIf the U.K. sticks to its present carrier acquisition program, GR9s would serve for several years on the new class before the arrival of the JCA.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe U.K. plans to purchase 138 JSF aircraft, likely the F-35B version, to provide a successor to the Harrier GR9, and also to meet the crewed element of its Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability requirement.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’explication \u00e9conomique vaut \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s ce qu’on nous dit, au MoD, \u00e0 propos de Prince Bandar et de ses aventures yamamesques. D’une part, personne ne conna\u00eet le prix du JSF (\u00e0 moins que les Britanniques aient leur id\u00e9e?) ; d’autre part, cette \u00e9conomie sur un achat qui aura tout de m\u00eame lieu est assez singuli\u00e8re si elle provoque une d\u00e9pense suppl\u00e9mentaire, sans aucune valeur d’investissement comme l’est la prolongation de vie de 5 ans des Harrier<\/em> GR9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl est vraiment tr\u00e8s, tr\u00e8s difficile de ne pas envisager un rapport de cause \u00e0 effet entre cette d\u00e9cision de retarder l’entr\u00e9e en service du JSF de trois ans et les nouvelles du JSF, alors qu’il est d\u00e9sormais \u00e9vident que, parmi les ennuis sans nombre du JSF, on trouve des d\u00e9lais importants, voire impressionnants concernant cette version F-35B (voir cette remarque de Bill Sweetman<\/a> : \u00abTwo years after a costly redesign effort was supposed to fix the problem, the U.K. says the F-35B’s ability to land on a carrier with weapons anf fuel reserves is at risk<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 14 juin 2007 \u00e0 15H03<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Sans trop de roulements de tambour ni de sonneries de trompette, les Britanniques font savoir que, toutes r\u00e9flexions faites, ils repoussent l’entr\u00e9e en service de leur JSF \u00e0 d\u00e9collage\/atterrissage vertical\/court (ADAC\/V), version F-35B, de trois ans, soit, de 2014 \u00e0 2017. Par rapport aux promesses initiales (1995-98), on approche la d\u00e9cennie de retard pour l’entr\u00e9e… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[250,3319,6770,4214,3519],"class_list":["post-68904","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-jsf","tag-navy","tag-retard","tag-royal","tag-technologie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68904","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68904"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68904\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68904"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68904"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68904"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}