{"id":68967,"date":"2007-07-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-07-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/07\/03\/le-plus-sale-secret-a-propos-des-bijoux-de-famille-de-la-cia\/"},"modified":"2007-07-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-07-03T00:00:00","slug":"le-plus-sale-secret-a-propos-des-bijoux-de-famille-de-la-cia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/07\/03\/le-plus-sale-secret-a-propos-des-bijoux-de-famille-de-la-cia\/","title":{"rendered":"Le plus \u201csale secret\u201d \u00e0 propos des \u201cbijoux de famille\u201d de la CIA"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Depuis deux semaines, nous sommes cens\u00e9s conna\u00eetre tous les secrets des fameux bijoux de famille (<em>crown jewels<\/em>) de la CIA, depuis que pr\u00e8s de 700 pages de documents ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9classifi\u00e9es et diffus\u00e9es sur <a href=\"http:\/\/www.gwu.edu\/~nsarchiv\/NSAEBB\/NSAEBB222\/index.htm\" class=\"gen\">le site<\/a> des National Security Archives. Ces bijoux de famille concernent essentiellement les sales secrets, ou sales coups (<em>dirty tricks<\/em>) de la CIA des ann\u00e9es 1950 et 1960, concernant les activit\u00e9s ill\u00e9gales de l&rsquo;Agence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe chroniqueur James Carroll, auteur de divers ouvrages remarquables sur les questions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, dont <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=2923\" class=\"gen\">House of War<\/a>, consacre sa chronique du Boston <em>Globe<\/em> du  <a href=\"ttp:\/\/www.boston.com\/news\/globe\/editorial_opinion\/oped\/articles\/2007\/07\/02\/cias_darkest_secret\/\" class=\"gen\">2 juillet<\/a> \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9v\u00e9nement. Il rappelle les grandes lignes des activit\u00e9s ill\u00e9gales de la CIA, les \u00e9claire d&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciations personnelles pertinentes. Il insiste notamment sur l&rsquo;une des pr\u00e9occupations de l&rsquo;Agence lorsque la campagne des activit\u00e9s ill\u00e9gales fut d\u00e9clench\u00e9e. Il s&rsquo;agissait de faire accepter par le public am\u00e9ricain des actes renvoyant \u00e0 cette r\u00e9pugnante philosophie d&rsquo;une action ill\u00e9gale, selon les termes du rapport de 1954 du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Doolittle, qui jugeait pourtant n\u00e9cessaire de l&rsquo;appliquer en raison du danger sovi\u00e9tique : \u00ab<em>It may be necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCarroll conclut sur ce qu&rsquo;il juge \u00eatre, finalement, le plus sale secret de toute cette affaire :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The irony, of course, is that the CIA, which has almost always been wrong about America&rsquo;s enemies, has been proven wrong, in the end, about the American public. When the national security establishment&rsquo;s Committee Hearings in the 1970s or in the release of the family jewels last week  the revelations are greeted with a national yawn. The monstrous military establishment, which intelligence crimes protect, is not questioned.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Why are the congressional switchboards not jammed with angry phone calls of dishonored Americans? Except for an ineffectual, if passionate, minority of objectors, the people of the United States handle the knowledge of past and present crimes committed in their name quite nicely, thank you. Ah, but there&rsquo;s the darkest secret of all.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette indiff\u00e9rence du public US \u00e0 ces actions notoirement ill\u00e9gales de la CIA, confirm\u00e9e aujourd&rsquo;hui par la persistance de cette attitude \u00e0 l&rsquo;occasion de la confirmation de ces actions, pourrait tenir, selon notre estimation, d&rsquo;abord \u00e0 la distance existant  entre ce public et l&rsquo;administration f\u00e9d\u00e9rale. Le gouvernement US n&rsquo;est pas de type r\u00e9galien. Il est per\u00e7u comme une administration centralisatrice, un syst\u00e8me charg\u00e9 de la gestion et de l&rsquo;action des USA. En ce sens, son activit\u00e9 est per\u00e7ue par les citoyens US comme quelque chose qui n&rsquo;engage pas n\u00e9cessairement leur responsabilit\u00e9 propre (cela d\u00e9pendant \u00e9videmment des circonstances, avec des changements lors d&rsquo;une urgence nationale spectaculaire). De cette fa\u00e7on, on peut mieux expliquer cette indiff\u00e9rence effectivement extraordinaire qui existe chez les citoyens US \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9gard des activit\u00e9s de la CIA, et qui permet de soutenir une attitude de compl\u00e8te irresponsabilit\u00e9 et d&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=2679\" class=\"gen\">inculpabilit\u00e9<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 3 juillet 2007 \u00e0 12H58<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Depuis deux semaines, nous sommes cens\u00e9s conna\u00eetre tous les secrets des fameux bijoux de famille (crown jewels) de la CIA, depuis que pr\u00e8s de 700 pages de documents ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9classifi\u00e9es et diffus\u00e9es sur le site des National Security Archives. Ces bijoux de famille concernent essentiellement les sales secrets, ou sales coups (dirty tricks) de&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6815,3369,3104,3075,2631,6816,6817],"class_list":["post-68967","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bijoux","tag-carroll","tag-cia","tag-coups","tag-de","tag-famille","tag-sales"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68967","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68967"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68967\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68967"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68967"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68967"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}