{"id":69065,"date":"2007-07-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-07-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/07\/29\/cest-sans-doute-la-plus-intense-bagarre-en-irak-le-premier-ministre-el-maliki-versus-le-general-us-petraeus\/"},"modified":"2007-07-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-07-29T00:00:00","slug":"cest-sans-doute-la-plus-intense-bagarre-en-irak-le-premier-ministre-el-maliki-versus-le-general-us-petraeus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/07\/29\/cest-sans-doute-la-plus-intense-bagarre-en-irak-le-premier-ministre-el-maliki-versus-le-general-us-petraeus\/","title":{"rendered":"C’est sans doute la plus intense bagarre en Irak : le premier ministre El-Maliki versus<\/em> le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral US Petraeus"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les \u00e9chos sont maintenant indubitables et d’une tr\u00e8s forte signification. Les relations entre le Premier ministre irakien El-Maliki et le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus, commandant-miracle des forces US en Irak, sont absolument ex\u00e9crables. Les rencontres entre les deux hommes sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de v\u00e9ritables affrontements. El-Maliki a d\u00e9j\u00e0 demand\u00e9 \u00e0 Bush le renvoi de son g\u00e9n\u00e9ral-miracle et il a fallu une plaidoirie de pr\u00e8s d’un quart d’heure de GW (tout cela sur grand \u00e9cran, \u00e0 12.000 kilom\u00e8tres de distance) pour faire revenir l’Irakien \u00e0 de meilleurs sentiments.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abOne Iraqi source said Mr Maliki used a video conference with Mr Bush to call for the general’s signature strategy to be scrapped. He told Bush that if Petraeus continues, he would arm Shia militias, said the official. Bush told Maliki to calm down.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAt another meeting with Gen Petraeus, Mr Maliki said: I can’t deal with you any more. I will ask for someone else to replace you.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes pr\u00e9cisions sont donn\u00e9es par le Daily Telegraph<\/em> du 27 juillet<\/a>. Un autre article, d’AP et repris notamment le 27 juillet<\/a> par le Marine Corps Times<\/em>, documente \u00e9galement le duel entre les deux hommes cens\u00e9s \u00eatre alli\u00e9s dans le m\u00eame combat pour la civilisation. (Les deux articles se recoupent et laissent penser que le journaliste du Telegraph<\/em> s’est largement inspir\u00e9 du compte-rendu d’AP.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDes explications diverses sont donn\u00e9es pour ces relations difficiles. Voici celles de Petraeus (AP) :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abPetraeus, a wily, rising star at the Pentagon who is known for holding his cards close to his chest, called his relations with al-Maliki very good…and that’s the truth, but acknowledged, we have not pulled punches with each other.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHere’s why, he said:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWe have made an enormous investment here 3,600-plus soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines have given their lives. And where we see something that could unhinge the progress that our soldiers and their soldiers are fighting to make … or jeopardize some of the very hard-fought gains that we have made, I’m going to speak up. And I have on occasion. And on a couple of occasions have demonstrated the full range of emotions.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa r\u00e9alit\u00e9 semble \u00eatre que tout oppose les deux hommes, leurs personnalit\u00e9s aussi bien que leurs objectifs diff\u00e9rents. Petraeus veut obtenir des r\u00e9sultats par tous les moyens, tr\u00e8s vite, en septembre si possible (pour son rapport au Congr\u00e8s sur les progr\u00e8s de son offensive), pour satisfaire son patron (le Pr\u00e9sident) et favoriser la suite de sa carri\u00e8re. Pour cela, il est pr\u00eat \u00e0 tous les exp\u00e9dients, y compris armer les milices sunnites pour pr\u00e9tendument affronter Al Qa\u00efda. El Maliki, lui, veut conserver son poste de Premier ministre dans des conditions \u00e9pouvantablement difficiles, en favorisant sa base chiite et en pr\u00e9parant la prise en main de la situation par la majorit\u00e9 chiite. Comme tous les leaders chiites, il est proche de l’Iran et veut tenir les sunnites irakiens \u00e0 distance, ce qui va contre la politique de Petraeus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCet \u00e9pisode incongru est \u00e9galement la marque d’une situation int\u00e9rieure irakienne que personne ne contr\u00f4le. On y constate surtout que les USA y jouent de plus en plus nettement un jeu quasi-uniquement conditionn\u00e9 par la situation \u00e0 Washington. Petraeus n’agit qu’en fonction de ses int\u00e9r\u00eats personnels, par rapport \u00e0 ses engagements et int\u00e9r\u00eats de carri\u00e8re ; en fait de g\u00e9n\u00e9ral-miracle capable de r\u00e9soudre les probl\u00e8mes tactiques en Irak, c’est sans doute le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral le plus politique qui ait eu jusqu’ici la charge du th\u00e9\u00e2tre irakien.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 29 juillet 2007 \u00e0 12H34<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les \u00e9chos sont maintenant indubitables et d’une tr\u00e8s forte signification. Les relations entre le Premier ministre irakien El-Maliki et le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus, commandant-miracle des forces US en Irak, sont absolument ex\u00e9crables. Les rencontres entre les deux hommes sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de v\u00e9ritables affrontements. El-Maliki a d\u00e9j\u00e0 demand\u00e9 \u00e0 Bush le renvoi de son g\u00e9n\u00e9ral-miracle et… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-69065","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69065","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69065"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69065\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69065"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69065"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69065"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}