{"id":69073,"date":"2007-08-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-08-01T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/01\/les-neocons-a-nouveau-en-guerre-contre-larabie-saoudite\/"},"modified":"2007-08-01T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-08-01T00:00:00","slug":"les-neocons-a-nouveau-en-guerre-contre-larabie-saoudite","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/01\/les-neocons-a-nouveau-en-guerre-contre-larabie-saoudite\/","title":{"rendered":"Les <em>neocons<\/em> \u00e0 nouveau en guerre contre l&rsquo;Arabie Saoudite"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Signe des temps et signe de l&rsquo;actuelle situation politique tr\u00e8s ambigu\u00eb entre les USA et l&rsquo;Arabie Saoudite : le <em>Weekly Standard<\/em> reprend ses attaques contre l&rsquo;Arabie. C&rsquo;est le cas dans le num\u00e9ro du 30 juillet, avec un <a href=\"http:\/\/www.weeklystandard.com\/Content\/Public\/Articles\/000\/000\/013\/937fxvva.asp\" class=\"gen\">article<\/a> de l&rsquo;auteur Stephen Schwartz, sp\u00e9cialiste des analyses critiques de l&rsquo;Arabie. Schwartz nous indique d&rsquo;ailleurs indirectement cette renaissance de l&rsquo;attaque contre l&rsquo;Arabie apr\u00e8s une armistice assez longue en mentionnant les attaques ant\u00e9rieures du <em>Weekly Standard<\/em> contre l&rsquo;Arabie, \u00e0 propos de son soutien financier aux opposants irakiens, et la derni\u00e8re datant d&rsquo;avril 2004 :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>None of the recent revelations should come as a suprise to anyone. In 2002, The Weekly Standard reported on the Al Rajhi financial network and terrorism; in 2003 on the Saudi injection of Wahhabi radicals into Iraq, including Saudi media publicity about their deaths in defense of Saddam Hussein and on Saudi involvement in combat against the U.S.-led coalition at Falluja; in 2004 on general Saudi support for terror in Iraq, and yet more on the Saudi involvement in the fight for Falluja.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;article est surtout centr\u00e9 sur une analyse technique de la politique saoudienne, notamment au niveau de l&rsquo;aide financi\u00e8re que les Saoudiens apportent aux groupes sunnites en Irak, et du soutien plus g\u00e9n\u00e9ral apport\u00e9 \u00e0 divers groupes aux activit\u00e9s terroristes. Diverses pr\u00e9cisions sont donn\u00e9es, concernant un domaine o\u00f9 effectivement la politique saoudienne est plus qu&rsquo;ambigu\u00eb, comme la politique US elle-m\u00eame vis-\u00e0-vis de l&rsquo;Arabie et les implications financi\u00e8res de nombreux dirigeants US avec les Saoudiens. C&rsquo;est mettre en lumi\u00e8re un domaine qui a toujours \u00e9t\u00e9 marqu\u00e9, aux USA, particuli\u00e8rement ces trente derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, par la contradiction, les conflits d&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat, les antagonismes de politiques poursuivant des buts compl\u00e8tement contradictoires, les positions personnelles corrompues, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Why has there been so little media interest in the role of Saudi money and influence in Iraq and elsewhere? The best explanation is media cooperation with the official U.S. preference for the quiet, behind-the-scenes influence that one administration after another has defaulted to in dealing with Saudi problems, and which the Saudis exploit to continue their deceptive ways.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;intervention du <em>Weekly Standard<\/em> dans ce sens ne fait que renforcer une \u00e9volution politique actuelle extr\u00eamement ambigu\u00eb \u00e0 Washington. Les relations avec l&rsquo;Arabie se trouvent dans une passe tr\u00e8s d\u00e9licate et radicalement antagoniste, entre d&rsquo;une part un renforcement du soutien US, avec notamment un renforcement promis au niveau de l&rsquo;armement de l&rsquo;Arabe, et d&rsquo;autre part la mise en \u00e9vidence croissante, avec des pressions dans ce sens du gouvernement irakien, des implications saoudiennes dans les courants terroristes. Les n\u00e9o-conservateurs retrouvent avec la phase actuelle une tendance initiale lorsque, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=335\" class=\"gen\">en 2002<\/a>, ils d\u00e9signaient l&rsquo;Arabie comme la principale cible de l&rsquo;action US au Moyen-Orient, apr\u00e8s l&rsquo;Irak mais plus mena\u00e7ante que l&rsquo;Irak. Une diff\u00e9rence aujourd&rsquo;hui : la position d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl, qui soutient la faction politique US pro-saoudienne au nom d&rsquo;une hostilit\u00e9 commune \u00e0 l&rsquo;Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSchwarz \u00e9crit :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Almost six years after September 11, 2001, and more than four years since the beginning of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, the American government and media have begun to admit something every informed and honest Muslim in the world has known all along. That is: the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, as well as 9\/11 and certain acts of extremist Sunni violence inside Iraq before then, are consequences of the official status of the ultra-fundamentalist Wahhabi sect in Saudi Arabia, Iraq&rsquo;s southern neighbor. Saudi Wahhabi clerics have preached and recruited for terror in Iraq; Saudi money has sustained it; the largest number of those who have carried out suicide bombings north of the Saudi-Iraqi border have been Saudi citizens.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Does this sound obvious and familiar? Perhaps to regular readers of The Weekly Standard and The Daily Standard, which have reported frequently on the Saudi connection to terror in the Iraq war since the phenomenon first appeared. But the truth is finally seeping out elsewhere. On Friday, July 27, the Washington Post and the New York Times reported on the links between Saudi Arabia and the Wahhabi terror in Iraq, employing their usual cautious and polite language when dealing with the desert kingdom. The Post ran a Reuters rewrite of the Times reportage, casting the problem in terms of Saudi distrust for the Shia-led Iraqi administration of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the resulting difficulties facing Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates as they visit the Saudis this week. Seven paragraphs down, the story quoted the Times about the real issue: the Saudis had offered financial support to Sunni groups in Iraq and U.S. officials were increasingly concerned about its close Arab ally&rsquo;s &lsquo;counterproductive&rsquo; role in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Counterproductive is a euphemism for Saudi state subsidies to Wahhabi clerics who demand the genocide of Shia Muslims, urge young men to go north and sacrifice themselves to that end, and preach eulogies after their deaths. It is also a diplomatic way to describe the official Saudi policy of ignoring financial contributions by rich Saudi citizens to support Wahhabi terror in Iraq. Others might call such behavior acts of war rather than merely counterproductive.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Times itself, in an article by Helene Cooper, further noted, Of an estimated 60 to 80 foreign fighters who enter Iraq each month, American military and intelligence officials say that nearly half are coming from Saudi Arabia and that the Saudis have not done enough to stem the flow. Administration officials, the paper reported spoke on the condition of anonymity because they believed that openly criticizing Saudi Arabia would further alienate the Saudi royal family. Then came the bald truth: the majority of suicide bombers in Iraq are from Saudi Arabia [and] about 40 percent of all foreign fighters are Saudi. Officials said that while most of the foreign fighters came to Iraq to become suicide bombers, others arrived as bomb makers, snipers, logisticians and financiers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal has revealed information about the Al Rajhi Bank, one of the kingdom&rsquo;s main financiers of Wahhabism, most of which has been available in print for several years. The fresh disclosures include the role of the Al Rajhi Bank in facilitating Saudi extremist operations. But the Journal admits that the Al Rajhi name appeared on a document many Westerners were loath to take seriously, the Golden Chain roster of al Qaeda donors seized by Bosnian authorities in Sarajevo, and handed over to the U.S. government in 2002.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Yet even the Journal seems not to have noticed that the Al Rajhi financial system&rsquo;s Suleiman Abdul Al-Aziz Al Rajhi also created the SAAR Foundation, an object of the federal raid known as GreenQuest, which struck a nest of Islamist entities in Northern Virginia in 2002.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 1er ao\u00fbt 2007 \u00e0 05H34<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Signe des temps et signe de l&rsquo;actuelle situation politique tr\u00e8s ambigu\u00eb entre les USA et l&rsquo;Arabie Saoudite : le Weekly Standard reprend ses attaques contre l&rsquo;Arabie. C&rsquo;est le cas dans le num\u00e9ro du 30 juillet, avec un article de l&rsquo;auteur Stephen Schwartz, sp\u00e9cialiste des analyses critiques de l&rsquo;Arabie. Schwartz nous indique d&rsquo;ailleurs indirectement cette renaissance&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3259,1104,6908,4342],"class_list":["post-69073","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-arabie","tag-neocons","tag-schwartz","tag-terroriste"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69073","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69073"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69073\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69073"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69073"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69073"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}