Comme chacun sait, l’Orient est tr\u00e8s compliqu\u00e9 et, dans la r\u00e9gion du Moyen-Orient, le Liban pr\u00e9sente un cas encore plus compliqu\u00e9. Par cons\u00e9quent et plut\u00f4t que de s’attacher \u00e0 l’appr\u00e9ciation de la crise libanaise dans le vain espoir de bien la comprendre, il faut noter un fait nouveau qui est per\u00e7u par contraste d’une fa\u00e7on beaucoup plus claire. Il s’agit de l’implication fran\u00e7aise dans la crise libanaise depuis le d\u00e9but de la pr\u00e9sidence Sarkozy. Sans pr\u00e9juger des r\u00e9sultats que cette implication pourrait amener, il est surtout int\u00e9ressant d’en appr\u00e9cier les effets sur la perception qu’en ont les principaux acteurs. De ce point de vue, il faut signaler le texte d’un analyste syrien, Sami Moubayed, mis en ligne aujourd’hui<\/a> sur Atimes.com<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat de ce commentaire est de pr\u00e9senter une position fran\u00e7aise beaucoup plus \u00e9quilibr\u00e9e que celle de la pr\u00e9sidence Chirac depuis l’assassinat de Hariri. La surprise est de voir que Sarkozy, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 avant son \u00e9lection comme plus proche d’Isra\u00ebl que Chirac, est per\u00e7u dans ce cas dans une position \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s contraire, et, finalement, bien plus proche de la fameuse politique arabe du gaullisme que celle de Chirac. Sarkozy et son ministre Kouchner sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme moins proches d’Isra\u00ebl (et des USA) par le seul fait d’avoir adopt\u00e9 une attitude prenant en compte tous les acteurs de la crise libanaise, particuli\u00e8rement ceux qu’Isra\u00ebl et les USA refusent eux-m\u00eames de prendre en compte. C’est un autre domaine de la politique ext\u00e9rieure o\u00f9 Sarkozy appara\u00eet comme tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rent des appr\u00e9ciations prospectives qui avaient faites \u00e0 son \u00e9gard avant les \u00e9lections.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVoici quelques passages du commentaire de Moubayed, o\u00f9 l’\u00e9ventualit\u00e9 d’une visite de Sarkozy en Syrie est m\u00eame signal\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAmid all this tension came the mediating efforts of France, which last week sent Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to Beirut to meet with senior players in Lebanon. The French have always been interested in Lebanon, a former colony to which they attach tremendous political and cultural importance.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbRelations had been personalized under former president Jacques Chirac, who rallied the French behind the Hariri family because of his personal friendship with Rafik Hariri. Chirac was unable to deal with Lebanon (at least not since 2005) as an honest or impartial broker. That resulted in his strained relationship with Syria, since he believed, like March 14, that Syria was responsible for the murder of Hariri.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThat changed when Nicolas Sarkozy came to power in May. In his mediating efforts, the new French leader reached out to Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, realizing that any deal in Lebanon could not be implemented let alone made without compliance of these principal players with whom Chirac had simply refused to deal, as the US still does.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt did not really matter if Sarkozy agreed with Syria, or even liked Damascus; what mattered was that he needed Syria to help solve the problems in Lebanon. This new French approach, along with the possibility of Sarkozy going to Damascus, has been greatly welcomed by Syria. That is why it encouraged its allies in Lebanon to take part in the French-sponsored talks.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbKouchner’s visit to Lebanon, however, was not entirely satisfactory, despite Syrian and Iranian efforts to make it succeed. Sarkozy was bringing both countries back into the limelight, recognizing their say in Lebanon at a time when the US has been trying all possible ways to undermine their regional influence. The fact that they are being consulted, and involved, is very important.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWill the US be able to solve the issues in Lebanon without turning to Iran, Syria and Hezbollah? The Americans refuse to recognize reality. The French – more experienced in the Middle East – know better. They realize that results are not achieved overnight in the Arab world and it takes patience, wisdom and concessions to get things done with the Arabs.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbPerhaps Round 1 of Kouchner’s talks in Beirut did not go as planned. Other rounds are needed. As long as he can bring all parties together, and use France’s considerable weight to get March 14 to work with Hezbollah, then progress is possible in Lebanon.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 2 ao\u00fbt 2007 \u00e0 07H03<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Comme chacun sait, l’Orient est tr\u00e8s compliqu\u00e9 et, dans la r\u00e9gion du Moyen-Orient, le Liban pr\u00e9sente un cas encore plus compliqu\u00e9. Par cons\u00e9quent et plut\u00f4t que de s’attacher \u00e0 l’appr\u00e9ciation de la crise libanaise dans le vain espoir de bien la comprendre, il faut noter un fait nouveau qui est per\u00e7u par contraste d’une fa\u00e7on… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6911,779,6695,5611,4607,4590],"class_list":["post-69079","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-arabe","tag-chirac","tag-kouchner","tag-liban","tag-politique","tag-sarkozy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69079","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69079"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69079\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69079"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69079"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69079"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}