new special relationship<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’analyse de Freedland est d’autant plus \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer qu’il n’y a pas eu, par contraste, les habituels textes des sp\u00e9cialistes du dithyrambe des relations USA-UK. De leur c\u00f4t\u00e9, on per\u00e7oit une r\u00e9serve significative. La rencontre Brown-GW, sans marquer rien de d\u00e9cisif, a confirm\u00e9 un malaise anglo-am\u00e9ricain, avec la perspective d’une nouvelle relation en train de s’\u00e9tablir. Freedland, qui est adversaire de l’alignement inconditionnel britannique type-Blair, explore les \u00e9l\u00e9ments qui vont dans le sens de son analyse.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abTo the naked eye it may have seemed as if these superficial matters of body language and costume were all that had changed. But a close reading of Brown’s words at Camp David, and indeed the content of his entire trip to the US, including his appearance at the United Nations yesterday, suggest otherwise. They indicate a shift not only in the so-called special relationship, but a deeper, strategic rethink in what Brown pointedly does not call the war on terror.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThat much was visible in the wide cracks of daylight the prime minister opened up between himself and the president. Yes, there were multiple avowals of shared purpose and common values. But while the president said the west confronted "an ideology of darkness", Brown declared that terrorism is not a cause; it is a crime. That immediately denies the terrorist the dignity of an enemy and casts him instead as a mere criminal, to be hunted down chiefly by policework and intelligence. Noticeable too was Brown’s desire to be specific: the conflict was not with terror an abstract noun but al-Qaida-inspired terrorism.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe differences were even clearer on Iraq. Bush still speaks with righteous zeal for the mission, but Brown offered only the flat statement that Britain had duties to discharge and responsibilities to keep. It was left to Bush to say that Gordon Brown understands that failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the security of our countries, but the prime minister said nothing to confirm that statement of his views. Bush still refers to Iraq as the central front in the war on terror, but Brown named Afghanistan as the frontline.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAbove all, Brown put the US on notice for an eventual withdrawal of British troops from Iraq, dependent on the word of military commanders on the ground. Since that is the same formulation Bush himself uses, he could hardly object.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt’s not quite Hugh Grant sticking it to Billy Bob Thornton in Love Actually, but this is about as far as a British prime minister could reasonably be expected to go in putting an American president at arms length. No, he didn’t call Bush a deranged Texan gunslinger but nor did he return a single one of Bush’s copious personal compliments. While the president tried to warm the air with talk of the humorous Scotsman, Brown said their talks had been full and frank icy diplomatese for a row. If breaking the clammy hug Blair and Bush shared was the goal, it certainly worked. A headline in yesterday’s Washington Post declared of Brown: More bulldog than poodle.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 2 ao\u00fbt 2007 \u00e0 07H22<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Le commentateur du Guardian Jonathan Freedland est affirmatif : il s’est vraiment pass\u00e9 quelque chose de nouveau dans les relations sp\u00e9ciales USA-UK avec la rencontre GW-Brown. Freedland, dans son commentaire du 1er ao\u00fbt, rappelle les diff\u00e9rences de comportement, la plus grande froideur, les diff\u00e9rence psychologiques plus marqu\u00e9es (que du temps de GW-Blair). Mais il ne… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4038,1382,3198,3345,3344],"class_list":["post-69080","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-brown","tag-freedland","tag-gw","tag-relationships","tag-special"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69080","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69080"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69080\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69080"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69080"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69080"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}