{"id":69093,"date":"2007-08-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-08-06T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/06\/la-navy-a-la-barre\/"},"modified":"2007-08-06T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-08-06T00:00:00","slug":"la-navy-a-la-barre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/06\/la-navy-a-la-barre\/","title":{"rendered":"La <em>Navy<\/em> \u00e0 la barre"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955;font-size:1.65em;font-variant:small-caps;\">La <em>Navy<\/em> \u00e0 la barre<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il fait de moins en moins de doute qu&rsquo;il existe aux USA une tendance presque \u00ab\u00a0autonome\u00a0\u00bb au sein des forces arm\u00e9es, particuli\u00e8rement dans le chef de l&rsquo;U.S. Navy et sans aucun doute en accord avec le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates et avec son soutien tr\u00e8s actif. Cette \u00ab\u00a0tendance\u00a0\u00bb va \u00e9videmment dans le sens de contrecarrer la politique expansionniste et aventuriste de l&rsquo;administration GW.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>On a eu un signe de plus de cette situation avec le t\u00e9moignage du nouveau pr\u00e9sident du Comit\u00e9 des chefs d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major, l&rsquo;amiral Mike Mullens. Joe Galloway, de McClatchy Newspapers, donne le <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.mcclatchydc.com\/galloway\/story\/18631.html\">1er ao&ucirc;t<\/a> un commentaire de cette audition qui va effectivement dans ce sens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo;<em>Still, the greatest shock was Adm. Mullens&rsquo; testimony, in which he said that the escalation of American troop strength in Iraq to 160,000 had improved things somewhat: \u00ab\u00a0Security is better. Not great, but better.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Then, responding to a question, the admiral acknowledged that the Iraqi government has made little, if any, progress in reaching the political compromises that are crucial to the future of that country. He added that without a political settlement between the Shiite Muslim majority and the Sunni minority there can be no victory in Iraq, regardless of how many American troops are sent there or how many years they remain.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>The admiral went even further in his statement to the senators, saying that the surge is temporary and can&rsquo;t be sustained past April of 2008, and in any case he wouldn&rsquo;t sustain it by extending the troops&rsquo; already extended combat tours beyond the present 15 months.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>What a remarkable breath of fresh air to hear the man tapped to be the nation&rsquo;s highest ranking military officer speak frankly and honestly about the security situation in Iraq and the faltering government in Baghdad. The outgoing chairman, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, and his predecessor, Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, failed miserably when it came to saying anything other than \u00ab\u00a0Sir, yes, Sir!\u00a0\u00bb to their civilian bosses.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>(&hellip;)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Can it be that the Bush administration has run out of military toadies who&rsquo;re willing to sit silently, in resplendent feathers, on civilian shoulders nodding wisely and squawking on cue as one misbegotten plan after another melts down in Iraq&rsquo;s broiling deserts? Or has the arrival of Robert Gates as secretary of defense, in place of the unlamented Donald H. Rumsfeld, liberated the generals and admirals to say what they think rather than what they think the boss wants to hear?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Either way, the American people are much better off, and we can only hope that speaking the truth is infectious and soon will become epidemic, to the further shock and awe of the president and his remaining men.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>What Adm. Mullens said was what other military commanders have said before &mdash; and what the president has stubbornly refused to hear &mdash; that nothing we do militarily can win this war. Victory can be achieved only by the Iraqis themselves, and so far none of them is willing to negotiate or even speak to each other in good faith.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Until they&rsquo;re willing to relinquish ancient blood feuds in the name of national unity, there&rsquo;s not one thing that 160,000 American troops, or 320,000 American troops, can do except stand between the warring parties and remain targets for all of them.<\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il semble de plus en plus \u00e9vident que Gates a mis en place un r\u00e9seau de commandement d&rsquo;hommes s&ucirc;rs, particuli\u00e8rement des amiraux, qui contribuent, peut-\u00eatre d\u00e9cisivement, \u00e0 contenir toute possibilit\u00e9 de prolongement grave de la situation militaire comme une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran. Il est tr\u00e8s probable que ces mesures ont \u00e9t\u00e9 prises sans que les dirigeants civils, notamment Cheney, se soient aper\u00e7us de la man&oelig;uvre qui avait lieu, au moment o&ugrave; elle a eu lieu, durant les neuf derniers mois. Rumsfeld vivait au Pentagone tr\u00e8s isol\u00e9, notamment par rapport aux chefs militaires, et Cheney l&rsquo;\u00e9tait et l&rsquo;est encore plus vis-\u00e0-vis de ces m\u00eames chefs. Ainsi, la faction radicale de l&rsquo;administration ignorait pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment et ignore encore, dans certains cas, ce que pensent les officiers g\u00e9n\u00e9raux, &mdash; et, par cons\u00e9quent, ceux qui sont mis en place par Gates.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Le cas de l&rsquo;amiral Fallon a \u00e9t\u00e9 exemplaire. Il a d&rsquo;abord \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme l&rsquo;<a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3551\">\u00ab\u00a0instrument\u00a0\u00bb id\u00e9al<\/a> pour une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran, selon les v&oelig;ux de l&rsquo;administration, de Cheney-GW. Il est rapidement apparu que Fallon \u00e9tait exactement <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3989\">l&rsquo;inverse<\/a>, au point o&ugrave; certaines sources avancent que Cheey aurait d\u00e9j\u00e0 sugg\u00e9r\u00e9 la possibilit\u00e9 de son d\u00e9part, &mdash; suggestion radicalement refus\u00e9e, voire ridiculis\u00e9e par Gates, soutenu par Rice et, pour cette fois, par GW. Il est aujourd&rsquo;hui acquis que c&rsquo;est Fallon qui a man&oelig;uvr\u00e9 pour <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4286\">r\u00e9duire<\/a> radicalement la pr\u00e9sence navale US dans le Golfe, alors qu&rsquo;il y a trois semaines <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4231\">encore<\/a>, certains avan\u00e7aient le contraire. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, les amiraux tiennent nombre des leviers de commande, avec le soutien de Gates, et ils ne les l\u00e2cheront pas de sit\u00f4t.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 6 ao&ucirc;t 2007 \u00e0 14H22<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La Navy \u00e0 la barre Il fait de moins en moins de doute qu&rsquo;il existe aux USA une tendance presque \u00ab\u00a0autonome\u00a0\u00bb au sein des forces arm\u00e9es, particuli\u00e8rement dans le chef de l&rsquo;U.S. Navy et sans aucun doute en accord avec le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates et avec son soutien tr\u00e8s actif. Cette \u00ab\u00a0tendance\u00a0\u00bb&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6296,3984,2773,6920,3319],"class_list":["post-69093","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-fallon","tag-gates","tag-iran","tag-mullens","tag-navy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69093","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69093"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69093\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69093"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69093"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69093"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}