On sait que le GAO a d\u00e9termin\u00e9 que 62% des armes transf\u00e9r\u00e9es par les USA vers les forces de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 irakiennes (dont 190.000 AK-47) ne sont plus retrouv\u00e9es dans la comptabilit\u00e9 bureaucratique et sont probablement r\u00e9parties vers d’autres horizons, dont sans doute des milices insurg\u00e9es, des groupes de r\u00e9sistance irakiens, etc. (Voir notamment l’article de Jane’s<\/em> du 9 ao\u00fbt<\/a>.) Mais cette affaire pourrait \u00eatre assez classiquement, et malgr\u00e9 son \u00e9normit\u00e9, une des parties imerg\u00e9s d’un iceberg consid\u00e9rable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tC’est ce que sugg\u00e8re David Isenberg, analyste bien inform\u00e9 des questions de transferts d’armement de l’organisation BASIC, dans un article qu’il met en ligne sur Atimes.com<\/em> le 17 ao\u00fbt<\/a>. Apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9tudi\u00e9 les conditions d\u00e9crites par le GAO pour la disparition de ces armes destin\u00e9es aux Irakiens, il poursuit:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abIn fact, the problem could be considerably worse than the GAO report indicates.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAccording to Amnesty International research, additional hundreds of thousands of US-approved arms transfers from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Iraq could also be missing. In a May 2006 report, Amnesty revealed that Taos Inc, a US company with multiple DOD contracts, subcontracted to a Moldovan\/Ukrainian company called Aerocom to transport hundreds of thousands of arms, more than 90 tonnes of AK-47s, and other weapons from Bosnia to Iraq between July 31, 2004, and June 31, 2005, for Iraqi security forces.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbUS military air-traffic controllers in Iraq, however, said Aerocom never requested landing slots to touch down in the country. Aerocom smuggled weapons to Liberia in 2002 and was operating without a valid license in 2004, according to the United Nations Security Council.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAs of August, Amnesty was still awaiting a reply from the Pentagon regarding its investigation into the Bosnia-to-Iraq weapons shipments.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAnd, in a move that can only be likened to the fox guarding the hen-house, it turns out, as the Los Angeles Times reported on August 13, that there may have been another factor at work, namely the US government’s use of Viktor Bout a Russian air transporter who also happens to be the world’s most notorious arms dealer.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhen the US government needed to fly four planeloads of seized weapons from Bosnia to Iraqi security forces in Baghdad in August 2004, it used Aerocom. But Aerocom is tied to Bout’s aviation empire. The problem is that the planes apparently never arrived. US officials admitted they had no record of the flights landing in Baghdad.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhy the US government would have used Bout-controlled Aerocom which had already been linked to supplying arms to Liberia when it was ruled by Charles Taylor and to drug traffickers in Belize is a mystery in and of itself, considering that by 2004 Bout was very well known to the US government as a global gun-runner whom they wanted to put out of business.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe latest development occurred this week when it was reported that that Italian anti-Mafia investigators had uncovered an alleged shipment of 105,000 rifles of which the US military command in Iraq was unaware. The Italian team, in an investigation code-named Operation Parabellum, stopped the $40 million sale and made four arrests. The consignment appears to have been ordered by the Iraqi Interior Ministry. The US high command in Baghdad admitted it had no knowledge of any such order, even though the ministry is supposed to inform the US before purchasing arms.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAn Iraqi Interior Ministry official insisted the weapons were mostly for Iraqi police in al-Anbar province. But given the close relationship between the Shi’ite-led government and Shi’ite militias and the irregular nature of the arms order, the disclosure prompted suspicion that the eventual destination could have been the militias, or police units close to them.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl semble qu’on puisse proposer des r\u00e9ponses aux interrogations d’Isenberg. On parle de ses supputations sur les raisons pour lesquelles les Am\u00e9ricains, notamment sous le contr\u00f4le des services de renseignement qui supervisent ces transferts d’armes prises sur place dans des territoires instables comme la Bosnie, passent des contrats avec des personnages et des organisations douteuses comme Bout et Aerocom. On peut avancer que de telles transactions sont le r\u00e9sultat de la privatisation intense des services de renseignement telle que la journaliste Hillhouse<\/a> l’a mise en \u00e9vidence. Plus aucun contr\u00f4le efficace de la part de la bureaucratie du gouvernement n’est exerc\u00e9 sur ces op\u00e9rations parall\u00e8les, impliquant la manipulation d’armes d’occasion, d’armes saisies, d’armes manipul\u00e9es par divers trafiquants. Le secteur priv\u00e9 US est impliqu\u00e9 d’une fa\u00e7on massive dans toutes ces op\u00e9rations et oriente les services de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale US qu’il a fortement p\u00e9n\u00e9tr\u00e9s dans le sens de ses int\u00e9r\u00eats. Le r\u00e9sultat est l’entretien constant des capacit\u00e9s de combat des divers th\u00e9\u00e2tres d’op\u00e9ration anti-am\u00e9ricanistes dans le monde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 16 ao\u00fbt 2007 \u00e0 15H58<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On sait que le GAO a d\u00e9termin\u00e9 que 62% des armes transf\u00e9r\u00e9es par les USA vers les forces de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 irakiennes (dont 190.000 AK-47) ne sont plus retrouv\u00e9es dans la comptabilit\u00e9 bureaucratique et sont probablement r\u00e9parties vers d’autres horizons, dont sans doute des milices insurg\u00e9es, des groupes de r\u00e9sistance irakiens, etc. (Voir notamment l’article de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3992,4248,6760,6688,6950],"class_list":["post-69123","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-armes","tag-gao","tag-hillhouse","tag-prive","tag-trafiquants"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69123","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69123"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69123\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69123"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69123"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69123"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}