{"id":69129,"date":"2007-08-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-08-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/19\/effectivement-voici-le-temps-des-pudding-eating-surrender-monkeys\/"},"modified":"2007-08-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-08-19T00:00:00","slug":"effectivement-voici-le-temps-des-pudding-eating-surrender-monkeys","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/19\/effectivement-voici-le-temps-des-pudding-eating-surrender-monkeys\/","title":{"rendered":"Effectivement, voici \u00able temps des \u201cPudding-eating surrender monkeys\u201d<\/em>\u00bb"},"content":{"rendered":"

La situation se d\u00e9t\u00e9riore \u00e0 grande vitesse dans la ville de Basra, dans le sud de l’Irak, qui n’est m\u00eame plus officiellement consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme tenue par les Britanniques. Il s’agit d\u00e9sormais d’un retrait qui est d\u00e9j\u00e0 une retraite et qui est presque une d\u00e9route. Les Am\u00e9ricains commencent \u00e0 s’en aviser s\u00e9rieusement et nous voil\u00e0 d\u00e9j\u00e0, encore plus vite que pr\u00e9vu<\/a>, pas loin du \u00abtemps des Pudding-eating surrender monkeys<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAu moins deux articles dans la presse londonienne montrent la pr\u00e9occupation des Am\u00e9ricains devant la situation des Britanniques en Irak, alors que le retrait de ces m\u00eames Britanniques devrait commencer juste apr\u00e8s le show<\/em> Petraeus \u00e0 Washington en septembre<\/a> (rapport, auditions au Congr\u00e8s, etc.). Le premier, dans le Sunday Times<\/em> de ce jour<\/a> rapporte les pr\u00e9occupations US pour une possible d\u00e9route britannique durant le retrait :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abA military adviser to President George W Bush has warned that British forces will have to fight their way out of Iraq in an ugly and embarrassing retreat.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbStephen Biddle, who also advises the US commander in Iraq, said Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias in the south would try to create the impression they were forcing a retreat. They want to make it clear they have forced the British out. That means they’ll use car bombs, ambushes, RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] . . . and there will be a number of British casualties.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe second, du Sunday Telegraph<\/em> \u00e9galement d’aujourd’hui<\/a>, est encore plus pr\u00e9cis. Il d\u00e9crit en d\u00e9tail le sentiment des chefs militaires US en Irak, prenant argument de la situation \u00e0 Basra pour critiquer les Britanniques, autant leur actuel comportement que leur intention de quitter l’Irak. D\u00e9sormais, le narrative<\/em> est clair: non seulement les Britanniques s’en vont (dito<\/em> ils abandonnent leur grand alli\u00e9 US) mais, en plus, ils laissent une situation \u00e9pouvantable qui requ\u00e9rra l’intervention US (dans le Sud de l’Irak). Nous ne sommes plus tr\u00e8s loin de la trahison.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWhen America’s top commanders in Iraq held a conference with their British counterparts recently, Major General Jonathan Shaw Britain’s senior officer in Basra was quick to share his views on how best to conduct counter-insurgency operations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFor much of the last four years, the Americans in the room would have listened carefully, used to deferring to their British colleagues’ long experience in Northern Ireland. This time, however, eyes that would once have been attentive simply rolled.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFew were in the mood for a lecture about British superiority, when they fear that Downing Street’s planned pull-out from Basra will squander any progress from their own hard-fought troop surge strategy elsewhere.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIt’s insufferable for Christ’s sake, said one senior figure closely involved in US military planning. He comes on and he lectures everybody in the room about how to do a counter-insurgency. The guys were just rolling their eyeballs. The notorious Northern Ireland came up again. It’s pretty frustrating. It would be okay if he was best in class, but now he’s worst in class. Everybody else’s area is getting better and his is getting worse.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe meeting, called by General David Petraeus, the senior US officer who has the task of managing the surge, is emblematic of what is fast becoming a minor crisis in Anglo-American military relations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn Britain, Gordon Brown’s government has tried to depict a quiet process of handover to Iraqi troops in Basra, which will see the remaining forces in the city withdraw to the airport in November.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWhat US generals see, however, is a close ally preparing to cut and run, leaving behind a city in the grip of a power struggle between Shia militias that could determine the fate of the Iraqi government and the country as a whole. With signs of the surge yielding tentative progress in Baghdad, but at the cost of many American lives, there could scarcely be a worse time for a parting of the ways. Yet the US military has no doubt, despite what Gordon Brown claims, that the pullout is being driven by the political situation at home in the UK.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab[A]minor crisis in Anglo-American military relations.<\/em>\u00bb, \u00e9crit le journaliste Tim Shipman? On comprend cela. Le Telegraph<\/em>, qui est pro-US notamment par la gr\u00e2ce de son orientation (proche des n\u00e9o-conservateurs), se doit de prendre des gants. Il n’emp\u00eache qu’on est bien sceptique devant le minor<\/em> car, au contraire, la crise \u00e0 ce niveau du retrait britannique d’Irak pourrait devenir consid\u00e9rable entre les deux pays, US et UK.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn comprend en effet \u00e9galement, et l’article le laisse entendre, comment le narrative<\/em> (le sc\u00e9nario, la fable, etc.) va se poursuivre. A Washington, GW va exploiter \u00e0 fond le retrait britannique, en le noircissant \u00e9galement \u00e0 fond, du point de vue politique et du point de vue militaire, pour deux raisons qui sont autant d’arguments pour sa politique:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La situation catastrophique que laissent les Britanniques n\u00e9cessite l’intervention US et un engagement US encore plus grand.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le d\u00e9part britannique et la catastrophe qui s’installe \u00e0 Basra, hors de tout contr\u00f4le, montrent que la pire des strat\u00e9gies est de quitter l’Irak. Ce qui vaut pour les Britanniques vaut encore plus pour les USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPar cons\u00e9quent, les Britanniques n’ont aucun cadeau \u00e0 attendre. Ils seront humili\u00e9s sur le terrain et essuieront des pertes. Ils seront critiqu\u00e9s, moqu\u00e9s, accabl\u00e9s \u00e0 Washington, et de tous les c\u00f4t\u00e9s, des r\u00e9publicains aux d\u00e9mocrates parce qu’on ne plaisante pas avec le sang des boys<\/em> abandonn\u00e9s en Irak par leurs alli\u00e9s. Brown peut attendre avec patience de meilleures relations avec Washington, avec le prochain pr\u00e9sident, il pourrait attendre longtemps. Nous sommes bien au \u00abtemps des Pudding-eating surrender monkeys<\/em>\u00bb. Les Fran\u00e7ais vont pouvoir conseiller leurs amis britanniques sur la fa\u00e7on de subir avec le plus de sto\u00efcisme possible l’outrage de la vindicte am\u00e9ricaniste ; mais non, d’ailleurs, les Britanniques connaissent, \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s aussi bien qu’ils connaissent les techniques de la guerre anti-gu\u00e9rilla.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPar contre, ils semblent ne toujours pas avoir compris ce qu’est vraiment la guerre transatlantique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 19 ao\u00fbt 2007 \u00e0 06H44<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La situation se d\u00e9t\u00e9riore \u00e0 grande vitesse dans la ville de Basra, dans le sud de l’Irak, qui n’est m\u00eame plus officiellement consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme tenue par les Britanniques. Il s’agit d\u00e9sormais d’un retrait qui est d\u00e9j\u00e0 une retraite et qui est presque une d\u00e9route. Les Am\u00e9ricains commencent \u00e0 s’en aviser s\u00e9rieusement et nous voil\u00e0 d\u00e9j\u00e0,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5394,3703,4038,4147,857,2766,4983],"class_list":["post-69129","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-basra","tag-britanniques","tag-brown","tag-deroute","tag-irak","tag-relations","tag-speciales"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69129","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69129"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69129\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69129"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69129"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69129"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}