{"id":69130,"date":"2007-08-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-08-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/19\/la-question-des-pertes-britanniques-en-afghanistan\/"},"modified":"2007-08-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-08-19T00:00:00","slug":"la-question-des-pertes-britanniques-en-afghanistan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/19\/la-question-des-pertes-britanniques-en-afghanistan\/","title":{"rendered":"La question des pertes britanniques en Afghanistan"},"content":{"rendered":"

Notre \u00e9poque est compl\u00e8tement infect\u00e9e par la communication et ses diverses coutumes, ses manipulations, le virtualisme qu’elle nourrit, le cloisonnement<\/a> des crises, etc., au point que toutes les perceptions des \u00e9v\u00e9nements en cours semblent possibles. La question des pertes essuy\u00e9es dans les conflits en cours est un des grands myst\u00e8res engendr\u00e9s par ces pratiques. La guerre en Afghanistan est certainement la plus affect\u00e9e \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. On a l’impression d’une guerre sans pertes, surtout du c\u00f4t\u00e9 alli\u00e9, alors qu’on ne cesse d’en d\u00e9crire des conditions d’une f\u00e9rocit\u00e9 incroyable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’Observer<\/em> d’aujourd’hui ne r\u00e9pond certes pas \u00e0 cette question ouverte mais il fournit des \u00e9l\u00e9ments qui permettent que se forme une impression sur la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la chose. D’abord, un premier article<\/a> de Mark Townsend aborde la question des bless\u00e9s britanniques, avec des pr\u00e9cisions chiffr\u00e9es : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe human cost of the war in Afghanistan to British soldiers can be revealed today as figures show that almost half of frontline troops have required significant medical treatment during this summer’s fighting.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn a graphic illustration of the intensity of the conflict in Helmand province, more than 700 battlefield soldiers have needed treatment since April nearly half of the 1,500 on the front line. The figures, obtained from senior military sources, have never been released by the government, which has faced criticism that it has covered up the true extent of injuries sustained during the conflict.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEnsuite, le m\u00eame Mark Townsend publie un second, tr\u00e8s long article<\/a>, r\u00e9sultat d’un reportage de trois semaines avec les troupes britanniques en op\u00e9rations. L’impression laiss\u00e9e par le reportage est mitig\u00e9e: \u00e0 la fois l’impression de pertes \u00e9lev\u00e9es et l’affirmation que les pertes (en tu\u00e9s) sont moindres que l’on ne croit L’impression que le d\u00e9sordre de la guerre et la fa\u00e7on dont nous la percevons et en rendons compte influent m\u00eame sur les t\u00e9moignages de premi\u00e8re main, voire sur l’exp\u00e9rience de la guerre elle-m\u00eame.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIn the modest number of Britain’s frontline troops 1,500 every man knows someone who has been killed. The chance of surviving the current tour of six months stands at one in 36. Casualty rates are higher than during the Second World War. In Afghanistan soldiers toil under constant pressure, each casualty undermining the overall ability to defend themselves. Not one soldier or officer disputed that more men were urgently required. Thousands more.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThat morning the insurgents, firing from 11 different positions, managed to surround the Royal Anglians. Shortly after dawn, the ant-filled trench felt like a grave for the ambitions of the British army in Helmand. The irrepressible nature of the enemy sows both admiration and disbelief among the British.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbMuch has been made of the casualty rate among frontline troops. The astonishing thing is actually just how few men have been killed. One of the many forgotten stories in a misunderstood conflict is how frequently ordinary troops are being pushed beyond the limits of orthodox soldiering. Infantrymen regularly perform SAS-style missions, operations that would have been considered unthinkable before Helmand.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 19 ao\u00fbt 2007 \u00e0 11H43<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Notre \u00e9poque est compl\u00e8tement infect\u00e9e par la communication et ses diverses coutumes, ses manipulations, le virtualisme qu’elle nourrit, le cloisonnement des crises, etc., au point que toutes les perceptions des \u00e9v\u00e9nements en cours semblent possibles. La question des pertes essuy\u00e9es dans les conflits en cours est un des grands myst\u00e8res engendr\u00e9s par ces pratiques. La… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,4875,4394,2758,610],"class_list":["post-69130","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-britannique","tag-pertes","tag-uk","tag-virtualisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69130","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69130"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69130\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69130"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69130"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69130"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}